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Abstract
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays which address three different issues 
with respect to the roles of democratic and non-democratic institutions in the economy.
The first essay titled, ‘Democratisation, systems of government and public spending’ 
investigates whether changes from non-democratic government systems to democracy 
bring about a significant effect on the size of general government consumption and 
public gross fixed capital formation relative to a country’s economy. Based on 
unbalanced panel data for 177 countries over the period 1960-2008, the results provide 
evidence that the effect of democratisation on the size of general government 
consumption is not robustly significant and depends on the specifics of government 
systems that prevail before and after a political change. Further, the results provide 
evidence that only democratisation that originates from a military dictatorship and ends 
up with a parliamentary democracy has a robust and significant effect on general 
government consumption size. With respect to the size of public gross fixed capital 
formation, the results provide evidence that the effects of democratisation and systems 
of government are weak and not statistically significant.
The second essay titled ‘Electoral budget cycles under non-democratic regimes’ 
investigates the relationship between elections and central government budget balance 
in countries that are considered to be non-democratic. Using a sample consisting of 
unbalanced panel data from 29 countries between 1960 and 2006, the essay provides 
evidence that electoral budget cycles do exist under non-democratic regimes. The 
relationship between elections and central government budget balance is significant and 
robust to a number of variations in control variables, estimation models, sample 
selection criteria and designations of election-year dummy. The essay also provides 
evidence that the persistence of the relationship is driven by countries that are less 
distant from democracy (that is, shallow autocracies).
The third essay titled ‘Food prices and political survival’ investigates the relationship 
between food prices and the occurrence of national leader exits, particularly in food-net- 
importing countries. Using international food price and domestic consumption data to 
construct a country-specific food price index for 77 economies between 1961 and 2009, 
the essay provides evidence that food prices have a robust significant effect on political 
survival. The effect does not change with changes in the log of real GDP per capita, real 
GDP per capita growth rate and the state of democracy. However, once the joint-effect 
between food prices and the state of democracy is controlled, the effect of food prices 
on political survival is significant only under democracy and not under non-democracy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background
Political economy as a sub-discipline of economics uses insights from economics and 
politics to analyse the interaction between political institutions, economic policies and 
economic outcomes.1 The recent political economy literature draws on the traditions of 
its historical predecessors which include the Classical political economy, public choice 
school and Downsian model (Besley 2007) and has analysed various topics, ranging 
from the effects of constitutions (see, for example, Persson & Tabellini 2003, 2004; 
Blume et al. 2009; Voigt 1997, 2011) to the roles of colonial origins (Acemoglu, 
Johnson & Robinson 2001), cultures (Washington 2008; Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 
2009; Tabellini 2010) and foreign aid (Alesina & Dollar 2000; Kilby 2009; Rajan & 
Subramanian 2011) in economic development.
Despite major advance over the last two decades, there are a number of important issues 
that remain under-examined (see, for example, Persson & Tabellini 2000; Acemoglu 
2005; Besley 2007; Voigt 2011). This thesis addresses three substantive issues with 
respect to the roles of democratic and non-democratic institutions in the economy. The 
first issue is the relationship between democratisation, systems of government and the 
size of public spending relative to a country’s economy. The second issue is the 
existence of electoral budget cycles under non-democratic regimes. The third issue is 
the effect that food prices may have on political survival and how the state of 
democracy may influence such an effect.
1 Here, ‘political economy’ refers to the term as it is used by modern economists and not to the term as it 
is used by classical economists nor as it is used in other disciplines such as politics, sociology and 
anthropology. In a loose way, the term ‘political economy’ in this thesis heavily overlaps with the term 
‘political economics’ (see Alt & Crystal 1983; Persson & Tabellini 2000) or can be rebranded as ‘new 
political economy’ (see Besley 2007).
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1.2 Structure
The thesis is organised into five chapters, of which three are self-contained. In brief, the 
contents of Chapters 2-5 are as follows.
Chapter 2 examines the effects that democratisation and systems of government may 
have on the size public spending. Focusing on the within-country variation before and 
after a political reform, this chapter attempts to answer three questions: (1) Does 
democratisation have a significant effect on general government consumption and 
public gross fixed capital formation relative to a country’s overall economy? (2) Does 
the effect differ with different systems of government prevailing before and after 
democratisation? (3) If yes, what government systems lead to the significant effect of 
democratisation on the size of public spending?
Chapter 3, titled ‘Electoral budget cycles under non-democratic regimes’, argues that, 
even under non-democratic regimes, political budget cycles can exist. This chapter is a 
response to the prevailing view in the literature that electoral budget cycles make sense 
only in democratic countries. To test the argument, the chapter makes use of a new 
measure of electoral competition from the National Elections across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde & Marinov 2012), and estimates the effect that 
competitive elections may have on central government budget balance.
Chapter 4, titled ‘Food prices and political survival’, examines the relationship between 
food prices and the survival of national leaders, particularly in food importing countries. 
The chapter uses international food price and domestic consumption data to compose a 
monthly country-specific food price index and estimates whether the index is 
systematically related to the occurrence of national leader exits.
Finally, Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks. It summarises the results obtained in 
the thesis and highlights what they might mean in terms of future research.
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Chapter 2: Democratisation, Systems of Government
and Public Spending
2.1 Introduction
Following an unprecedented wave of democratisation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
economists and political scientists have attempted to identify the effects that 
democratisation has on the economy (see, for example, Przeworski & Limongi 1993; 
Rodrik & Wacziarg 2005; Papaioannou & Siourounis 2008). In similar fashion, scholars 
have attempted to identify the effects of certain democratic institutions such as 
government systems (Persson & Tabellini 2004; Blume et al. 2009; Andersen 2011), 
electoral rules (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno 2002; Persson, Roland & Tabellini 
2007) and party attributes (Cusack 1997; Ferreira & Gyourko 2009) on government 
spending and taxation policies.
Despite the seemingly parallel trend, crossover between these two research streams 
remains small. There is hitherto very limited evidence of how democratisation affects 
government spending and taxation policies. Three recent studies (Mulligan, Gil & Sala- 
i-Martin 2004; Hausken, Martin & Plumper 2004; Deacon 2009) examined public 
policies including government spending under democracy and non-democracy. 
However, the analyses relied mostly on cross-sectional variation and therefore only 
indirectly addressed the effects of political changes.
The present chapter focuses on the within-country relationship between 
democratisation, systems of government and public spending. More explicitly, it 
investigates whether changes from non-democratic government systems to democracy 
bring about a statistically significant effect on the sizes of general government 
consumption and public gross fixed capital formation relative to a country’s overall 
economy. It also investigates whether the effect that democratisation has on general 
government consumption and public gross fixed capital formation sizes differs with
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different government systems prevailing before and after a political change, and if yes, 
what system of government leads to the significant effect and what system does not.
The present chapter is close in spirit to the work by Persson and Tabellini (2006), 
particularly their regression reported in Table 2 column 2. However, the present chapter 
covers non-democratic government systems in addition to democratic systems and 
examines the importance of these systems of government in directing the effect of 
democratisation.
The results provide evidence that democratisation does not by itself bring about a robust 
significant effect on the size of general government consumption relative to a country’s 
overall economy. The co-efficients of the democracy dummy are mostly insignificant 
and subject to the inclusion of dummies specifying the systems of government that 
prevail before and after a political reform. The results further provide evidence that only 
democratisation that originates from a military dictatorship and ends up with a 
parliamentary democracy has a robust significant effect on general government 
consumption size. Democratisation that originates from a civil autocracy almost never 
has a significant effect on the size of general government consumption, regardless of the 
democratic system of government adopted. With respect to the size of public gross fixed 
capital formation, the results provide evidence that the effects of democratisation and 
systems of government tend to be much weaker and not statistcally significant.
Based on a sample consisting of unbalanced panel data from 177 countries between 
1960 and 2008, the primary finding in this chapter is that democratisation does not by 
itself bring about a robust significant effect on the size of general government 
consumption relative to a country’s overall economy. The importance of 
democratisation for general government consumption size is different with different 
government systems prevailing before and after a political reform. The other finding is 
that only democratisation that originates from a military dictatorship and ends up with a 
parliamentary democracy has a robust significant effect on the size of general 
government consumption. Democratisation that originates from a civil autocracy almost 
never has a significant effect on the size of general government consumption, regardless
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of the democratic systems of government adopted. With respect to the size of public 
gross fixed capital formation, the finding is that the effects of democratisation and 
systems of government are weak and not statistically significant.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of 
the relationship between democratisation, systems of government and the size of public 
spending, including a simple formal illustration of fiscal decisions under different 
democratic and non-democratic systems of government. Section 2.3 describes the 
empirical strategy and data used in the analysis. Section 2.4 discusses the results, while 
section 2.5 offers conclusions.
2.2 Theoretical Overview
There are at least two distinct lines of reasoning to explain the effect of democratisation 
on the size of public spending. The first is based on an assumption that democratic and 
non-democratic rulers have different sources of income. In McGuire and Olson (1996), 
non-democratic rulers earn income only from extracting budgetary surplus (that is, the 
remains of tax revenues that are not spent on public-good provision). Meanwhile, 
democratic rulers govern the economy in the interests of a majority that earns income 
from redistributing to itself as well as selling labour in the market. Therefore, in contrast 
to rulers in non-democratic countries, rulers in democratic economies face an incentive 
to maintain the market function by limiting tax-induced distortions and providing more 
public goods needed to support production. Thus, tax rate (and the size of government 
spending) will be smaller and public-good provision will be larger under democracy 
than non-democracy. In Niskanen (1997), democratic rulers govern the economy in the 
interests of median-income voters rather than the majority. However, the conclusion is 
the same. Democracy gives rise to a smaller rate of income tax (and a smaller size of 
government spending) and produces more public goods than non-democracy.
The second lines of reasoning to explain the effect of democratisation on the size of 
public spending is based on the standard political economic model of optimal income 
taxation (see, for example, Meitzer & Richard 1981). In Agell and Persson (2006), both
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democratic and non-democratic rulers levy income tax from labour activity in the 
market. In contrast to democratic rulers, who set the tax rate and the level of public- 
good provision in a way that maximise the median voters’ utility, non-democratic rulers 
exempt themselves from taxation and pocket budgetary surplus. Even so, as both 
democratic and non-democratic rulers face incentives to increase labour productivity in 
the market, it is in their best interests to follow the Samuelson (1954) condition for 
optimal level of public-good provision.
None of the above models provides an insight into how specific government systems 
prevailing before and after democratisation affect the size of public spending. 
Democracy and non-democracy are very broad concepts (see Persson & Tabellini 2006) 
and explaining the effect of democratisation based merely on the state of democracy 
might not be precise enough because the internal variations are large.
Democracy includes two pure systems of government: presidential and parliamentary. 
Regardless of disagreements over what precisely constitutes a democratic government 
system (Elgie 1998), the most salient feature that distinguishes a presidential from a 
parliamentary system is whether an executive head depends on the continued support of 
the parliament to survive (Strom 2000; Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland 2010). The 
president, which is the executive head in a presidential system, cannot be removed by 
members of the parliament during its constitutional term in office. By contrast, in a 
parliamentary democracy, the political fate of a prime minister is subject to retaining the 
confidence of a majority in the legislature.
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) demonstrate how this feature brings about 
different sizes and compositions of government spending. Their argument centres on the 
idea that fiscal policy making is susceptible to the three-dimensional conflicts of interest 
that involve policy makers as the agents and voters as the principals. The policy 
outcome depends on the constitutional framework of who makes policy proposals, who 
can approve or amend them and who assigns the representatives that will eventually 
exercise the authority. Because presidential democracy implies a greater separation of 
power than parliamentary democracy and, at the same time, connotes less cohesion
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among members of a governing coalition in the legislative, Persson, Roland and 
Tabellini (2000) predict that the former system results in a smaller government size than 
the latter.
Meanwhile, non-democracy groups together a number of government systems that 
democracy is not (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland 2010). Political scientists have 
constructed various approaches to classifying non-democratic regimes, such as based on 
the degree of political competition (Levitsky & Way 2002; Schedler 2002), control over 
access to power and influence (Geddes 1999) and the manners in which dictators retain 
their power (Hadenius & Teorell 2007). More recently, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
(2010) highlight another classification approach, which is based on the manners in 
which non-democratic rulers are removed from power. These authors divide non­
democracy into monarchy, military dictatorship and civil autocracy.
Monarchs, military dictators and civil autocrats each have different sources of power 
and face different insurrection threats (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007). Monarchs inherit 
the throne. Besides threats from democratic activists, the insurrection threats they face 
emerge by and large from internal members of the royal family. Military dictators gain 
their power through a coup and are mostly threatened by other members of the military 
force. The probability of a military dictator being deposed by fellow military members 
is high, not only because of their direct access to the tools of violence, but also because 
of the hierarchical character of the military chain of command (Svolik 2009). Finally, 
civil autocrats do not inherit power nor do they have immediate ability to appeal to the 
armed forces. To support their regimes, civil autocrats need to create new organisations, 
such as parties, consultative councils or political bureaus. The possibility that civil 
autocrats may be ousted is high because they face threats from almost everyone— 
democratic activists, the armed forces and other leaders in the ruling party (Gandhi & 
Przeworski 2007).
To illustrate how these elemental incentives bring about different sizes of public 
spending, the following is a simple model of fiscal decisions under different systems of 
government adapted from McGuire and Olson (1996). Despite the same analytical
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machinery, the line of reasoning here is different from that in the original model. First, 
it is assumed that not only democratic rulers but also non-democratic rulers earn market 
income in addition to controlling the fisc. McGuire and Olson (1996) might be correct 
when they presume that non-democratic rulers do not sell their labour in the market. 
However, it seems natural to say that these rulers own a large amount of capital that 
serves as input in the market. Indeed, the presence of non-democratic rulers in the 
Forbes Magazine’s list of richest people gives a strong indication that rulers hold a 
positive fraction of market income irrespective of the system of government under 
which they govern. Second, as both democratic and non-democratic rulers earn market 
income in addition to controlling the fisc, they all face an incentive to maintain the 
market function by limiting tax-induced distortions and providing the public goods 
needed to support market production. The central element that distinguishes fiscal 
policy under democratic and non-democratic systems of government is the market 
income with which the policy makers are concerned. It is assumed that the policy 
makers in each system take into account only the market income accruing to political 
actors relevant to their interest.
2.2.1 Presidential Democracy
Consider a president who makes fiscal decisions under presidential democracy. Given 
existing institutional constraints, the president seeks to maximise their own welfare and 
the welfare of their voters. Since support from the legislative is required to pass budget 
bills, the president needs to accommodate the interest of the majority in the legislature 
and take their welfare into account in a joint share of actual production in the economy. 
This joint share, S, is contingent not only upon the income that the president and their 
allies earn from selling factor inputs in the marketplace, but also upon the redistribution 
that they extract from the rest of society.
The formula for S is provided by
S = (<5i + S2 + 53)F + [1 — (Öi + Ö2 + Ö3)F]r; Ö1 + ö2 + S3 = 1 [2.1]
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where SXF , S2F  and S3F  are the fractions of market income accruing to the president, 
the majority in the legislature and their voters respectively, (1 — F) is the fraction of 
market income accruing to other individuals in the economy, and r  is the gross income- 
tax rate. For simplicity, assume that parameter 0 < F < 1 is exogenous.
In order to maximise S, the president chooses the tax rate, r, which is assumed to be 
constant, and the level of public-good provision, g, whose price per unit is assumed to 
be equal to 1. Equation [2.1] shows that a positive income-tax rate is essential for 
redistribution and, in turn, for the welfare of the president and their allies.
Nonetheless, when the tax is imposed, distortion occurs such that actual or realised 
gross output, y(r)Y(g),  is lower than potential gross output, Y(g)? The amount of tax 
collected is, therefore, equal to ry(r)Y(g)  and pure inefficiency loss is equal to 
[1 — y(r)]Y(g).  As public-good provision is important for production, when the level 
of public-good provision changes, the level of output also changes such that Y'(g) > 0, 
Y'Xg) < 0 and T(0) = 0. In this situation, the president as a policy maker needs to 
decide how many resources to allocate to public-good provision and how many to 
devote to their own welfare and the welfare of their allies.
In short, the optimisation problem faced by the president is
max(l -  r)y (r)(5 ! + ö2 + ö3)FY(g) + [ry(r)Y(g) -  g}\ S1 + ö2 -1- ö3 = 1 [2.2]
The first term denotes market income that the president and their allies receive after tax 
and deadweight loss, while the second term reflects the surplus they transfer to 
themselves.
2 Following the original model in McGuire and Olson (1996), Y is labelled ‘gross’ because the cost of 
the resources that must be used to produce g has not been subtracted, and ‘potential’ product because it 
omits the losses from incentive-distorting taxation, including the taxation necessary to obtain the 
resources for producing g.
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The first-order condition for the optimisation in equation [2.2] with respect to r  is
(<Si + S2 + S3)F[-y  + (1 -  r)y '] + (y + ry ') = 0[2.3]
and the optimal income-tax rate is
__*  y  ( ^ 1  ■ [ ' ^ 2 f  S? 1 1 o  r-< , 'i
r = (*1 + *2 + g3)F *  1 [2.4]
2.2.2 Parliamentary Democracy
Under parliamentary democracy, fiscal policy is made solely by the legislature. In 
contrast to the presidential system, the members of the parliament need only to 
maximise their own welfare and the welfare of their voters. For these policy makers, the 
joint share of actual production in the economy is
S = (S2 + S3)F + [1 -  (52 + 53)F]r; ö2 + 63 = 1 [2.5]
where 82F and 83F are the fractions of market income accruing to the majority in the 
legislature and their voters respectively, (1 — F) is the fraction of market income 
accruing to other individuals in the economy, and r  is the gross income-tax rate. For 
simplicity, again assume that parameter 0 < F < 1 is exogenous.
In order to maximise S, the majority in the legislature chooses the tax rate, r, and the 
level of public-good provision, g. The optimisation problem is therefore
max(l -  r )y (r ) (5 2 + S3)FY(g) + [ry(r)Y(g) -  g]; ö2 + ö3 = 1 [2.6]
The first-order conditions for the optimisation in equation [2.6] with respect to r is
(ö2 + 83)F[-y  + (1 -  r)y'] + (y + ry ') = 0 [2.7]
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and the optimal income-tax rate is
r * y
y '
((S2-t-(?>3)F ; ($2 + 83)F *  1 [2 .8]
2.2.3 Non-democratic Systems
Under monarchy, military dictatorship and civil autocracy, the policy makers are 
independent of the voters. Policy makers in these systems of government therefore 
abandon voters’ welfare and focus on maximising their own welfare and the welfare of 
close allies.
For policy makers under non-democracy, the joint share of actual production in the 
economy is
S = (81 + 82)F + [1 -  (5, + 52)F]r; = 1 [2.9]
where 51F can be interpreted as the fraction of market income accruing to the 
monarchs, military dictators or civil autocracts, 82F can be interpreted as the fraction of 
market income accruing to their close allies (instead of legislature majority), and 
(1 — F) is the fraction of market income accruing to other individuals in the economy.
In order to maximise S, the policy makers under non-democracy chooses the tax rate, r, 
and the level of public-good provision, g, such that the optimisation problem is
max(l -  r)y (r)(5 i + 82)FY(g) + [ry(r)Y{g) -  g]\ 8X + S2 = 1 [2.10]
The first-order condition for the optimisation in equation [2.10] with respect to r is
(Si + 82)F[-y  + (1 -  r)y'] + (y + ry ') = 0 [2.11]
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and the optimal income-tax rate is
r * y_
y'
( 5 1 +^2  +  ^ 3)^7 
[ l - ( 5 !  + 5 2)F]
; + 62)F ± 1 [2 . 12]
The difference between monarchy, military dictatorship and civil autocracy lies in the 
value of 02. As mentioned above, insurrection threats facing monarchs emerge largely 
internally, from members of royal family. Meanwhile, military dictators are threatened 
mostly by other members of the military force. Since civil autocrats do not inherit 
power nor do they have the immediate ability to appeal to the armed forces, they need to 
create new organisations as well as accommodating the interests of other parties because 
they face threats from almost everyone—democratic activists, the armed forces and 
other leaders in the ruling party. In this situation, it can be expected that the value of 02 
refers to more political actors in civil autocracy and relatively fewer political actors in 
the monarchy and military dictatorships.
Overall, as the fraction of market income accruing to the policy maker and his allies 
might be random, empirical research is required to resolve whether the optimal tax rate 
and the size of government spending are higher or lower in democratic and non- 
democratic systems of government.
2.3 Empirical Estimation
The effect of democratisation and systems of government on the size of public spending 
is estimated based on the following equation
y-i,t = ßo + ßtdemoci+ ß2gsystem it_1 + ß3Xu _1 + ß4ct + ß5y t + [2.13]
where Yi t denotes the size of public spending relative to the economy in country i in 
year t, Xi t_1 denotes a vector of time varying control variables that will be explained 
later, q  and y t denote a vector of country fixed effects and year fixed effects 
respectively, and ei t denotes error terms.
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The size of public spending as dependent variable is approximated either using the share 
of general government consumption in real GDP per capita or public gross fixed capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP. Data for the share of general government 
consumption in real GDP per capita, which include consumption by all levels of 
government (central, provincial and local levels), are taken from the Penn World Table 
(PWT) (see, Heston, Summers & Aten 2011). Data for the gross fixed capital formation 
of the public sector, which includes land improvements, fixed capital purchases and the 
construction of roads, railways, airports and the like, are calculated from total and 
private gross fixed capital formation data available in the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2011).
The key independent variable, democi t_ls is a dummy taking the value 1 if a country is 
considered democratic and 0 otherwise. This refers to a minimalist, strictly procedural 
view of democracy and is taken from the Democracy-Dictatorship (DDR) dataset (see 
Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland 2010). To be considered democratic, a country must have 
had executive and legislative branches of government that were elected in multiparty 
elections. Besides, the country must also have experienced no incident such that the 
legislature was closed unconstitutionally in favour of the executives. If one of these 
criteria does not hold, the country is deemed to be non-democratic (Cheibub, Gandhi & 
Vreeland 2010). To discern actual reforms from political instabilities, the coding of the 
democracy dummy further imposes a condition of two-year stability. It means that 
democratisation that lasts for only one year is ignored, and rather than taking the value 
1, the democracy dummy takes the value 0 over the period.
The other key independent variable, gsysterrii t_1, represents a vector of dummies for 
the systems of government. These dummies are generated based on the six-fold regime 
classification provided in the DDR dataset. The dummy for an absolute monarchy takes 
the value 1 if a country is considered to be non-democratic and its effective leader is 
titled a king, a queen or their equivalents. The dummy for a military dictatorship takes 
the value 1 if a country is judged to be non-democratic and its effective leader is a 
military member by profession. The dummy for a civil autocracy is valued 1 if a
13
country is deemed to be non-democratic and its effective leader is neither a monarch nor 
a military dictator. Here, a retired member of the army, navy or air force is not 
attributed civil status because, as Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) argue that 
shedding military uniform does not necessarily indicate a change in leadership 
characters. With respect to democratic systems of government, dummies for mixed, 
presidential and parliamentary democracies are valued 1 if a country is judged to be 
democratic and adopts the corresponding system of government.
Finally, the control variables consist of the one year lag of log real GDP per capita, 
growth rate of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age- 
dependency ratio. These variables may affect public spending as it is natural for policy 
makers to consider them when making fiscal policy (see, for example, Rodrik 1996; 
Alesina & Wacziarg 1998; Ram 2009). Data for real GDP per capita, the growth rate of 
real GDP per capita and trade openness all come from the PWT (see, Heston, Summers 
& Aten 2011), whereas data for total population and age-dependency ratio are from the 
United Nations (2011) (details of variable definitions and sources are provided in the 
Appendix 2.1).
Since the focus of analysis in this chapter is the within-country effects of 
democratisation and changes in government systems, parameters /?x and ß2 can be seen 
as difference-in-difference estimators, where countries experiencing a change in 
government systems belong to the treatment group and those experiencing no change 
belong to the control group. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) have shown that 
difference-in-difference estimators tend to aggravate the downward bias of positive 
residual autocorrelation in the standard errors. Therefore, to avoid the possible 
overestimation of t-statistics and significance levels, robust standard errors clustered at 
country level are used.
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Figure 2.1 The Number of Shifts in Government Systems in Sample 
Countries over the Period of Analysis3
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
From /to M onar. Civil M ilita ry  P a rliam . P re s id . M ixed
Monarchy 0 2 2 0 0
Civil 0 0 57 5 13 9
Military 0 56 0 9 2S 10
Parliamentary 1 5 12 0 0 4
Presidential 0 4 IS 0 0 1
Mixed 0 2 4 5 1 0
=Experince no shift = SS countries; Experience at least a shift = 91 countries
Hi
Non-democracy Non-democracy Democracy to Democracy to 
to non- to democracy non-democracy democracy 
democracy
Estimations cover unbalanced panel data from 177 countries for the period between 
1960 and 2008. Sample selection is based on data availability and only countries with at 
least seven years of observations are included in the regressions. Figure 1 summarises 
the number of shifts in the state of democracy and systems of government that took 
place in the sample countries over the period of analysis.
3 The names o f the sample countries and the shifts that took place in each country are presented in the 
Supplementary Tables.
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2.4 Results
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics. In Table 2.1a, the statistics of regressand and 
non-dummy regressors are cross-tabulated based on the state of democracy. In Table 
2.1.b, the cross tabulation is based on the systems of government.
Table 2.1a Descriptive Statistics Based on the State of Democracy
N  obs. M ean Std dev.
G eneral governm en t consum ption  (%  o f  R G D P per capita)
- Full sam ple 6774 11.654 7.862
- N on-dem ocracy 3773 11.132 6 .654
D em ocracy 3001 12.068 8.682
Public g ross fixed capital fo rm ation  (%  o f  G D P)
- Full sam ple 5554 14.912 9 .454
- N on-dem ocracy 2789 13.189 9.711
- D em ocracy 2765 16.650 8.854
R eal G D P per cap ita  g row th rate (%  per annum )
- Full sam ple 6774 2.272 7.604
- N on-dem ocracy 3773 2.519 5.015
- D em ocracy 3001 2.076 9.151
L og o f  real G D P per capita
- Full sam ple 6774 8.250 1.290
- N on-dem ocracy 3773 8.969 1.100
D em ocracy 3001 7.678 1.135
T rade openness
- Full sam ple 6774 69.609 47.985
- N on-dem ocracy 3773 68.805 43 .029
D em ocracy 3001 70.249 51.586
T otal popu la tion
- Full sam ple 6774 31.466 113.913
- N on-dem ocracy 3773 34.955 107.603
- D em ocracy 3001 28.691 118.633
A ge dependency  ratio
- Full sam ple 6774 74.766 18.925
- N on-dem ocracy 3773 64.982 16.779
D em ocracy 3001 82.548 16.807
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Table 2.1b Descriptive Statistics Based on the Systems 
of Government
N  o bs. M e a n S td  d ev .
G e n e ra l g o v e rn m e n t c o n su m p tio n  (%  o f  R G D P  p e r  c a p ita )
- A b so lu te  m o n a rc h y 503 10 .603 6 .0 8 6
- C iv il a u to c ra c y 1956 12 .512 9 .5 0 3
- M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip 1314 11 .9 6 9 8 .1 7 4
- M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y 572 1 0 .6 0 0 5 .2 6 3
- P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y 9 1 0 10 .2 9 8 8 .4 1 5
- P a r lia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y 1519 11 .8 3 2 5 .8 0 2
P u b lic  g ro s s  f ix ed  c a p ita l fo rm a tio n  (%  o f  G D P )
- A b so lu te  m o n a rc h y 3 6 2 15 .9 6 8 10 .664
- C iv il a u to c ra c y 1362 13 .1 7 0 10 .462
- M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip 1065 12 .2 6 8 8 .0 6 4
- M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y 513 1 6 .4 7 6 9 .3 1 4
- P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y 86 9 1 3 .759 8.821
- P a r l ia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y 1385 1 8 .519 8 .1 8 5
R ea l G D P  p e r  c a p ita  g ro w th  ra te  (%  p e r  an n u m )
- A b so lu te  m o n a rc h y 503 2 .4 1 3 7 .5 9 3
- C iv il a u to c ra c y 1956 2 .1 4 3 9 .7 1 4
- M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip 1314 1 .847 8 .8 2 8
- M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y 5 72 2 .8 3 7 5 .8 8 4
- P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y 9 1 0 1 .858 4 .7 2 9
- P a r lia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y 1519 2 .7 9 5 4 .7 8 6
L o g  o f  rea l G D P  p e r  c a p ita
- A b so lu te  m o n a rc h y 503 8 .6 6 4 1 .417
- C iv il a u to c ra c y 1956 7 .5 7 0 1.041
M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip 1314 7 .4 6 0 0 .9 3 5
- M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y 572 8 .8 8 6 1 .242
- P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y 9 1 0 8 .5 4 2 0 .9 6 3
- P a r lia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y 1519 9 .5 2 6 1 .030
T ra d e  o p e n n e ss
- A b so lu te  m o n a rc h y 503 8 9 .1 2 3 4 2 .1 7 0
- C iv il a u to c ra c y 1956 7 1 .7 9 5 5 7 .6 7 4
- M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip 1314 6 0 .7 2 2 4 2 .2 0 7
- M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y 57 2 6 6 .6 1 7 3 0 .6 6 0
- P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y 9 1 0 5 8 .0 0 2 3 4 .2 3 0
- P a r lia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y 1519 7 6 .1 0 2 4 9 .7 8 7
T o ta l p o p u la tio n
- A b so lu te  m o n a rc h y 503 6 .761 9 .6 7 3
- C iv il a u to c ra c y 1956 3 9 .2 7 8 1 6 1 .4 9 2
- M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip 1314 2 1 .3 2 7 3 4 .0 4 2
M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y 572 12 .9 9 2 18 .944
- P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y 9 1 0 3 3 .6 5 7 6 2 .1 5 5
- P a r l ia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y 1519 4 4 .0 0 3 142 .0 1 8
A g e  d e p e n d e n c y  ra tio
- A b so lu te  m o n a rc h y 503 7 5 .9 0 3 2 0 .0 6 0
- C iv il a u to c ra c y 1956 8 1 .7 3 6 17 .218
- M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip 1314 8 6 .3 0 0 13 .5 7 4
- M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y 572 6 1 .8 8 6 17 .599
- P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y 9 1 0 7 2 .3 7 9 16 .692
- P a r lia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y 1519 6 1 .7 1 6 15 .032
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2.4.1 The Basic Results
Tables 2.2a and 2.2b summarise the basic results. In Table 2.2a, the dependent variable 
is the share of general government consumption in real GDP per capita, whereas in 
Table 2.2b, the dependent variable is public gross fixed capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP.
In Table 2.2a, column 1 reports the result when a dummy for democracy is the only 
political variable included in the regression along with economic and demographic 
control variables, country dummies and year dummies. The coefficient of the 
democracy dummy, which reflects the effect of democratisation on the share of general 
government consumption in real GDP per capita, is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels.
Column 2 reports the results when dummies for a presidential and a mixed democracy 
are added to the regression as controls. The coefficient of the democracy dummy now 
becomes statistically significant as it reflects only the effect of democratisation that ends 
up with a parliamentary democracy. In column 3, the dummies for a presidential and a 
mixed democracy are excluded from the regression, while dummies for a civil autocracy 
and a military dictatorship are included instead. The coefficient of the democracy 
dummy, which reflects the effect of democratisation that originates from an absolute 
monarchy, is statistically significant. Together with the result in column 1, the results in 
columns 2 and 3 suggest that the effect of democratisation on the share of government 
consumption in real GDP per capita is subject to the specifics of government systems 
that prevail before and after a political change.4
To investigate the systems of government that lead to a significant effect of 
democratisation on the share of government consumption in real GDP per capita,
4 While results from several other regressions which include different sets of dummies for democratic 
and non-democratic government systems support this finding (for example, regressions which include 
dummies for a parliamentary democracies and a mixed democracies, or dummies for a parliamentary 
democracies and a presidential democracies, or dummies for an absolute monarchy and a military 
dictatorship), only the results of regressions as in columns 2-3 are reported, particularly for the reason 
of brevity and space limitation.
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regressions in columns 4-12 include different sets of dummies for democratic and non- 
democratic government systems. In column 4, the dummies for a presidential 
democracy, a mixed democracy, a civil autocracy and a military dictatorship are 
included in the regression, restricting the coefficient of the democracy dummy to the 
effect of democratisation that originates from an absolute monarchy and ends up with a 
parliamentary democracy. The estimates in this column indicate that, holding other 
things constant, leaving an absolute monarchy for a parliamentary democracy leads to 
an approximately 3.03 percent increase in the share of government consumption in real 
GDP per capita. In columns 5, a dummy for parliamentary democracy instead of the 
dummy for a presidential democracy is included. The coefficient of the democracy, 
which reflects the effect of democratisation that starts from an absolute monarchy and 
culminates with a presidential democracy, is significant. New presidential democracies 
that were previously under an absolute monarchy raise government consumption by 
2.04 percent of real GDP per capita.
The effect of democratisation that originates from an absolute monarchy and ends up 
with a mixed democracy is reported in column 6. The coefficient of the democracy 
dummy which represents this effect is significant. New mixed democracies that were 
previously under an absolute monarchy raise the share of government consumption in 
real GDP per capita by 3.74 percent.
Columns 7-9 report the results for democratisation that starts from a civil autocracy. 
The estimates in column 7 indicate that entering a parliamentary democracy from a civil 
autocracy leads to a 0.60 percent increase in government consumption as a share of real 
GDP per capita. In column 8, the estimates indicate that new presidential democracies 
which were previously under a civil autocracy reduce government consumption by 0.38 
percent of real GDP per capita. In column 9, it is estimated that mixed democracies 
originating from a civil autocracy raise the share of government consumption in real 
GDP per capita by 1.32 percent. The fact that none of the coefficients of the democracy 
dummy are significant in these columns, however, implies that such estimates may arise 
simply by chance.
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In column 10-12, the democratisation begins from a military dictatorship. The estimates 
in column 10 indicate that leaving a military dictatorship for a parliamentary democracy 
leads to a 1.45 percent increase in the share of government consumption in real GDP per 
capita. In column 11, the estimates indicate that new presidential democracies that were 
previously under a military dictatorship raise government consumption by 0.47 percent 
of real GDP per capita, while in column 12, it is estimated that mixed democracies 
originating from a military dictatorship raise the share of government consumption in 
real GDP per capita by 2.17 percent.
In Table 2.2b, column 1 again reports the result when a dummy for democracy is the 
only political variable included in the regression along with economic and demographic 
control variables, country dummies and year dummies. The coefficient of the 
democracy dummy, which reflects the effect of democratisation on the share of public 
gross fixed capital formation in GDP, is negative and not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Column 2 reports the results when dummies for a presidential and a 
mixed democracy are added to the regression as controls. The coefficient of the 
democracy dummy remains negative and statistically insignificant even as it reflects 
only the effect of democratisation that ends up with a parliamentary democracy. In 
column 3, the coefficient of the democracy dummy, which reflects the effect of 
democratisation originating from an absolute monarchy, is positive but also not 
statistically significant.
To further investigate whether the effect of democratisation on the share of public gross 
fixed capital formation in GDP is subject to the specifics of government systems that 
prevail before and after a political change, regressions in columns 4-12 include 
different sets of dummies for democratic and non-democratic government systems. In 
columns 4-6, the democracy dummy reflects a shift that starts from an absolute 
monarchy to either a parliamentary, presidential or mixed democracy. In columns 7-9, 
the dummy reflects a shift that starts from a civil autocracy, whereas in 10-12, the 
dummy reflects a shift originating from a military dictatorship.
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The results show that the coefficients of the democracy dummy happen to be negative 
or positive depending on the specifics of government systems that prevail before and 
after democratisasion. The coefficients of the democracy dummy are always negative 
for each shift that ends up with a mixed democracy, but by contrast, always positive for 
each shift that ends up with a presidential democracy.
The coefficients of the dummy for democracy are, however, mostly not significant 
except in column 5 where the coefficient of the democacy dummy is significant at the 5 
percent level. The estimate in this column suggests that, holding other things constant, a 
shift from an absolute monarchy to a presidential democracy raises gross fixed capital 
formation of the public sector by 4.09 percent of GDP.
2.4.2 Results with a Five-year Democratic Stability Condition
Regressions in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b include a democracy dummy that is coded with a 
two-year stability condition. However, it could be argued that two years is too short for 
a country to accomplish a democratic reform. While there is no clear-cut argument for 
how many years the condition should be, some authors have imposed a five-year 
democratic stability condition in their analyses (Papaioannou & Siourounis 2008; 
Cervellati, Fortunato & Sunde 2011).
To ensure that the relationship between democratisation, system of government and the 
size of public spending is not subject to the stability condition enforced, regressions in 
Tables 2.3a and 2.3b impose such an alternative condition for the democracy dummy. 
Democratisation that lasts for four years or less is ignored, and rather than taking the 
value 1, the democracy dummy is given the value 0 over the period.
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The results indicate that the effects of democratisation and systems of government are 
persistent. In Table 2.3a columns 1 where the dependent variable is the share of general 
government consumption in real GDP per capita, the coefficients of the democracy 
dummy remain insignificant. In columns 4-12 of the same table, the coefficients of the 
democracy dummy remain significant or insignificant conforming to the pattern in 
Table 2.2. In Table 2.3b where the dependent variable is public gross fixed capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP, the pattern of the effects that was present in Table 
2.2b also remains in place. The coefficients of the democracy dummy are mostly not 
statistically significant, except in column 5.
2.4.3 Results with an Alternative Measure of Democracy
Measures of democracy are different one from another (Munck & Verkuilen 2002; 
Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland 2010). For example, in contrast to the DDR dataset which 
focuses on a minimalist, strictly procedural, view of democracy (Cheibub, Gandhi & 
Vreeland 2010), the Polity IV (PIV) dataset lays emphasis on the broad concept of 
institutionalised democracy (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2010).
To test whether the effects of democratisation and systems of government on the size of 
public spending are subject to the measure of democracy used, regressions in Tables 
2.4a and 2.4b include a dummy for democracy that refers to the PIV dataset instead of 
the DDR dataset. Following Persson and Tabellini (2006), a country is considered 
democratic if its polity2 score in the PIV dataset is strictly positive and non-democratic 
if the polity2 score is zero or negative. Nonetheless, as no ready classification of 
government systems is available in the PIV dataset, dummies for the systems of 
government still refer to the DDR dataset, taking into account discrepancies that exist in 
the democracy dummy.
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The results reported in column 1 of Tables 2.4a and 2.4b affirm that the effect of 
democratisation on the share of general government consumption in real GDP per capita 
and the share of public gross fixed capital formation in GDP is not by itself statistically 
significant. The other results reported in Table 2.4a columns 4-12 also affirm that 
democratisation originating from an absolute monarchy significantly increases the share 
of general government consumption in real GDP per capita regardless of the democratic 
government system adopted, whereas democratisasion that originates from a military 
dictatorship significantly increases the share of general government consumption if only 
it ends up with a parliamentary or mixed democracy. In Table 2.4b columns 4-12, the 
results show that the coefficients of the democracy dummy are all not significant even 
though their signs remain consistent with the pattern in previous relevant tables.
2.4.4 Results with an Alternative Public-spending Proxy
Thus far, general government consumption as a proxy for the size of public spending is 
measured using the share of general government consumption in real GDP per capita. 
While this proxy taken from the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers & Aten 2011) 
has been widely used in economic literature, many studies instead employ the ratio of 
general government consumption to GDP which is taken from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2011). To test whether the effects of democratisation and 
systems of government on the size of general government consumption are subject to 
the choice of proxy, regressions in Table 2.5 include the ratio of general government 
consumption to GDP as regressand.
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The result in column 1 shows that the coefficient of the dummy for democracy is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, different from previous results 
suggesting that democratisasion does not by itself significantly affect the size of general 
government consumption, the result in column 1 suggests that democratisasion has a 
significant effect on the ratio of general government consumption to GDP. Leaving non­
democracy for democracy, in general, leads to a 1.34 percent increase in the ratio of 
general government consumption to GDP. Further results reported in the appendix, 
however, indicate that the relationship between democratisasion and the ratio of general 
government consumption to GDP is not robust and subject to the change in the measure 
of democracy.
The results in columns 4-12 show that the coefficients of the democracy dummy are 
mostly not significant, except in columns 10 and 11 where the coefficients of the 
dummy are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The estimates in these columns 
indicate that, holding other things constant, leaving a military dictatorship for a 
parliamentary democracy raises the ratio of general government consumption to GDP 
by 2.69 percent, whereas leaving a military dictatorship for a presidential democracy 
increases the ratio of general government consumption to GDP by 1.80 percent.
Further results reported in the appendix show that only democratisation that originates 
from a military dictatorship and ends up with a parliamentary democracy has a robust 
and significant effect on the ratio of general government consumption to GDP. The 
effect of democratisation that originates from a military dictatorship and ends up with a 
presidential democracy becomes insignificant once the ratio of general government 
consumption to GDP is regressed using the PIV dataset as an alternative measure of 
democracy.
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2.5 Conclusion
Exploiting time variation in countries that experienced changes in the state of 
democracy, this chapter examines the effects of democratisation and systems of 
government on the size of public spending. The results provide evidence that 
democratisation does not by itself bring about a robust significant effect on the size of 
general government consumption relative to a country’s overall economy. The co­
efficients of the democracy dummy are mostly insignificant and subject to the inclusion 
of dummies specifying the systems of government that prevail before and after a 
political reform. The results further provide evidence that only democratisation that 
originates from a military dictatorship and ends up with a parliamentary democracy has 
a robust significant effect on general government consumption size. Democratisation 
that originates from a civil autocracy almost never has a significant effect on the size 
of general government consumption, regardless of the democratic system of government 
adopted. With respect to the size of public gross fixed capital formation, the results 
provide evidence that the effects of democratisation and systems of government are 
weak and not statistically significant.
On the whole, the results in this chapter support the idea that democracy is a broad 
concept (Persson & Tabellini 2006). Predicting the impacts of democratisation based 
merely on the state of democracy risks a loss of explanatory power because internal 
variations within democracy and non-democracy are very large.
Further research is needed to determine whether government systems affect the 
composition of public spending. Countries under an absolute monarchy, a military 
dictatorship or a civil autocracy can have the same public spending size as those under a 
presidential or a parliamentary democracy, but be very different in the way they allocate 
it. The extent to which different countries under different government systems are able 
to efficiently use the spending is also worthy of future research.
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Appendix 2.1
Table A2.1.1 Variable Definitions and Sources
The size of public spending 
(proxy “a”)
The size of public spending 
(proxy “b”)
The size of public spending 
(alternative proxy “a”)
Democracy dummy
Democracy dummy 
(using an alternative measure 
of democracy)
Dummy for an absolute 
monarchy
Dummy for an absolute 
monarchy
(using an alternative measure 
of democracy)
Dummy for a military 
dictatorship
Dummy for a military 
dictatorship
(using an alternative measure 
of democracy)
- The share of general government consumption in purchasing-power- 
parity-converted GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices.
- Taken from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011)
- Public gross fixed capital formation, i.e. investments that cover gross 
outlays by the public sector on additions to its fixed domestic assets.
- Calculated using data from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2011).
- General government final consumption expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP.
- Taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2011).
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years; 0 otherwise.
- To be considered democratic, a country must have had executive and 
legislative branches of government elected in multiparty elections. 
Besides, the country must have experienced no incident such that the 
legislature was closed unconstitutionally in favour of the executives.
- Constructed using data from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years; 0 otherwise.
- To be considered democratic, a country must have a polity2 score 
greater than zero in the Polity IV dataset. A country whose polity2 
score is zero or negative is judged to be non-democratic.
- Constructed using data from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2010).
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is judged to be non-democratic 
and its effective leader is titled a king, a queen or their equivalents;
0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data and the six-fold regime 
classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be non- 
democratic and its effective leader is titled a king, a queen or their 
equivalents; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2010), taking into account discrepancies in the state of 
democracy.
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be non- 
democratic and its effective leader is a military member by 
profession; 0 otherwise.
- A retired member of the army, navy of the air-force remains treated 
as a military personal.
- Constructed using data from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be non- 
democratic and its effective leader is a military member by 
profession; 0 otherwise.
- A retired member of the army, navy of the air-force remains treated 
as a military personal.
- Constructed using democracy data from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers
(2010) and the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2010), taking into account discrepancies in the state of 
democracy._________________________________________________
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Table A2.1 Variable definitions and sources_______________________ {continued from previous page)
Dummy for a civil autocracy - Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be non- 
democratic and its effective leader is neither a monarch nor a military 
member by profession; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data and the six-fold regime 
classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
Dummy for a civil autocracy 
(using an alternative measure 
of democracy)
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be non- 
democratic and its effective leader is a military member by 
profession; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2010), taking into account discrepancies in the state of 
democracy.
Dummy for a parliamentary 
democracy
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years and has a parliamentary government that can be 
removed by the legislative; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data and the six-fold regime 
classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
Dummy for a parliamentary 
democracy
(using an alternative measure 
of democracy)
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years and has a parliamentary government that can be 
removed by the legislative; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2010), taking into account discrepancies in the state of 
democracy.
Dummy for a presidential 
democracy
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years and has a non-parliamentary government that 
cannot be removed by the legislative; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data and the six-fold regime 
classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
Dummy for a presidential 
democracy
(using an alternative measure 
of democracy)
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years and has a non-parliamentary government that 
cannot be removed by the legislative; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2010), taking into account discrepancies in the state of 
democracy.
Dummy for a mixed 
democracy
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years and has a parliamentary government with a head 
of state that is elected directly by the people; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data and the six-fold regime 
classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
Dummy for a mixed 
democracy
(using an alternative measure 
of democracy)
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years and has a parliamentary government with a head 
of state that is elected directly by the people; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using democracy data from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2010), taking into account discrepancies in the state of 
democracy.
Log of real GDP per capita - Log of purchasing-power-parity-converted GDP per capita at 2005 
constant prices.
- Calculated using data from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011)
Real GDP per capita growth - The annual growth rate of purchasing-power-parity-converted GDP 
per capita at 2005 constant prices.
- Calculated using data from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011)
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Table A2.1 Variable definitions and sources________________________ {continued from previous page)
Trade openness - The values of export plus import as a percentage of GDP at 2005
constant prices.
- Taken from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011).
Total population - Total number of estimated population (in million people).
- Calculated using data from the United Nation (2011a).
Age-dependency ratio. - The ratio of population aged 0-14 and 65+ to 100 population aged
15-64.
___________________________ - Interpolated into yearly using data from the United Nation (201 lb).
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Appendix 2.2
Table A2.2.1 The Effects of a Change in the Systems of Government 
when Estimated Directly; Comparable to the Results Reported 
in Tables 2.2a and 2.2b Columns 4-12
Table 2.2a columns 4-12 Table 2.2b columns 4-12
Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
effects effects effects effects effects effects
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Absolute monarchy -2.424*** -1.572* -3.941** -2.709
(0.736) (0.821) (1.926) (2.013)
Civil autocracy 2.424*** 0.852* 3.941** 1.232
(0.736) (0.492) (1.926) (1.047)
Military dictatorship 1.572* -0.852* 2.709 -1.232
(0.821) (0.492) (2.013) (1.047)
Parliamentary democracy 3.026*** 0.602 1.454** 1.146 -2.795 -1.563
(0.836) (0.602) (0.580) (2.010) (1.808) (1.679)
Presidential democracy 2.040** -0.384 0.468 4.089** 0.148 1.380
(1.022) (0.814) (0.858) (2.059) (1.018) (0.873)
Mixed democracy 3.744*** 1.320 2.172** -0.432 -4.373 -3.141
(1.143) (0.997) (1.007) (3.468) (3.241) (2.745)
N observations 6,774 6,774 6,774 5,554 5,554 5,554
N countries 177 177 177 171 171 171
Within R-squared 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.182 0.182 0.182
Adj. R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.173 0.173 0.173
Note: In this table, the effects of leaving a non-democratic government system and entering a particular 
form of democracy on the size of public spending are estimated directly (rather than merely as controls 
to the effect of democratisation in general). The democracy dummy is left out, while all but one of the 
dummies for government systems are included in the regressions along with economic and demographic 
control variables, country dummies and year dummies. The results in columns 1-3 are comparable to 
that in Table 2.2a columns 4-12. The results in columns 4-6 are comparable to that in Table 2.2b 
columns 4-12.
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Table A2.2.2 The Effects of a Change in the Systems of Government 
when Estimated Directly; Comparable to the Results Reported 
in Tables 2.3a and 2.3b Columns 4-12
Table 2.3a columns 4-12 Table 2.3b columns 4--12
Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
effects effects effects effects effects effects
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Absolute monarchy -2.374*** -1.543* -3.737* -2.606
(0.751) (0.859) (2.004) (2.066)
Civil autocracy 2.374*** 0.831* 3.737* 1.131
(0.751) (0.475) (2.004) (0.997)
Military dictatorship 1.543* -0.831* 2.606 -1.131
(0.859) (0.475) (2.066) (0.997)
Parliamentary democracy 3.185*** 0.811 1.642*** 1.118 -2.619 -1.488
(0.890) (0.588) (0.587) (2.050) (1.878) (1.773)
Presidential democracy 1.973* -0.401 0.430 3.866* 0.129 1.260
(1.156) (0.897) (0.935) (2.121) (1.039) (0.923)
Mixed democracy 3.766*** 1.391 2.223** -0.460 -4.197 -3.066
(1.196) (1.033) (1.048) (3.603) (3.335) (2.865)
N observations 6,774 6,774 6,774 5,554 5,554 5,554
N countries 177 177 177 171 171 171
Within R-squared 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.180 0.180 0.180
Adj. R-squared 0.0584 0.0584 0.0584 0.172 0.172 0.172
Note: In this table, the effects of leaving a non-democratic government system and entering a particular 
form of democracy on the size of public spending are estimated directly (rather than merely as controls 
to the effect of democratisation in general). The democracy dummy is left out, while all but one of the 
dummies for government systems are included in the regressions along with economic and demographic 
control variables, country dummies and year dummies. The results in columns 1-3 are comparable to 
that in Table 2.3a columns 4-12. The results in columns 4-6 are comparable to that in Table 2.3b 
columns 4-12.
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Table A2.2.3 The Effects of a Change in the Systems of Government 
when Estimated Directly; Comparable to the Results Reported 
in Tables 2.4a and 2.4b Columns 4-12
Table 2.4a columns 4-12 Table 2.4b columns 4-12
F ix ed F ix ed F ix e d F ix ed F ix ed F ix ed
e ffec ts e ffe c ts e ffe c ts e ffe c ts e ffec ts e ffe c ts
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Absolute monarchy —2 742*** -1.344* -3.664* -2.380
(0.657) (0.805) (1.914) (1.933)
Civil autocracy 2.742*** 1.398** 3.664* 1.285
(0.657) (0.545) (1.914) (0.988)
Military dictatorship 1.344* -1.398** 2.380 -1.285
(0.805) (0.545) (1.933) (0.988)
Parliamentary democracy 2.891*** 0.149 1.547*** 1.357 -2.307 -1.022
(0.778) (0.507) (0.509) (1.874) (1.723) (1.582)
Presidential democracy 1.758** -0.984* 0.414 3.081 -0.584 0.701
(0.768) (0.539) (0.493) (1.904) (0.776) (0.749)
Mixed democracy 3.986*** 1.244 2.642*** -0.412 -4.076 -2.792
(1.106) (0.874) (0.931) (3.339) (3.132) (2.725)
N observations 6,124 6,124 6,124 5,041 5,041 5,041
N countries 159 159 159 153 153 153
Within R-squared 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.215 0.215 0.215
Adj. R-squared 0.0850 0.0850 0.0850 0.206 0.206 0.206
Note: In this table, the effects of leaving a non-democratic government system and entering a particular 
form of democracy on the size of public spending are estimated directly (rather than merely as controls 
to the effect of democratisation in general). The democracy dummy is left out, while all but one of the 
dummies for government systems are included in the regressions along with economic and demographic 
control variables, country dummies and year dummies. The results in columns 1-3 are comparable to 
that in Table 2.4a columns 4-12. The results in columns 4-6 are comparable to that in Table 2.4b 
columns 4-12.
38
T
a
b
le
 A
2
.2
.4
a
 R
es
u
lt
s 
fo
r 
T
a
b
le
 2
.2
a
 w
it
h
 a
 O
n
e-
m
il
li
o
n
 P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 T
h
re
sh
ol
2
C/5
11
Uh OJ
C/511
ÜU <L>
C/511
Uh OJ
C/5
• -
U h O
C/211£  t:
C/5
11
Uh <D
C/5
11U h o
C/511; — <H—«
Uh <L>
C/511Uh <U
C/511
U« O
C/2"3 £  
c £  
Uh <U
u
a
C/2
d  tS
• —  b—i
U h O
*  /-----v *r~- cn — (N m  o  t-~ o  r-~-
3- m  m  r -  oo
d
CN
NO 3‘
® s
vo O' m  
On 3- CN 3" O' vo
Ö Ö Ö
I w  I
00
CNCN
/—v * /“N /■—S
3- 3- — 3- m  cn
o  M O  ^  ^
^-1 O h—I o  o  o'— H I s— H-
oo 20
U! oo
0  s
cn oo CN «Nvo cs 
o  —.
* /-v * /-V - V— O' — ■'t id (NOO «  h  ^Ti oo cq ' t
• -• o  d  O
m
CN
no' O  20 02 
0 0  3 "
s °
----- V *  -----vCN <N 20 3"
in  3" m  oq q ^ o o
-  3 ^  S
/-V * v02 VO o  3" 
cn ^n cn o  
3- rq 3- oo
O  O  ni ©
W/-v *  /-vt-~ 02 O  3" 
in  cn cn ©  
1/2 VO oo
d O ( N O
,—2 ----. S1/2 CN o  O' n  oo'O O' (N (Nvq ^  q  2 0  (N
d d d d d  —
I w  I w  I w
/—-2 /—V
in  cn oo 20h  1/1 (\| 'S
2 0  q  HH 0 0
d  d  d  d
I '--- x 2—/
cn oo 
c n <N 
v q  <N
d  —\
i n nT. m io 3;
d  d
I w
*  /-'OO <N 00 <N
*q <n  
cn r -1
* ✓—' m  oo 20 02 OO 02 
<N O
* ^
m
Q \ (N Qs O '
<N O
*  /--- vso ^CN )0o  oo 
d  ©
*  /--2<n  r-m  <N — m
—; d
*  /---- Vo  OO 20 —  o  1/2
d  d
*
2 0
CN
^  * © 20 oo r~-
d  X
3" 20 m  os
oo 3- 
d  d
/—s
0 0  SO ON (N NO Qn ^  -H ° 0  qf On
o  o  o  o
I
/—V / - vOn m  oo 
N- CN (N02 20 (N
d  d  — :'— - I >_✓
■Jf -Ä-*  /— V * /--v /-V-—1 oo NO
O so ^  CnI
OO t—^  OO r-H 0 0
<N s  ~  s  ® s
m  ooCN (N 20 tN
d  —\
* /-  ^* - V
2 0  N -  ^-h ^ rcn o  20rq
*  H-v * /-vOn in oo
O n m  i o  O 'rn oo tq oo 
<n  o  d  d
OO 20 20 02(N'-OON'^
-H  OO H t ON
cf e ®  s
riiONOt^-— i it r~- o  oo —  q  no 
in d  ®  o
cni on o  r- —  r- o  OO^  —H o  20 
in d  ®  o
(21 O '  O  h—  -t oOO O 20•v • nom  o  do
(N O' O h—  -3- t-- o  oo^ — i cq 20
in d  ®o
on on o  r- «  h  o
00  ^H-H O 2 0
in d  ®o
cN on o  r- Tt- r- o  OO^  H-H o  20
in d  o^
cN on o  r- —  N- r~- o  m  -H q  20
in d  o^
cN on o  r -  — N- r-~- o  
oq hh q  o
in d  ®o
cN on o  r -  — N- f— O oo^  —h O 2 0
in d  ^  o
CN 02 02 CN — N- 20 Ooq h—I o  no 
in d  ®  o
CN
d  dI
> 2
o
Q
j=.
Ico
E
<L>
sX)
<
> 2
q
> 2
X
E
1
Eo
-a
> 2
0
1 o"3
äVh
o
o ••1
3
CO
3 Eo
- 3
3
.1
E3 O-3 "3o
>
u 1 3Oh £Cu
X
s
^—'  ' — '
t— m m (N rn ^  q- (N oo mCN 02
® s
cN 02 q  q  -  Nt 20 Noo^  h- h o  in
in d  o^
cN 02 m m
h— q- no ■q- q  -  q  in 
in d  ^  o
"O4J
o
i . §
u —S § ■§ 8 z z
3 KCT cd C« 3
^ 6  CO 'S
l - s
1 2  ^ 3 c~  >>~o «
= -s g  31 i“i |I5§^ öß c^  o  
-  ft <N
’S -o «22 C03 C y —[i] 03 *- C/5
o §  1 1  
5 I 1 1«N 3  -o X
S o S '-“a s § ^<
<* S  1  3  S
S r f - 3  
E 
E3
0 0
I I
a> vh
X
s ' i |
I ss I
1  h  S  a
&  c  -  T3rl CÖ «  >
>2-5 —
s'? s
.  °  & a
w > 2  -3 JJ
i3 3 - ^ § a -
• S -x -S  8  2
s  % g g o - S
0  2 - 3 «
Oh bß (U 3  m
2  S  .g  _ r
I S
a  -g ”  Ia S » »
o Ü ^ ” c
1 g &
ß & H ' S
1 r§ § I S »; -a s 
a  sii-s 
1 1 1  8 *
£ o- « S 
> Q «? 3  *
o O  «  -§ \  
2 § | S 5 *
| s
oo oc 3 O g
o °  >■“ !
£ S c  X £cd -3 3 d  cd
•5 i 8 > S'Jg —  ^ ^■ g i ?. . _  O
. 2  s  I  8  Ü
•§ s|J t 
■ i i i g S '  =• 1 8 > §
61 g N  8 
?  > , S E S  
4J h  S - O - o
0  §  O  3  £
•o o  °  o  H
jS : i i !
H. I  s . 1  ^
g  S 8  ^  Ö
1  S u Ü 6
T
ab
le
 A
2.
2.
4b
 R
es
ul
ts
 f
or
 T
ab
le
 2
.2
b 
w
ith
 a
 O
ne
-m
ill
io
n 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
T
hr
es
ho
l2
JU
cp
s3
C /2
~3
tu
C /2
I Itu <u
c/2
"3 'S
.  ^  M — (
tU <d
C /5
. g |
tU  <L>
C /5
II
tU  <L)
C /5
II
tU  <u
C /5
11
tU  <D
C /511
Uh (U
C /5
11
Uh (D
C /5
IItu <u
C /5II
t u  <u
C /2
I I
t u  <u
C /5
73 O
8 J
• —  4 htU <D
. X- - - - S  *  X— V_, *— • ^  '  pi 3" 00 —1 OO CN
o  OO 0 2  P  O  S
O  (N  r n  —  —  —1 3 - • oo •• m m
- - - - - - ' - - - - '  “  - - - - - '
If - V * - - /-\
*  i r ,  r t  ^rp o  oo —1 oo cn£  02 as I- © -
-- 2- d-
*
P  on Tj-
5  vo  oo  —  oo  M
OO 02 t o  —
o  ^  
o
7  2
£  &oo Z.
T 6
S- S'!
.__  -
' £  S'2 .  -H P  O  
®  O  ^  <N
n 2 7 d
s 5 $ s
'S 3 - o  20
7  2 ^  w
- - - - - -  *  / - - - - V
M  O  OO r o  
OO OO 20 fO
x“s x—*\ /-—V
oo 04 £  ® oS 2
O © NO
3"00
■
(N
cn / m
S _ _ X  “  S — X
P |  2o  __
Ö  ^  ^ • rJ, m7  -  ' d
*
no oo ( 7 3 -  p *
S s i s  
7  d  7  2
OO CNo  —:
u>o3"
C3
t-~ 7  00 02 oo Zh
7  d
On 2— p: o
O  ^  M
r ^ 7 n
. w  I ' — '
<n >n NO O 
ON 3"  
o  rn
in  <—OO oo
*  / - - - - S  *  / — V  / - - - - s
00 r n  -rf o  nN O ^ o o ^ p ^ o g r O N
o ' O o s p ^ f N g g z
*  *  
*  ^  *  
O O  m  7 f
VO on  00 
o  'O
P  g  IO
On 7  O
^  d ?  d
-  7  
Sg£
7  6
<N
7  7CN —1
* /-sm no m no^  in
NO 7  
'S On
7  2
* /-N *
oo n  sr  
VO ^  oo o  'O ONr-
* in on (o' 
on _  r~ oo  o  "* S 
rn 2 7  2
*  / - - - - - V *  / - - - - vm  ON on On
oo t m  ®  t  1; n  ^  
3 : —  c n  —n.
. 2  NO £ 7
, - h po
g  q  o> CM.
r ^ P 7  2
»—i C On On
^  —  o
oo — n  r-i
t^-r ö  ö
—  t^ -  ON ON
i^- — o 
oo — r^ j r-4
rt ö  ö
-  O n O n 
i -  ' t  -  O  
OC —H (N  <N
•^ tr  o  o
-  ON ON^  — o
OO —  CN| (N
Ö Ö
— r - ON ON
*3- — o00 -H (N (N
rf Ö Ö
rH  ON ON 
^  ^  —  O  
OO CN CnJ 
O  O
—< r - On On
^ ^  —1 o
OO —  (N CN
O  Ö
-  ON ON
■"t — o
O C  —  C n |  f N
r t  Ö  Ö
r n  O n ON it t  — O 
OO -H  (N  fN  
Tf Ö Ö
— r— r^ - oo
Nt nJ- O  O n GO —< r4 
r f  C 2 o
—  r^- *cf 
tj- ^  —
00  —N (N CN
Ö Ö
<—I r~- cn Nt^fOO 
OC —  CNj
Tt Ö Ö
>>
p
>2JCo
C3
C0
E
3Jo
1 
<
> 2
2o
w
C3
:>u
cu
'B2
I
!
0
E<uT3>,
03
1
E
.2
03Cu
>2
■-
o
E<u-a
-*-*
a>
3CA<U
£
•—
o
E<u"O
to<u
X
I !  
s 1 
•§ 3 
z  z
r <
c/T - o5• — Cu
C /5<D
E  
E3- a  
-  ^  -o
E  0»
o  2o  >
03 _C
’S a>
§ 1  o  £
3
& ! s  sC S 2  “S
a
Ü 03
Xw 
_o 
2
V 2
o
Ö
U  03
w T3
Ü
c  CZ
•S 5
E  Q
C /2  ♦ - >
CCS Cd
3_o
c/2 CU <i>
SO i  o
r -  03 2
O  - 3  cSi
CU G
Q -2
a  g
U h 3  
O CU
a a c2 3 Ö 
g O I
2  « 5
03 C
^.ts
E  ’SG
| . s-3 3 O ^*.2 > 
2  to 
£ 8. 
-  S
tocd(U
§ H t3
G -  u  J Co ^ ^
T3 cd
I
3
öcu
§■$
”3 <u x «3
C /2  
C /20
ob
.2 .
1  Q3.0
Ö )  ( U
B 3
s |
3 'Za- os
I ! 2>i 3 "3
f  S g
^  O 'O 00*^ - 
Öß T3 •“ 13 _g U
C /5<Dt3 3C/2 3•—
3
S 3<5 ™
1 e
op
<D
a U l  
g  1 .1  7
a  u 3  t3
°  JO c  3
Ö Prcu Q
a
öa. —13
M S IH  ^  3.. -3<U O ^
2  o t
B  *
3  C /2C/5 (D. c^
S3 23 -5
^  G
p 2
^  2
o3
cos
■Öso
U
h
'£
C3
S-
CSo>
£Eh
JS-u-
‘5
IT)
CN
—
-Cw
H
~
£
o>
C*
ir>
<N
c4
<
S
03
H
C/5
11i-u <d
C/5
11Ph CD
C/51|
Ph CD
C/511
U- a
C/5"O ^8 J• —* 4h Ph <D
C/5s|•”* <+hPh <D
C/5
11
Ph CD
C/5II
u- aj
C/511Ph CD
C/511
PP <D
C/5T3 £  
Ph CD
C/5T3 £
* 1Uh <D
r~~
/*VIT) 't M  Os -r <N OO 00 ©  On OS
©  —  CN —
*  / ----\  / ----v
on m  ooNO O' N  OO io I'; On O'
—  S  ri Ö
* /-H /-'rn >n oo (Ni (N (N op 00 CN On On
cn r-< cn r->
Co00
Ö
Cooo
©
»o 00 tn o
cn —  r-- cnOn N  NO O
-  d  s
m  n  cnin Nn r~-(S (N ©
—  ~  <=>
v
CNO
Cooo cn cn no m  cn <n  CN t": N  N  ON»—  CL~J "^H 1w  I W  I
<~1
/—N X-v(N Gv m  On (N ^  on. -
©  — . CN
/-s /-- /-VOn no ©  OO cn O©  00 CnI — 1 CN(N| O; N  NO o
j  6  -C o  sI N-- N -
ONCN (N cncn©  ©  c-~ cn v ^
CN ^  SO . 
®  o  -  CN
/-S /-V
on ©  cn cnON 00 >n NT) (N (N| fN|
7 S - C
CN©
cn ©  on cn CN ©  (N o') in cn NO ’S
ON ©  ©  00 CN t-~ 
—  ©I w
m  m  no oo >n n  (N -  CN CN ©  CN
cn ©  m  ^  o  —
CN CN^
©  cn oo 
cn cn cn© —N. ©
cn ni
cn o  r- cn
X“^v
O
(N
VsOO O' h^ On
Ö  r*
©  nf r-~ cn r- ©  
©  CN,
* ^  ©  ©  —  (N
NO 0O
cn _©  <N no o  
— ' — : ©
©CN©
©CN©
©CN©
©CN©
©(N©
©CNON
in
cn^  oo m  <n £ £ £  i—j ©  O n cN (N 
r4 cn ^  ^
/*^*N
CN©
cn oo cn cn —  ©  
CN CN
/■-'
oo©
cn m  un 
cn CN
-^s -Vcn ©  oo (N —  ©  CN
©  ©  ©  r-~- ©  ©  ©  }^- in ©
CN CN^
CN
* /-s00 ©  r- ©— I in
—i ©
in
d
in©
c33o
in
cx
©
2
I
o
£<u©
>,
Uh
o
£<D"O
in
Uh
o
£
2_3
o
i-H
0
1
0
■6
1
3
31)
E.3
3
1
r2
£<u-3
T3<UC/5n ’> ro ~ C/5<u X
< u
3Oh cu Ü
©  ©
d  ©
©  ©
©  ©
©  ©
©  ©
©  ©
—  ©  t"~ —
©  ©
—  ©r-. —
 ^V /—■Srf CN ^  OO 
OO ©  ©©  CN oo — ;
©I
©(N©
©CN©
©  ©
d ©
cn—  ©  
©  ©
©  CN —  ©
©  ©
S .2-a h
*-> ©  c3
8 px U  c UJ w  oo 
■5 ‘S
3 2
•2 ,yjII 
I  §o
T3
i' q<u Q
"2 Q
<U <U 
£ u -
GO c/5fl«
3 1  2
SI-O « ^  cdr? cx
121
CU
Q
O  g-
2  «
g 2
d
t-
o 
Eao
«T *o 
u 2c £  c H
2c3
Ü>
-2
£n
3
ajc a
<u
13
w T3in W
M..C  ^“
s i  | €
es onc 2 «  _ 
| « o 2  
0 .3 c3 Ö
I &  S 2c« O —  P3C J_ >0 3^
O Ö .2 c
T3 O
c33 ©C/5
C2 g*
.S di
8 f
z z ^ <
<u
<L> 'Sa. °
Oh ”ZS
Q
2  1
! ■ §  § Dd a. . <u c -a _o
-53
OJJQ
O-H
O 73
.2 ä
2 o
£  °
i f
•2 to
c/T«3 .2 
&  £ -a
^ £(U C+-1in
I S  
3 * 
1 §  8 1s 
in EJh ”77
"c5
>N"5
a>a.C/5
2
u
Ö
ÖCx
E3©
>N-<—I
3O
<U<uUh>
dd
"i
O  13
T
ab
le
 A
2.
2.
6 
R
es
ul
ts
 f
or
 T
ab
le
 2
.5
 w
it
h 
an
 A
lt
er
na
ti
ve
 M
ea
su
re
 o
f 
D
em
oc
ra
cy
JU
Qj
C/5
l ltU <u
c/5
• — U—<tu <L>
• 1tu 0)
C/3
• l l
i-U CD
C/3
11tu  <U
C/5-o tj
• •—1tu <L>
C/3
11
t u  CL>
C/3
11tu  <D
C/3
11tu <u
C/3
11
tu  cu
T3
Sjg
tu  <u
"O
M—<
Uh <U
r“—i
✓--' * ^
vO (N  ^O 0 s  i n  O  
n  m  ^  i n  M
(n
O  i/~>
d  d  ~  d
(50 T) O' O  M O' h  ' t  
m  q  cn q  
—* —< o  —
/---S /-- s *  /—s
O ' 'O  i n  O
On ^  m  ^  >n fN
o  ^  o  i d  on
- d d s
*  /--v "--S *  /-- s
Q n v o  O ' i/~3 O  
O  <N c n  —* i d  (N  
o  o  o  iD
^ d ^  d -  ©
* ^  
r -  r -
o  —Os —
Os ®  r- nt 
cn o
ö  —
r~~
cn
q
in
cn cn 
CN —
o  o
* /--S /---t— C GO m< 
O  — CN Os 
o s  —  i n  ®
o  os' in OO ^ 00 <N 
O  Os —H —'
d  6  r iI w  w
/—■N S
On (N  >T)
in  o  oo M
O '  T-H
d  o  r iI w  w
*  /—v /—V /—v
m  ®  oo in os o
i n ( N ( N |3 s r ' , t  
in Os in  q  cn ®
— ©  Z  — cd —*
I '— <• ' — '  I — '
r -  nt- cn cn cn m  cn —i
in  d  d
r -  nr cn <N 
cn in  cn —
in  o  ©
r~- nr cn cn 
cn m  cn —
/----v *  -— Sin  o  h  h  
m  (N o  — in Os os »Sz  © —; —II —  W
3  p
OS O
r -  n r
q  ^
o  q
in 
oo m
—I CN
*  ^-n
m  ®  in CN m  Os
I ■ s tj  »“ «
I w  I
*  r —V v
t— t"'- oo in
O  —1 CN OS O' - 1 in  O
-  © 
s o  cn  
cn q
T d
/—v /—n< m  so Os 
oo cn cn ’~~I r- q  
rH ri ri ri 
I w  I w
r~v s
0 0  'O  OS O  
M  OS t s  T f
in  q  cn ©
ö  —
©Os
<N
/---V /--- v *
-— i n s o O s t ^ ' t ^ '  oo (N m  —> o  t-<— <—< r^ - ®  os »—1
—' r i  ni ni — ~
I w  I w  w
m  q
ö  d
r- nT 
so r~~ 
cm q  
o
oo ®  r -  os 
SO —
ö  (N
*  /— v
s o  0 0
Os O  
(N Os
ni 6,
O  ro r t  oo 
oo mi
© d
—i in so Os oo (N m r—1— — r-- q
— d  r-i d
*  /---N /--vr -  r--- oc m  
O  ^  (N Os
o s  - s  m  o
s
M  t  M  c c  
(N n  rH I f
v o  (N  r i  
d  r i  (N (N
m  r -  o s  — 
r t  SO — 
OO ®  so O  • • • • 
T—H • 1
>>
5
>s
JZ
c3
co
E
<U
J2
S
X i
<
äv-
O
D
C3
>
u
D.
2
§5
2
I
t-
o
Eu
-a
>s
S
c
CU
E
. 5
c3
a .
u
0
E<u-a
1
rs
u
£
2oo
£a>
■O
■q
i n ö  o
^  cn cn m m (N »—I
q  —  — ; — ; 
in cd ö
r— ^  (N (N 
cn m  cn —
in  ö  ö
' t  CN CS|
cn in  cn
q  —  —
in ö  Ö
C~ ^  (N (N
m  m  cn s— 
in o  ö
c -  s r  r- i c l  
cn  m  cn —i
in  ö  Ö
n- t '  oo 
m — o5^
in o  ö
r-~ nc cn •st cn >n —i o
in ö  o
h  S t  O ' o  
c n  m  o  oq
ö  ö
o
3  s  . 
i s *  
s  §
•§ °
-a 
<u 
frt "O 
3 2 
CT
•j'i
rf s b i  
§ -  c2 §
«  D . °  ^ 5
C  <U —•' ^
§ a « -
I l l s  
I  d«  I
. S  2  d  cC  •♦-* • ^
e  u  cd C
o  3  -O  M
•i g  > -
§oo *m‘ ~o 
^ 2 *  
c« T3r t  "Ow S
d  c 2 * 
q  .2
® 3  | :
> 3  C  *
1  l - i  s
•a 2  s  21 2 I §
C ^  .S
g ^  so
n  d
u  oj
Ea
• -  ^z z  ^<
! 1 | !
-S d  « ^  
■■5 &  o  g  
5 2  > , §
s 5 'S a
1  &
a « ; 2
! ‘| . s  j
2 d  u 
5 ^ 2 “ ° a- « 2
« & u
«  §  t  "H
g « r
£ S
14 |1
o  C3 . 5  - 5  
00  o  ^  o  
t. u  Cu
s  8 . ' S  d
l a .  ° . l
— — * d i
^  C« ' S
°  1 5  -  §
O S S *
* i  u  £  . 2
2  O  3  ^
l l l l
.2 g ä 
— E 1  ^
c  ^« Q00 rn
•§ E'C 3
c3 T3
S E £ I 
S
1/3 v E ° 1
J-
c  03u
’S  C/5S .a
g" £
^  E
£  -i _
H  On C
.. is «
2 s  s2 . o  o  /U O cu
I  13-u- >
3  O  
O CN
2  c<u
00  coo
S3
CNnt
10
 p
en
Ta
bl
e 
A
2.
2.
7 
R
es
ul
ts
 fo
r 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
5 
w
ith
 a
 O
ne
-m
ill
io
n 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
Th
re
sh
o2
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
(N
*
✓—S S *  '--N
OO Qv O  O  ^  ^  i n  'O
^  r ,
iy~) O s  >D O  Tj* ON
Os iO  h
=0 sO ^  ^
o  O  (N ^  O  ™  z i ~  S rsLO —  O  O
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
*
*  —^v —^S /*s / V /-—V
on o  o s  o  o  ^  oc  L nr -  ^  o  ^  ( N ^  m  r*-
on oo IT) O  O  ON ^  C>
0  'so r -
00  NO ^  ^
— ’- ’ S . <N' w ^ S  ’“ C -
irC ö  ö
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
c
*  ! 
*  *  :
*   S /—S  ^ N  ^ N *  / s !
^ ^ —• 0 ^ 0 0 ^  h  oo n  ^  !
o  >-n —1 < t  O  'O  M  !
O ' —; m  ^  o  ^  o  (N !
on so  r -
00  so  ^  r n
1 1  ^ ^
' j '  C - 7  F | i n  -  d  6
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
*
r-v  /—v *  r-N
k o O o < N  o  —
o  — a s  no r~-
t3- ON i/~) OO O  M  a 00  m
5 \ ^ S - d  7 8 ^ 3 - 8
r. X| • •
10  O  O
C/5
s  £
/^S z' s / • -N
m  0  ^ on iT 5 ^ o
o ^ O ( N ^ 5  r n  r ^
° ° r - ; i r 5 o q  0  00  0  <N ^ - on
On NO r -
° °  so  ^  ^
Uh <d o o
* O  ^  ’ O  *—< —^ OW  N,__✓  N__✓  I N-- ✓ N---/ I S--✓
CS \ |  • •
^  O  O
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
r-31 2
.0
0
7
(1
.2
9
2
)
1
.5
1
9
(1
.8
7
2
)
-
1
.0
0
0
(0
.8
6
1
)
-1
.0
2
7
(1
.2
3
8
)
-2
.4
6
3
*
*
(1
.1
4
5
)
5
,1
8
9
1
4
6
0
.1
4
6
0
.1
3
7
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
*
/ s / V / s *  /—S / V
VI M  O N M O N O r i i O i o ' O
t^- i/n
O s OO VI X  V i -3 - ~  T f CN
on no r~~
00  no 2  2Ü
s
—^  ; —  r i  —  r i  —  —’ 0
\ '—' 1 w  1 ^  w  w irT —  Ö  O
C/5
T3 t j
g  £
r —s r-v  v / -v
o s  10  on <N on 0  r -  00  10  no
fr-)ND —  ' t  (N| O l t ' -
i/"n On i n  00 i n  ^  0  n  - ^ - O n
on no r -
22  no ^  7Ü
b  ' u s
O - i  —  ^ o i  —  —; —1 —h' O
I w  1 w  1 w  w  1 w
#s \ j  • •
l/~i *—• 0  0
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
*
/—V /—-N ^—\ -X* /^N
00  *0  O v ^ N O v O  h  00  m  IT)
0 0 NO —   ^ (s | VO
~-f- t^- i n  DO i n  h  O f N r J - i —;
on no r -
00 NO ^  n’ 1 1 - 1
- t O ' -1 —h —* (N —1 —^  — r- i —w  1 w  1 w  , w  1 ^
•s N • •
m  -  0  0
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
r F
-0
.1
6
7
(1
.7
9
5
)
-1
.0
3
7
(1
.8
4
3
)
-2
.0
9
2
(1
.7
4
0
)
5
,1
8
9
1
4
6
0
.1
4
2
0
.1
3
2
*  *
Fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s
F j 2
.4
8
3
*
(1
.0
7
1
)
-0
.8
0
3
(1
.1
8
5
)
-2
.4
2
1
*
(1
.0
7
8
)
5
,1
8
9
1
4
6
0
.1
4
2
0
.1
3
3
u
c -X-E
o3 iy
«
- a  r i
*  /—s
NO ^  
CN ^ ON 00 ON
IT) NO OO no ^  (N|^ ^   ^ 1 ]Z
0 -
* C^
Ü- OJ
i-4 0 ^ vn —i ö  Ö
>1
O >s
^  ö 8
p  2  i  0  ^4Z 'S  C  O "O
0  2  <U c  0
«  >1 O  ^  E  2
1 §  5  b  ^  g
>1 £  Ö . 2  S  0  £
a i i  
I  8 ? !8 s 1 "  1 1 -81 1 1 S 1 1 -8
1  JS  >  3  - g  V  . s
>  i  Di cn
"  §  .E o4
43 0  jo  •
j 0  0  • ~  ' ö 1a  <  G S £  £  2 ; Z Z ^ <
■ s  ja e
' S  3  O 
~  X) t
§-S “
*  B  S3
«3 1  
« 1 *  
s  ^  3
S Oc (U Q
o ^  Q “  
^ ü <u o
03 W
cn o  U .z. 
T3 "=* J3
<U 0) _
s §
ÖD"? o ^
S  * £  a
31 ai 
£  c g ' l— o § x: 
o  ‘-3 £ c  
<N £  %  " 1
s- ft  2
>N
o o — >
“ £ § i s
2  2  o ^
“  o E ^
C  £  _  53
q 5 h * ;
0 g - s i  S
2  -8 ^  * I
<L> at <U O  ^
3  “  § 1  2  
=5 H >> o -oC  ö  -Q o  c
g - s i s  “
s 2 .2 a  u .2 ® „ - s a
f . 2  a  1  S3
1 t|-s §
0 S .S Ü  8
1  £  §  | I
« § s * “
X  MC «3 c H  S 
1 2 | . d  1
1 2 1-S-S
>  ^5 *
£S1§12 a  °  >>*
S  CL =  5  *
& 8  r f l : '
' S  _  . 2  t o  *
°  J3 C  ^  vi
.2 2 i  g S
u  M u  S c 
£  - c3 ^  ju(U
«1 CO ^  « I
I  ■! 1 1  .£
•s i -is
l - 3 - l § - S
s  § | S  £
flj ^  ■
l i i i  1
£ § 8 g
E o >  2
3  O 03 
^  "T3c •- y 
S « £  a3
I i l l8 8 a  o
5
Chapter 3: Electoral Budget Cycles under 
Non-democratic Regimes
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between elections and macroeconomic dynamics has been subject to 
debate in economic literature. Following seminal contributions by Nordhaus (1975) and 
Tufte (1978), one strand of the large body of research on the political business cycle is 
the study of electoral budget cycles. Recently, several authors have confirmed the 
presence of politically driven budget cycles, not only in terms of total size (for example, 
Schuknecht 2000; Persson & Tabellini 2003; Shi & Svensson 2006), but also in terms of 
composition (Vergne 2009; Katsimi & Sarantides 2012; Drazen & Eslava 2010). 
However, it has been noted that politically driven budget cycles are the experiences of 
newly democratised countries and are not a phenomenon of old or established 
democracies (Brender & Drazen 2005).
Despite this advance, there has been hardly any cross-country study investigating the 
effect of elections on government budget under non-democratic regimes/ Previous 
literature (for example, Block 2003; Brender & Drazen 2005; Vergne 2009) argues that 
electoral budget cycles make sense only in democratic countries where electoral 
competition is present, and ignores the possibility that elections may have an effect on 
government budget in non-democratic countries. Implicit in the argument is that 
competitive elections are exclusive to democracy.
This chapter argues that, even under non-democratic regimes, political budget cycles 
can exist. Electoral competition is a concept narrower than democracy and the former 
may apply in the absence of the latter (Hyde & Marinov 2012). To the extent that 
elections are competitive, incumbents in non-democratic countries face a non-zero 
probability of loss and have incentives to distort the government budget. To test the
5 Wright’s (2011) manuscript is an exception. A limited number of single-country studies includes 
Gonzalez (2002a), Blaydes (2006) and Pepinsky (2007).
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argument, this chapter makes use of the National Elections across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA) dataset which covers a new measure of electoral competition, and 
estimates the effect of competitive elections on the central government budget balance 
in 29 non-democratic countries between 1960 and 2006.
This chapter is motivated by the fact that, in the last few decades, elections have spread 
to almost all countries in the world, including those commonly judged as non- 
democratic. Indeed, many rulers take up executive and legislative elections while at the 
same time resisting full democratisation, creating so-called ‘hybrid regimes’ (Collier & 
Levitsky 1997; Geddes 1999; Diamond 2002). Regardless of the reasons for such 
decisions,6 it is natural to expect that the rulers of hybrid regimes would attempt to win 
any election and make efforts to maintain their power, including perhaps by 
manipulating the government budget.
The primary finding is that electoral budget cycles do exist under non-democratic 
regimes. The effect of elections on the share of central government budget balance in 
gross domestic product (GDP) is significant and robust to a number of variations in 
control variables, estimation models, sample selection criteria and designations of the 
election-year dummy. The other finding is that the persistence of budget cycles under 
non-democratic regimes is driven by the subsample of countries that are less distant 
from democracy (that is, shallow autocracies). The effect of elections on the share of 
central government budget balance in GDP is under no circumstances significant when 
the regression includes only the subsample of countries more distant from democracy 
(that is, deep autocracies).
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses theoretical constructs 
that underlie the relationship between elections and budget cycles under non­
democracy. Section 3.3 describes estimation strategy and data. Section 3.4 provides the 
results and section 3.5 offers conclusions.
6 Political scientists have given different explanations about why autocratic rulers take up elections, such 
as to signal a regime’s party strength, to identify the nature of a regime’s support or to enjoy the fruits 
of domestic and international legitimacy (see, for example, Geddes 2005; Gandhi & Przeworski 2006). 
A complete discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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3.2 Theoretical Overview
In response to the occurrence of hybrid regimes, political scientists have proposed 
different categorisations for different levels of democracy. For example, Diamond 
(2002) lists countries in the world under one of six mutually exclusive political regimes 
in 2001, namely politically closed authoritarian (for example, Cuba, China), hegemonic 
electoral authoritarian (Republic of Congo, Kazakhstan), competitive authoritarian 
(Belarus, Haiti), ambiguous regimes (Guatemala, Mexico), electoral democracy (Brazil, 
Argentina) and liberal democracy (Australia, United States). Elections take place under 
all of these categories except the politically closed authoritarian.
Naturally, elections under hegemonic electoral authoritarian or competitive 
authoritarian are not the same as elections under electoral democracy or liberal 
democracy. Levitsky and Way (2002) consider hegemonic electoral authoritarian and 
competitive authoritarian as regimes in which elections play important roles in the 
acquisition of power, but do not appear to be fair enough to meet the minimum criteria 
for modem democracy. Elections under these two regimes are marked by the abuse of 
government resources, the prohibition of opposition media coverage, hassling of 
political opponents and, in some cases, falsification of the results of elections. 
Meanwhile, elections under electoral democracy or liberal democracy are open, free and 
fair, with appropriate protection of civil rights, including freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press. Even though violations occur at various times, they are not 
systematic enough to hamper political competition.
This does not mean that electoral budget cycles make no sense under non-democracy. 
First, as Hyde and Marinov (2012) emphasise, electoral competition is a concept 
narrower than democracy and the former may apply in the absence of the latter. For an 
election to be competitive, it requires that there are at least one opposition group to 
contest the incumbent; multiple political parties are technically and constitutionally 
legal; and the number of candidates competing for a slot exceeds the number of slots to 
be filled. To the extent that these requirements are met, the outcome of an election 
would be uncertain. Thus, even in non-democratic countries where the conditions are
46
harshly biased against opposition candidates, an incumbent faces a non-zero probability 
of losing office and has the incentive to distort the government budget.
Second, palpable electoral fraud or falsification of voting results, while technically 
possible, can be in contradiction to the raison d’etre of taking up elections. This is true 
when leaders in non-democratic countries aspire to enjoy the fruits of domestic and 
international legitimacy (Joseph 1999; Schedler 2002) or to reduce the threat of 
revolution and other kinds of violent removal (Cox 2010). These leaders recognise that, 
rather than committing electoral fraud or falsifying voting results that potentially trigger 
popular grievances (Thompson & Kuntz 2006; Fearon 2011) and revolutions (for 
example, Tucker 2007; Kuntz & Thompson 2009), distorting the public budget prior to 
an election is a less risky means of maintaining political power.
Moreover, there should be more room for budget manipulation under non-democracy 
than under democracy. Less democracy implies not only greater incumbent power over 
fiscal policy, but also less transparency (Hollyer, Rosendorff & Vreeland 2011) and 
more asymmetric information. Evidence confirms that transparency matters for the 
presence of budget cycles. Using data from 19 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries, Alt and Lassen (2006) report a persistent pattern 
of electoral budget cycles in countries with low transparency. The less transparent the 
public sector, the lower the likelihood that voters can observe the true budget 
conditions.
How asymmetric information induces electoral budget cycles is formally modelled in 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990). For these authors, electoral budget cycles 
can be construed as part of a signalling game where voters are concerned only with the 
competence (that is, the ability to deliver more public goods for the same level of taxes) 
of politicians. Politicians have perfect information about their own level of competence, 
while no voters are able to observe it. To signal their competence, incumbents cut taxes 
and raise govemmentconsumption spending prior to an election and return them to 
normal after the election process has finished.
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Gonzalez (2002b) extends Rogoffs (1990) model to explain the effects of the level of 
democracy on budget cycles. Progress in the level of democracy (that is, from totally 
authoritarian to full democracy) increases the possibility of enforcing electoral results. 
Consequently, the cost of political turnover decreases, enticing incumbents to 
manipulate the government budget prior to elections. By the same token, as the level of 
democracy progresses, the likelihood that voters perceive incumbents’ true competence 
increases. Electoral budget cycles therefore occur at intermediate levels of democracy, 
where the cost of enforcing electoral results is low and the voters’ chance to recognise 
the incumbents’ competence is also relatively low.
To put this hypothesis in the context of the regime categorisation above, budget cycles 
are less likely to take place under the extreme categories of hegemonic electoral 
authoritarian and liberal democracy, but more likely to arise under the hybrid regimes of 
competitive authoritarian and electoral democracy. Under hegemonic electoral 
authoritarian, the cost of removing an incumbent is excessively high for the voters. 
Election results cannot be enforced and incumbents need not worry about the risk of 
being voted out. Consequently, there is little incentive to engage in costly manipulation 
and no budget cycles take place. Under more democratic regimes, political competition 
is higher and the cost of enforcing political turnover is lower. Incumbents are at risk of 
being voted out, especially when they are perceived to be of the low-competence type. 
Incumbents therefore have an incentive to signal their competence to the voters by 
manipulating the government budget during pre-election periods. Budget cycles shrink 
as the level of democracy increases because the more chances that voters have to 
discover an incumbent’s true competence, the less space there is for budget 
manipulation.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
The basic regression equation in this chapter is provided by
Yi,t =  ßo +  ßiYi.t-1 + ß2 electyearix + ß3Xi>t_1 +  ßAct + ßsy t + ei>t [3.1]
where C; denotes unobserved country fixed effects, y t denotes year fixed effects and e^  t 
denotes error terms. The dependent variable, Yi t , is the central government budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP in country i in year t. It captures the dynamics of 
overall government budget size and is approximated using data from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) (see, IMF 2011). However, as the IFS data suffer from missing 
values, identically-defined budget balance data from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) (see, World Bank 2011) are used to complement. Here, rather than arbitrarily 
filling in the missing values or replacing certain data points in the IFS data using 
information from the WDI, a more prudent approach is taken. That is, to use 
observations from the IFS as they are, or to replace them all with observations from the 
WDI.7 For each country, the WDI become a choice only if observations from the IFS 
are totally missing or partially missing but consist of shorter observation years within 
the country’s time series.
The key independent variable, electyeari t , is a dummy coded 1 for the years with a 
competitive election, and 0 otherwise. ‘Competitive’ means that the election meets the 
requirements of opposition presence, multiparty involvement and multicandidate 
appearance in the NELDA dataset (Hyde & Marinov 2012). Since the focus in this 
chapter is head-of-govemment elections, only executive elections are covered under a 
directly elected presidential system and only legislative elections are included under an 
indirectly elected presidential system or a parliamentary system. In countries with a 
mixed system of government, legislative elections are chosen if no presidential elections 
took place or if Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) call the effective head of 
government as a prime minister, an acting prime minister, a premier or a chancellor.
7 This is particularly important because electoral budget cycle is all about year-to-year patterns. To fill in 
the missing values or to replace certain data points arbitrarily using observations from one data source 
or another may cause unintended subjectivity bias.
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The control variables, Xi t_1, consist of the lagged log real GDP per capita, annual 
growth rate of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age- 
dependency ratio. Real GDP per capita and, in particular, its growth rate are considered 
as a natural smoother of budget balance.8 Trade openness matters because it possibly 
affects the way governments manage the economy. The more open an economy, the less 
effective is the stabilisation function of surplus or deficit policy (Jensen & Jensen 
1995). Total population and the age-dependency ratio may affect government revenue 
and government expenditure in opposite manners and are therefore likely to impact the 
budget balance. Data for real GDP per capita, the growth of real GDP per capita, and 
trade openness are all from the Penn World Table (PWT) (see, Heston, Summers & 
Aten 2011), while population and the age-dependency ratio data are from the United 
Nations (2011).
Including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor, on the one hand, exemplifies the 
common sense belief that the current government budget is affected by the previous 
budget. On the other hand, it causes endogeneity problems with respect to lagged 
control variables and unobserved country-specific characteristics and may result in 
biased coefficient estimates. To deal with this issue, regression coefficients in equation 
[3.1] are estimated using Arellano-Bond dynamic panel Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimators (Arellano & Bond 1991) in addition to fixed effects 
estimators.
Estimations are carried out for an unbalanced panel of non-democratic countries 
between 1960 and 2006. To be included in the estimation sample, a country must have a 
zero or negative polity2 score in the PIV dataset (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2010) and 
not be an absolute monarchy or a single-party communist country. The country must 
also have no less than seven years of observation in total (with each period of separated
8 Here, the basic assumption is that log of real GDP per capita and real GDP per capita growth rate in 
the previous year affect current fiscal policy, although it is also likely that fiscal policy affects these 
variable in the first place (see, for example, Romero-Avila & Strauch 2008; Afonso & Furceri 2010).
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observations lasts for at least two years) and cover at least one election.9 To allow 
analysis of electoral budget cycles under different levels of non-democracy, the full 
sample of non-democracies is partitioned into two subsamples.10 Countries whose 
average polity2 score exceeds -5 are deemed to be shallow autocracies, whereas those 
whose average polity2 score is -5 or less are listed as deep autocracies. The descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 3.1 highlight the characteristics of the data covered.
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics
N obs. Mean Std dev.
Budget balance (% of GDP in current prices)
- Full sample 486 -1.903 4.199
Shallow autocracies 236 -1.351 4.691
- Deep autocracies 250 -2.425 3.608
Real GDP per capita growth rate (% per annum)
- Full sample 486 2.238 7.091
- Shallow autocracies 236 2.529 5.156
- Deep autocracies 250 1.963 8.527
Log of real GDP per capita
- Full sample 486 7.691 1.125
- Shallow autocracies 236 7.967 1.181
- Deep autocracies 250 7.429 1.005
Trade openness (% of GDP at constant prices)
- Full sample 486 81.200 79.485
- Shallow autocracies 236 104.116 101.129
- Deep autocracies 250 59.568 41.065
Total population (million people)
- Full sample 486 20.174 32.650
- Shallow autocracies 236 14.046 17.826
- Deep autocracies 250 25.958 41.319
Age dependency ratio
- Full sample 486 84.412 19.464
- Shallow autocracies 236 82.668 21.907
- Deep autocracies 250 86.059 16.713
9 This requirement implies that the minimum time series length in dynamic Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimations is six years.
10 Despite its appeal. Diamond’s (2002) regime classification mentioned above cannot be used to divide 
the sample into subsamples because it covers the portrait only in 2001 only.
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3.4 Estimation Results
3.4.1 The Basic Results
Table 3.2 columns 1—4 summarises the results for the full sample. In columns 1-2, 
estimations are based on a fixed effects model. Irrespective of whether economic and 
demographic control variables are excluded or included in the regression, the 
coefficients of the election-year dummy turn out to be negative and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. In columns 3-4, the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel 
GMM is used to estimate the parameters. The coefficients of the election-year dummy 
continue to be negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. These results 
suggest that electoral budget cycles do exist under non-democratic regimes. Holding 
other factors constant, the central government budget balance as a share of GDP is 
about 0.8 percent lower in election years than in non-election years.
Columns 5-8 of Table 3.2 summarise the results for shallow autocracies. Regardless of 
the estimation models used, the coefficients of the election-year dummy are always 
negative and statistically significant. Elections do induce a decrease in the GDP share of 
the central government budget balance with a magnitude of approximately 1.1-1.2 
percent. Remarkably, the converse applies for deep autocracies. The results reported in 
columns 9-12 indicate that, although they have the same negative sign, the coefficients 
of the election-year dummy are never statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Thus, while electoral budget cycles are prevalent in shallow autocracies, they are not in 
deep autocracies.
Overall, the results in Table 3.2 indicate that shallow autocracies drive the relationship 
between elections and the share of the central government budget balance in GDP. 
Removing these countries from the larger sample renders the effect of elections on the 
GDP share of the central government budget balance statistically insignificant.
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3.4.2 Results with More Stringent Criteria for Sample Selection
Previous estimations include every observation where a country is considered non- 
democratic (that is, it receives a zero or negative polity2 score in the PIV dataset), 
regardless of whether the observation is part of a long non-democratic period or occurs 
in the midst of democratic periods that have been treated as missing. To ensure that the 
conclusions drawn are not driven by the inclusion of amid-democratic-observations, 
regressions in Table 3.3 add more criteria for sample selection. Observations that are 
interrupted by five or more missing years are excluded unless they constitute a period of 
at least four consecutive observations and one election. Five years represents the longest 
interval between two regular elections (for example, presidential elections in Mexico 
and the Philippines) and enforcing such criteria can help reduce potential bias related to 
interrupting democratic periods. Besides, to be included in the estimations, a country 
must have a minimum of seven years of observations and cover at least one election.
The results indicate that the pattern of the effect of elections on the central government 
budget balance as a share of GDP is persistent. In columns 1-2, where the sample 
includes all autocracies, the coefficients of the election-year dummy are always 
statistically significant. In columns 3-4, where only shallow autocracies are included in 
the sample, the coefficients of the election-year dummy are also significant. Finally, in 
columns 5-6, where only deep autocracies are covered in the sample, the coefficients of 
the election-year dummy are not significant.
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Table 3.3 The Effects of Elections on Budget Balance under Non- 
democratic Regimes; Results with More Stringent Criteria 
for Sample Selection
Full sample Shallow autocracies Deep autocracies
Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic
effects3 panelb effects3 panelb effects3 panelb
H I f21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Election-year dummy6 -0.809** -0.828** -1.215** -1.191*** -0.305 -0.217
(0.390) (0.356) (0.538) (0.406) (0.725) (0.743)
RGDP per capita growth 0.002 -0.003 0.081* 0.088** -0.011 -0.005
(0.024) (0.030) (0.042) (0.040) (0.026) (0.030)
Log of RGDP per capita -0.177 -0.278 3.478 4.742* -2.490 -4.034**
(1.153) (1.201) (2.723) (2 .886) (1.911) (1.816)
Trade openness -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.019 -0.013*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
Total population 0.001 0.016 0.311** 0.427* 0.063 0.009
(0.050) (0.066) (0.133) (0.220) (0.071) (0.082)
Age dependency ratio -0.110*** -0.130*** -0.127** -0.130*** -0.125 -0.108*
(0.035) (0.026) (0.054) (0.019) (0.076) (0.057)
N observations 465 427 236 216 229 211
N countries 28 28 14 14 14 14
2nd order testd 0.392 0.684 0.933
Sargan test6 0.280 0.506 0.142
Adj. R-square 0.601 0.711 0.440
Note: The dependent variable is the central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. aEach 
regression includes a constant, one lag of the dependent variable, country dummies and year dummies. 
bEach regression is estimated using the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator and includes a constant and 
year dummies. Lagged log of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age-dependency 
ratio are assumed to be strictly exogenous, while the lag of real GDP per capita growth rate is assumed 
to be predetermined. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. cElection-year dummy takes the value 1 
in the year of election no matter when in the year the election took place. dP-values> 0.05 implies that 
the error term in the regression is not serially correlated. eP-values> 0.05 implies that the instruments are 
not correlated with the error term. ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level 
respectively.
3.4.1 Results with an Alternative Designation of Election Year
Past studies have noticed that instead of capturing pre-electoral effect, the election-year 
dummy may for the most part capture the period after an election, especially when the 
election took place early in the year (Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya 2004). To test whether 
the effect of elections on the central government budget balance under non-democratic 
regimes is sensitive to such concern, regressions in Table 3.2 are repeated, but with an 
alternative designation for the election-year dummy. In Table 3.3, the binary variable 
for election years takes the value 1 in the year preceding an election if the election took 
place before July, and in the year of election if the election took place in July or later.
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The results reported in Table 3.4 suggest no evidence for the concern described above. 
In columns 1-4, where the sample includes all autocracies or only shallow autocracies, 
the coefficients of the election-year dummy remain significant. Meanwhile, in columns 
5-6, where only deep autocracies are covered in the sample, the converse remains true. 
Further tests using different months as a threshold for the election-year dummy indicate 
that the pattern of the relationship between elections and the GDP share of the central 
government budget balance is robust to the designation of the election-year dummy.
Table 3.4 The Effects of Elections on Budget Balance under Non- 
democratic Regimes; Results with an Alternative Designation
of Election Year
Full sample Shallow autocracies Deep autocracies
Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic
effects3 panelb effects3 panelb effects3 panelb
111 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Election-year dummyc -1.136** -1.113*** -1.423** -1.487*** -0.463 -0.009
(0.450) (0.366) (0.555) (0.355) (0.790) (0.584)
RGDP per capita growth 0.023 0.027 0.084** 0.092** 0.018 0.025
(0.025) (0.033) (0.041) (0.038) (0.028) (0.034)
Log of RGDP per capita -0.017 -0.398 2.926 4.343 -1.990 -3.868**
(1.074) (1.198) (2.789) (2.868) (1.858) (1.674)
Trade openness 0.009 0.008 -0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009)
Total population 0.006 0.077 0.285** 0.409* 0.011 0.161*
(0.047) (0.065) (0.135) (0.217) (0.083) (0.095)
Age dependency ratio -0.073** -0.117*** -0.135** -0.136*** -0.028 -0.038
(0.032) (0.025) (0.056) (0.019) (0.051) (0.043)
N observations 507 463 236 216 271 247
N countries 31 31 14 14 17 17
2nd order testd 0.719 0.549 0.184
Sargan teste 0.250 0.592 0.160
Adj. R-square 0.584 0.715 0.396
Note: The dependent variable is the central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. aEach 
regression includes a constant, one lag of the dependent variable, country dummies and year dummies. 
bEach regression is estimated using the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator and includes a constant and 
year dummies. Lagged log of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age-dependency 
ratio are assumed to be strictly exogenous, while the lag of real GDP per capita growth rate is assumed 
to be predetermined. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. cElection-year dummy takes the value 1 
in the preceding year if an election took place before July, and in the year of election if the election took 
place in July or later. dP-values> 0.05 implies that the error term in the regression is not serially 
correlated. eP-values> 0.05 implies that the instruments are not correlated with the error term. ***, ** 
and * denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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3.4.2 Further Results
3.4.2.1 Election Types and Government Systems
Elections in this chapter refer either to executive or legislative elections depending on 
whether a country adopts a presidential, parliamentary or mixed-government system. In 
this sense, the effect of elections on the central government budget balance as a 
percentage of GDP may be bound by the prevailing system of government (see, for 
example, Persson & Tabellini 2003).
Table 3.5 The Effects of Elections on Budget Balance under Non- 
democratic Regimes; Results for Executive versus Legislative
Elections
Full sample Shallow autocracies Deep autocracies
Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic
effects3 panelb effects3 panel*5 effects3 panel*5m [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Execu elect year dummy0 -0.757* -0.781* -0.920 -0.944** -0.534 -0.446
(0.442) (0.446) (0.585) (0.399) (0.811) (0.868)
Legis elect year dummy0 -0.895 -0.861** -1.795 -1.680*** 0.719 1.154
(1.005) (0.427) (1.247) (0.274) (1.258) (0.913)
RGDP per capita growth 0.001 0.008 0.082* 0.088** -0.012 0.006
(0.022) (0.028) (0.042) (0.040) (0.026) (0.029)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.308 -0.237 3.376 4.639 -1.924 -4.318***
(1.123) (1.255) (2.766) (2.884) (1.978) (1.640)
Trade openness 0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.017 -0.009
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009)
Total population 0.009 0.082 0.303** 0.419* 0.041 0.183*
(0.054) (0.071) (0.137) (0.220) (0.087) (0.106)
Age dependency ratio -0.070** -0.114*** -0.128** -0.131*** -0.028 -0.045
(0.033) (0.026) (0.055) (0.019) (0.056) (0.041)
N observations 486 445 236 216 250 229
N countries 29 29 14 14 15 15
2nd order testd 0.407 0.647 0.812
Sargan test0 0.211 0.527 0.093
Adj. R-square 0.591 0.701 0.427
Note: The dependent variable is the central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. aEach 
regression includes a constant, one lag of the dependent variable, country dummies and year dummies. 
bEach regression is estimated using the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator and includes a constant and 
year dummies. Lagged log of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age-dependency 
ratio are assumed to be strictly exogenous, while the lag of real GDP per capita growth rate is assumed 
to be predetermined. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. cElection-year dummies take the value 1 
in the year of election no matter when in the year the election took place. dP-values> 0.05 implies that 
the error term in the regression is not serially correlated. eP-values> 0.05 implies that the instruments are 
not correlated with the error term. ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively.
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To test whether the existence of electoral budget cycles under non-democratic regimes 
is subject to the types of election (and, less directly, to the systems of government), 
regressions in Table 3.5 split the election-year dummy into two separate dummies: 
executive and legislative election-year dummies. The results indicate that executive 
elections are more likely to have a significant effect on the central government budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP. The coefficients of executive elections are significant 
in columns 1-2 and 4, while the coefficients of legislative election-year dummies are 
significant only in columns 2 and 4. In columns 5-6, the coefficients of executive and 
legislative election-year dummies are, without exception, proved to be insignificant.
3.4.2.2 Predetermined Election Dates
Thus far, it is assumed that election dates are predetermined. However, sometimes an 
incumbent decides to delay an election or call for an early election. It is also likely that 
an election takes place extraordinarily beyond normal expectations.11 The effect of 
elections on the share of the central government budget balance in GDP may be, 
therefore, conditional on whether the elections are predetermined or not.
To discern the effect of predetermined elections from the effect of other elections that 
are not exogenously fixed by law, regressions in Table 3.6 include two separated 
dummies—regular and irregular election-year dummies—instead of the single election- 
year dummy. Based on the NELDA dataset (Hyde & Marinov 2012), an election is 
coded regular if it was held according to its scheduled date and irregular if it was 
delayed, held earlier than its scheduled date, or extraordinary in that no political actors 
have shared expectations about when the election would be held.
11 For example, no one had expected that Indonesia would have an election in 1999, at least until the end 
of May 1998 when President Soeharto stepped down.
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Table 3.6 The Effects of Elections on Budget Balance under Non- 
democratic Regimes; Results for Regular versus 
Irregular Elections
Full sample Shallow autocracies Deep autocracies
Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic
effects“ panelb effects“ panelb effects“ panelb
m 121 PI [41 [51 [61
Regul elect year dummyc -1.017** -0.883** -1.431** -1.426** -0.581 -0.060
(0.467) (0.394) (0.655) (0.573) (0.896) (0.715)
Irreg elect year dummyc -0.372 -0.644 -0.676 -0.614 -0.143 -0.525
(0.638) (0.703) (0.766) (0.448) (1.174) (1.291)
RGDP per capita growth 0.002 0.008 0.084** 0.091** 0.011 0.005
(0.023) (0.028) (0.042) (0.039) (0.026) (0.029)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.292 -0.230 3.347 4.632 -1.957 -4.362***
(1.121) (1.277) (2.763) (2.919) (1.987) (1.665)
Trade openness 0.002 0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.016 -0.009
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010)
Total population 0.009 0.082 0.300** 0.421* -0.040 0.183*
(0.054) (0.071) (0.137) (0.218) (0.088) (0.107)
Age dependency ratio -0.068** -0.113*** -0.125** -0.127*** -0.027 -0.045
(0.032) (0.025) (0.053) (0.018) (0.056) (0.041)
N observations 486 445 236 216 250 229
N countries 29 29 14 14 15 15
2nd order testd 0.407 0.711 0.755
Sargan teste 0.211 0.493 0.093
Adj. R-square 0.593 0.710 0.427
Note: The dependent variable is the central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. “Each 
regression includes a constant, one lag of the dependent variable, country dummies and year dummies. 
bEach regression is estimated using the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator and includes a constant and 
year dummies. Lagged log of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age dependency 
ratio are assumed to be strictly exogenous, while the lag of real GDP per capita growth rate is assumed 
to be predetermined. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. cElection-year dummies take the value 1 
in the year of election no matter when in the year the election took place. dP-values> 0.05 implies that 
the error term in the regression is not serially correlated. eP-values> 0.05 implies that the instruments are 
not correlated with the error term. ***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level 
respectively.
The results for regular elections suggest quite a similar pattern as the basic results in 
Table 3.2. In columns 1^1, where the sample includes all autocracies or only shallow 
autocracies, the coefficients of the regular election-year dummy are always significant 
at the 5 percent level. In columns 5-6, where the sample comprises only deep 
autocracies, the coefficients of the regular election-year dummy are not significant. By 
contrast, the results for irregular elections suggest a very different pattern. Irrespective 
of the countries included in the sample and the model used in the estimations, the 
coefficients of the irregular election-year dummy are never statistically significant.
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This can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, in contrast to regular elections, which 
offer an incumbent with immense chances to manipulate the budget, irregular elections 
provide the incumbent with very limited time between when the election is called and 
when it is held. Second, in favourable moments, an incumbent deliberately chooses to 
delay elections or to call early elections even if it means that they have to waive budget 
manipulation. Thus, the delays of an election, or the calls for an early election, are seen 
as strategies substitutable with budget manipulation.
3.4.23 International Scrutiny
In their recent paper, Hyde and O’Mahony (2010) point out the importance of 
international scrutiny of budget balance. Monitoring by international observers 
increases the costs of committing electoral fraud and, hence, makes budget 
manipulation a more attractive option for an incumbent. By contrast, an engagement 
with the IMF reduces the chance of manipulating the budget. The IMF requires 
countries entering into its programmes to adopt sustainable macroeconomic policies, 
which in many cases implies a more disciplined fiscal policy and a cut in the budget 
deficit (Fischer 2004).
To test whether the relationship between elections and the GDP share of the central 
government budget balance is contingent upon the presence of international observers, 
in Table 3.7, the election-year dummy is split into two: observed and unobserved. 
Following Hyde (2006), an election is coded observed if at least one official delegation 
of foreign observers (friendly missions do not count) attended and directly monitored 
the election. Otherwise, the election is coded unobserved.
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Table 3.7 The Effects of Elections on Budget Balance under Non- 
democratic Regimes; Results for Observed versus 
Unobserved Elections
Full sample Shallow autocracies Deep autocracies
Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic
effects3 panelb effects3 panelb effects3 panelb
rn [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Obser elect year dummy' -0.749 -0.919* -1.105 -1.043*** -0.053 -0.023
(0.524) (0.547) (0.692) (0.399) (0.897) (0.901)
Unobs elect year dummy' -0.831 -0.679** -1.298* -1.303** -0.899 -0.644
(0.550) (0.326) (0.770) (0.511) (0.938) (0.779)
RGDP per capita growth 0.000 0.008 0.082** 0.089** -0.012 0.006
(0.022) (0.028) (0.042) (0.038) (0.026) (0.029)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.309 -0.227 3.480 4.746 -2.029 -4.410***
(1.123) (1.261) (2.724) (2.887) (1.992) (1.671)
Trade openness 0.002 0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.009 -0.008
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.017) (0.009)
Total population 0.009 0.082 0.310** 0.426* 0.042 0.182
(0.054) (0.071) (0.134) (0.221) (0.088) (0.107)
Age dependency ratio -0.070** -0.114*** -0.128** -0.131*** -0.029 -0.044
(0.031) (0.025) (0.055) (0.018) (0.055) (0.041)
N observations 486 445 236 216 250 229
N countries 29 29 14 14 15 15
2nd order testd 0.406 0.685 0.795
Sargan test' 0.208 0.511 0.097
Adj. R-square 0.593 0.709 0.428
Note: The dependent variable is the central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. aEach 
regression includes a constant, one lag of the dependent variable, country dummies and year dummies. 
bEach regression is estimated using the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator and includes a constant and 
year dummies. Lagged log of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age-dependency 
ratio are assumed to be strictly exogenous, while the lag of real GDP per capita growth rate is assumed 
to be predetermined. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 'Election-year dummies take the value 1 
in the year of election no matter when in the year the election took place. dP-values> 0.05 implies that 
the error term in the regression is not serially correlated. eP-va/ues> 0.05 implies that the instruments are 
not correlated with the error term. ***, ** and * denote significance at a 1,5 and 10 percent level.
Interestingly, the results are almost the opposite of Hyde and O ’Mahony’s (2010) 
prediction. Rather than observed elections, unobserved elections appear more likely to 
induce electoral budget cycles. The coefficients on unobserved elections are significant 
in columns 2-4, while the coefficients on observed elections are significant only in 
column 2 and 4, where the regressionsare estimated using the Arellano-Bond dynamic 
panel GMM.
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Table 3.8 The Effects of Elections on Budget Balance under Non- 
democratic Regimes; Results for Elections with versus 
without IMF Programmes
Full sample Shallow autocracies Deep autocracies
Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic
effects3 panelb effects3 panelb effects3 panelb
m [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
D. elect with the IMFC -0.708 -0.996* -1.421* -1.361** 0.596 0.294
(0.577) (0.589) (0.848) (0.546) (0.976) (0.971)
D. elect without the IMF6 -0.975** -0.845** -1.311* -1.343*** -1.399 -0.972
(0.508) (0.359) (0.688) (0.397) (1.090) (1.138)
RGDP per capita growth 0.001 0.008 0.083** 0.090** 0.010 0.006
(0.022) (0.027) (0.041) (0.038) (0.026) (0.029)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.305 -0.218 3.589 4.884* -1.919 —4.277***
(1.124) (1.263) (2.732) (2.853) (2.006) (1.631)
Trade openness 0.002 0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.014 -0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010)
Total population 0.009 0.083 0.318** 0.437** -0.037 0.177
(0.054) (0.072) (0.135) (0.220) (0.088) (0.109)
Age dependency ratio -0.071** -0.115*** -0.126** -0.130*** -0.027 -0.044
(0.033) (0.025) (0.054) (0.018) (0.056) (0.041)
N observations 486 445 236 216 250 229
N countries 29 29 14 14 15 15
2nd order testd 0.406 0.699 0.912
Sargan test6 0.205 0.503 0.084
Adj. R-square 0.594 0.710 0.433
Note: The dependent variable is the central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. “Each 
regression includes a constant, one lag of the dependent variable, country dummies and year dummies. 
bEach regression is estimated using the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator and includes a constant and 
year dummies. Lagged log of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age-dependency 
ratio are assumed to be strictly exogenous, while the lag of real GDP per capita growth rate is assumed 
to be predetermined. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. cElection-year dummies take the value 1 
in the year of election no matter when in the year the election took place. AP-values> 0.05 implies that 
the error term in the regression is not serially correlated. eP-values> 0.05 implies that the instruments are 
not correlated with the error term. ***, ** and * denote significance at a 1,5 and 10 percent level.
In Table 3.8, the election-year dummy is split into two dummies: one for elections that 
take place concurrently with IMF programme participation and another for elections 
that are held without the concomitant presence of the IMF. The results for the sample 
including all autocracies or only shallow autocracies indicate that budget cycles exist 
even when elections are held concurrently with IMF programme participation. 
Meanwhile, the results for the sample including only deep autocracies indicate that 
electoral budget cycles are absent regardless of whether the elections take place with the 
concomitant presence of the IMF or not.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines the relationship between elections and government budget 
balance under non-democratic regimes. The results provide evidence that electoral 
budget cycles exist under non-democratic regimes. The effect of elections on the GDP 
share of the central government budget balance is significant and robust to a number of 
variations in control variables, estimation models, sample selection criteria and 
designations of election-year dummy. The results also provide evidence that the 
persistence of budget cycles under non-democratic regimes is driven by the subsample 
of countries with less distance from democracy (shallow autocracies). The effect of 
elections on the share of the central government budget balance in GDP is under no 
circumstances significant when estimations include only the subsample of countries 
with greater distance from democracy (deep autocracies). Further, the results provide 
evidence that there tends to be no difference in the pattern of the effect of executive 
versus legislative elections, the effect of observed versus unobserved elections, and the 
effect of elections held with the concomitant presence of the IMF versus elections held 
without it. Flowever, there exists a difference in the pattern of the effect of regular 
versus irregular elections.
Findings in this chapter, in combination with findings from earlier works that electoral 
budget cycles are driven by the experience of newly democratised countries (Brender & 
Drazen 2005), suggest that the relationship between electoral budget cycles and the 
level of democracy is hill-shaped. Electoral budget cycles are less likely to take place 
under the extreme regimes of deep autocracy and old democracy, but more likely to 
arise under shallow autocracy and new democracy. Further empirical study should 
examine this hypothesis more directly.
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Appendix 3.1
Table A3.1.1 Variable Definitions and Sources
Government budget balance
Election-year dummy
Executive election-year 
dummy
Legislative election-year 
dummy
Regular election-year 
dummy
Irregular election-year 
dummy
Observed election-year 
dummy
Unobserved election-year 
dummy
- Central government budget balance as a percentage of total GDP at 
current prices.
- Calculated using the items of cash surplus/deficit and total GDP at 
current prices in the International Financial Statistics(IMF 2011) or 
taken from the World Development Indicator (World Bank 2011).
- Binary variable: coded 1 for the years in which a competitive election 
took place; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012) and 
the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
( 2010).
- Refer to executive elections for countries with a directly elected 
presidential system
- Refer to legislative elections for countries with an indirectly elected 
presidential system, countries with a parliamentary system, or 
countries with mixed government system whose effective leader is a 
prime minister, a premier or a chancellor.
- Binary variable: coded 1 for the years in which a competitive 
presidential election took place; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012) and 
the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
( 2010).
- Binary variable: coded 1 for the years in which a competitive 
parliamentary election took place; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012) and 
the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
( 2010).
- Binary variable: coded 1 for the years in which a competitive regular 
election took place; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012) and 
the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
( 2010).
- Binary variable: coded 1 for the years in which a competitive 
irregular election took place; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012) and 
the six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
( 2010).
- Binary variable: coded 1 for the years in which a competitive election 
took place and was attended by international observers; 0 otherwise.
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012), the 
six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
(2010), and information from Hyde (2006).
- Binary variable: coded 1 for the years in which a competitive election 
took place and was not attended by international observers;
0 otherwise.
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012), the
six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
(2010), and information from Hyde (2006).______________________
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Table A3.1 Variable definitions and sources_______________________ {continuedfrom previous page)
Dummy for elections years 
with concurrent IMF 
programme
- Binary variable: coded 1 for the years in which a competitive election 
took place with concurrent IMF programme participation;
0 otherwise.
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012), the 
six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
(2010), and information from Hyde (2006).
Dummy for elections years 
without concurrent IMF 
programme
- Binary variable: coded 1 for the years in which a competitive election 
took place without any concurrent IMF programme participation;
0 otherwise.
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012), the 
six-fold regime classification from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 
(2010), and information from Hyde (2006).
Log of real GDP per capita - The log of purchasing-power-parity-converted GDP per capita at 
2005 constant prices.
- Calculated using data from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011)
Real GDP per capita growth - The annual growth rate of purchasing-power-parity-converted GDP 
per capita at 2005 constant prices.
- Calculated using data from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011)
Trade openness - The values of export plus import as a percentage of GDP at 2005 
constant prices.
- Taken from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011).
Total population - Total number of estimated population (in million people).
- Calculated using data from the United Nation (201 la).
Age-dependency ratio. - The ratio of population aged 0-14 and 65+ to 100 population aged 
15-64.
- Interpolated into yearly using data from the United Nation (201 lb).
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Appendix 3.2
Table A3.2.1 Results for Table 3.4 with More Stringent Criteria
for Sample Selection
Full sample Shallow autocracies Deep autocracies
Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic
effects3 panelb effects3 panelb effects3 panelb
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Election-year dummyc -1.208*** —1 189*** -1.423** -1.487*** -0.544 -0.150
(0.466) (0.381) (0.555) (0.355) (0.900) (0.638)
RGDP per capita growth 0.024 0.023 0.084** 0.092** 0.016 0.017
(0.027) (0.035) (0.041) (0.038) (0.028) (0.037)
Log of RGDP per capita -0.308 -0.372 2.926 4.343 -2.313 -3.193*
(1.115) (1.123) (2.789) (2.868) (1.856) (1.726)
Trade openness 0.005 0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.017) (0.012)
Total population 0.011 0.022 0.285** 0.409* -0.084 0.026
(0.050) (0.062) (0.135) (0.217) (0.076) (0.086)
Age dependency ratio -0.106*** -0.129*** -0.135** -0.136*** -0.102 -0.078
(0.034) (0.024) (0.056) (0.019) (0.068) (0.051)
N observations 483 443 236 216 247 227
N countries 30 30 14 14 16 16
2nd order testd 0.715 0.549 0.153
Sargan teste 0.313 0.592 0.215
Adj. R-square 0.588 0.715 0.382
Note: The dependent variable is the central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. aEach 
regression includes a constant, one lag of the dependent variable, country dummies and year dummies. 
bEach regression is estimated using the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator and includes a constant and 
year dummies. Lagged log of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age-dependency 
ratio are assumed to be strictly exogenous, while the lag of real GDP per capita growth rate is assumed 
to be predetermined. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. cElection-year dummy takes the value 1 
in the preceding year if an election took place before July, and in the year of election if the election took 
place in July or later. dP-values> 0.05 implies that the error term in the regression is not serially 
correlated. eP-values> 0.05 implies that the instruments are not correlated with the error term. ***, ** 
and * denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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Table A3.2.2 Results for Table 3.4 with April as a Threshold for 
the Election-year Dummy
Full sample Shallow autocracies Deep autocracies
Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic
effects3 panelb effects3 panelb effects3 panelb
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Election-year dummyc -0.777** -0.764** -1.314** -1.307*** -0.258 0.142
(0.395) (0.322) (0.509) (0.344) (0.803) (0.584)
RGDP per capita growth 0.020 0.027 0.085** 0.091** 0.012 0.024
(0.024) (0.032) (0.041) (0.040) (0.027) (0.034)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.055 -0.451 3.227 4.583 -2.114 -4.112**
(1.080) (1.267) (2.753) (2.886) (1.923) (1.699)
Trade openness 0.004 0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009)
Total population -0.006 0.068 0.296** 0.416* -0.006 0.163*
(0.052) (0.069) (0.133) (0.217) (0.086) (0.099)
Age dependency ratio -0.082*** -0.122*** -0.133** -0.132*** -0.047 -0.048
(0.031) (0.024) (0.055) (0.019) (0.052) (0.039)
N observations 523 477 236 216 287 261
N countries 32 32 14 14 18 18
2nd order testd 0.799 0.628 0.167
Sargan test6 0.219 0.539 0.136
Adj. R-square 0.584 0.713 0.412
Note: The dependent variable is the central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. aEach 
regression includes a constant, one lag of the dependent variable, country dummies and year dummies. 
bEach regression is estimated using the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator and includes a constant and 
year dummies. Lagged log of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age-dependency 
ratio are assumed to be strictly exogenous, while the lag of real GDP per capita growth rate is assumed 
to be predetermined. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. cEleetion-year dummy takes the value 1 
in the preceding year if an election took place before April, and in the year of election if the election 
took place in April or later. dP-vaIues> 0.05 implies that the error term in the regression is not serially 
correlated. eP-values> 0.05 implies that the instruments are not correlated with the error term. ***, ** 
and * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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Table A3.2.3 Results for Table 3.4 with April as a Threshold for 
the Election-year Dummy and More Stringent Criteria 
for Sample Selection
Full sample Shallow autocracies Deep autocracies
Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic Fixed Dynamic
effects3 panelb effects3 panelb effects3 panelb
[11 [21 PI [41 [51 [61
Election-year dummyc -0.777** -0.774** -1.314** -1.307*** -0.138 0.196
(0.390) (0.326) (0.509) (0.344) (0.816) (0.632)
RGDP per capita growth 0.022 0.024 0.085** 0.091** 0.012 0.016
(0.026) (0.035) (0.041) (0.040) (0.027) (0.035)
Log of RGDP per capita -0.296 -0.454 3.227 4.583 -2.620 -3.517*
(1.127) (1.206) (2.753) (2.886) (1.878) (1.804)
Trade openness 0.001 0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.011 -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011)
Total population -0.006 0.006 0.296** 0.416* -0.117 0.014
(0.050) (0.063) (0.133) (0.217) (0.078) (0.081)
Age dependency ratio -0.117*** -0.135*** -0.133** -0.132*** -0.129* -0.090*
(0.034) (0.024) (0.055) (0.019) (0.067) (0.047)
N observations 499 457 236 216 263 241
N countries 31 31 14 14 17 17
2nd order testd 0.812 0.628 0.124
Sargan test6 0.281 0.539 0.203
Adj. R-square 0.589 0.713 0.414
The dependent variable is the central government budget balance as a percentage of GDP. aEach 
regression includes a constant, one lag of the dependent variable, country dummies and year dummies. 
bEach regression is estimated using the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator and includes a constant and 
year dummies. Lagged log of real GDP per capita, trade openness, total population and age-dependency 
ratio are assumed to be strictly exogenous, while the lag of real GDP per capita growth rate is assumed 
to be predetermined. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. cElection-year dummy takes the value 1 
in the preceding year if an election took place before April, and in the year of election if the election 
took place in April or later. dP-valnes> 0.05 implies that the error term in the regression is not serially 
correlated. eP-values> 0.05 implies that the instruments are not correlated with the error term. ***, ** 
and * denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively.
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Chapter 4: Food Prices and Political Survival
4.1 Introduction
The dramatic food price increases within the last few years have sparked protests in 
numerous countries. From Bangladesh to Ivory Coast, some of these protests have 
turned out to be violent political unrests, with many protesters killed, injured or detained 
(see, for example, Earth Policy Institute 2008). In Haiti, the Parliament dismissed Prime 
Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis (Delva & Loney 2008). In the Middle East and North 
Africa, the situations went more serious and resulted in the deposal of Tunisia’s 23- 
year-long-standing President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s 29-year-long-ruling 
President Hosni Mubarak (Amara & Lowe 2011; Paul 2011; Evans-Pritchard 2011).
While no single cause can be easily pinpointed, such a phenomenon roughly depicts the 
important role that food prices have in affecting political survival. However, 
notwithstanding its intuitive appeal, there is hitherto no rigorous analysis on the 
relationship between variation in food prices and the occurrence of national leader exits. 
Several recent works have looked at the political consequences of food prices (Hendrix, 
Haggard & Magaloni 2009; Bellemare 2011; Arezki & Bruckner 2011), but they were 
limited to the incidence of anti-government demonstrations and riots and did not cover 
changes in national leaders. Meanwhile, most of the previous literature on the economic 
determinants of political survival has focused on macroeconomic factors such as 
inflation, unemployment and economic growth (for example, Warwick 1992; Palmer & 
Whitten 1999; Burke 2012). The only non-macroeconomic factor that has been linked to 
political survival is oil prices (see, Smith 2004; Cuaresma, Oberhofer & Raschky 2011).
This chapter is aimed at examining the impact of food prices on the survival of national 
leaders in democratic and non-democratic countries. It uses international food price and 
and domestic consumption data to compose a monthly country-specific food price index 
and estimates whether the index is systematically related to the occurrence of national 
leader exits. Estimations are carried out for a large panel data set of 77 food importing
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countries over the period 1961-2009 and control for time-invariant country 
characteristics and global trends.
The primary finding is that food prices have a robust significant effect on political 
survival. The effect does not change with changes in the log of real gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita or real GDP per capita growth rate. The effect also does not 
change with changes in the state of democracy. However, once the joint-effect between 
food prices and the state of democracy is controlled, the effect of food prices on 
political survival is significant only in democracies and not in non-democratic countries.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of how 
food prices may affect political survival. Section 4.3 describes the empirical strategy 
and data used in the analysis. Section 4.4 discusses the results. Section 4.5 offers 
conclusions.
4.2 Theoretical Overview
To get an intuition about the relationship between food prices and political survival, 
consider what happened in France between 1787 and 1789 (see, for example, Furet 
1996; Rude & Kaye 2000; Neely 2008). Marked by severe weather (extremely cold 
winters, hot summers and heavy rains) and poor harvests, this country’s relatively rich 
economy falls into deep crisis. On the one hand, many farmers and peasants 
experienced reductions in income.12 On the other hand, the prices of food rose intensely. 
With an ongoing resentment at high taxes levied to upkeep royal family’s lavish 
lifestyle and a growing sense of awareness of the degrading political orders in general, 
the increase of food prices was like a lit in a dry forest. It provoked people and 
generated wide bread protests and riots against King Louis XVI.
12 As the quantity of food produced was very low, the farmers’ gain from price hike is smaller than the 
income loss due to the decline in quantity sold.
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On 5 October 1789, thousands of women marched to Versailles bringing with them a 
variety of small weapons like pitchforks, pikes and muskets and chanted, “Bread...! 
Bread...!” This march, which was a response to bread shortages and bread price increase 
in the marketplaces of Paris, turned to be momentous in escalating the struggle of the 
revolutionaries who were calling for reforms toward a constitutional monarchy. By the 
time it reached Versailles, the crowd circumvented the palace. In contrast to earlier 
revolutionary incidents that failed to coerce King Louis XVI to submit his power to the 
will of the people,13 this incident dominated by women demanding bread happened to 
be successful. On the following day, the crowd forced the King and the Queen to move 
to Paris as a sign of good faith in addressing the harsh economy. King Louis XVI yet 
remained inept and was increasingly dismayed by the revolutionaries. In July 1790, a 
shift from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy took place, ending Louis XVI’s 
authority as a national leader and marking the collapse of the Ancien regime that had 
ruled France for centuries.
Riots and revolutions are not the only channels through which food prices affect 
political survival. In democratic economies, citizens are free to express their 
disappointment, grievance and anger. Democracy also enables a change in the political 
leadership without massive harms or killings. This moderates the conflicts between 
citizens and the government and, instead of riots and revolutions, the effect of food 
prices on political survival is channeled through the regulated mechanisms of elections.
There are at least two reasons why food prices may affect election results and, hence, 
the political survival of incumbent leaders. First, as suggested by economic voting 
models, the state of the economy has significant impacts on electoral behavior (see, for 
example, Hibbs 2006; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier 2007). Economic upsurges give an 
advantage to candidates from the incumbent party, whereas economic downturns 
increase the electoral chances of the opposition (Kramer 1971; Kiewiet & Udell 1998; 
Bartels & Zaller 2001; Hibbs 2000). Higher food prices imply not only a decrease in 
people’s ability to buy food items, but also a decrease in the purchasing power of their
13 Earlier revolutionary incidents include the Storming of the Bastille (14 July 1789), the Great Fear (17 
July-5 August 1789), the August Decrees (4 August 1789) and the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen (26 August 1789).
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income in general. While it remains inconclusive whether the impacts of the state of the 
economy are due to voters’ personal economic grievances or their appraisal of broader 
economic conditions (for example, Kinder & Kiewiet 1979; Grafstein 2009; 
Ansolabehere, Meredith & Snowberg 2011), the possible effect of food prices remains 
pertinent. This is because variation in food prices applies to everyone and no difference 
needs to take place between what an individual faces personally and what she sees in 
the economy.14
The second reason why food prices may affect the results of elections and the survival 
of incumbent leaders is that, even though voters are rational, imperfect information 
makes it difficult for them to know exactly the extent to which incumbent leaders are 
able to manage the economy (Alesina, Roubini & Cohen 1997; Duch & Stevenson 
2008). Voters may therefore use variation in food prices as a proxy for leaders’ 
competence.
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that leaders in democratic countries are more 
susceptible to economic slowdowns than their counterparts in non-democratic countries. 
Democratic leaders need to not only maintain the support of their inner circles, but 
larger constituents in the society. This is clearly harder to do under weak economic 
conditions. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean that the effect of food prices will 
be worse for democratic leaders than non-democratic leaders. The regulated elections 
under democracy, once again, moderate the relationship between citizens and the 
governments. Whether the effect that food prices have on political survival differs for 
rulers in democratic countries and non-democratic countries is an empirical matter.
14 This is different for example from the case of unemployment in which an individual can be personally 
employed, but unhappy with the high unemployment rate in her country or vice versa.
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4.3 Empirical Estimation
The effect of food prices on political survival is estimated based on the following 
regression equation
Di>t = ß0 + ßxln{f o o d p i n d e x + /?2XU- i  + ß3ct + ß4y t + eix [2.13]
where Xi t_1 denotes a vector of control variables that will be described later, ct 
denotes a vector of country dummies, y t denotes a vector of year dummies, and ei t 
denotes error terms. The dependent variable, Di t, is a dummy for leader exits taking the 
value 1 if there is a national leader exit in a country i during month t , and 0 otherwise. 
The dummy covers both regular and irregular exits, including those caused by sickness, 
resignation, the loss of legislature support, election loss and other incidents that 
contravene the constitution, conventions or norms in a country, such as a popular revolt, 
domestic armed rebellion, military coup d'etat, and assassination. The dummy, however, 
excludes leader changes that are caused by natural death or deposition by another state. 
Data for the leader exit dummy rely primarily on information provided by Goemans, 
Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009), with minor revisions and more recent updates based on 
various sources.
The key independent variable is a monthly country-specific food price index. This index 
covers the prices of several food items weighted differently to capture the idea that 
different food items can have different impacts in different countries. Mathematically, 
the index is calculated according to the following arithmetic formula
foodpindexit = .w i,tjx [4.2]
where pindexjtl,t denotes international price index for each single food item j  in month 
t (with January 2010 as the base month) and
Wi.j =  “  E t = l [ ( p j , t c i , j t ) / n i,t] [4.3]
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denotes a time-invariant weighting factor, which is equal to the mean ratio of each food 
item consumption value, pc, to nominal GDP, n. The consumption value is obtained 
from multiplying an item’s international price, p, and its domestic consumptions, c.
Here, the reason for using international prices rather than domestic prices and 
maintaining a constant rather than variable weighting factor is that domestic prices and 
domestic concumptions may be subject to internal socio-political dynamics. By using 
international prices and maintaining the weight constant, endogeneity problem between 
the food price index and political survival can be avoided.
There are two different practices on the number of items included in a food price index. 
Burke and Leigh (2010) use a large number of food items, while some other authors 
include only particular items in the index (Hendrix, Haggard & Magaloni 2009; 
Bellemare 2011; Arezki & Bruckner 2011). The advantage of including only particular 
items is that it is more convenience and allows for a more focused analysis on the 
impacts of major food items. However, it also has its caveats especially when the items 
included in the index are too restricted. The practice in Hendrix, Haggard and Magaloni 
(2009) is, perhaps, an example. In the paper analysing the political consequences of 
food prices, the three authors concentrate only on wheat prices, assuming that wheat 
prices are highly correlated with the prices of rice and maize. This is obviously 
unrealistic as the significance of wheat is different for different economies. Hence, in 
line with that in Arezki and Bruckner (2010), the index in equation [4.2] includes the 
three most consumed staples providing 60 percent of the human food energy intake, 
namely rice, wheat and maize (see, for example, Food and Agriculture Organization 
1995; von Braun et al. 2010). The index in equation [4.2], yet excludes sugar and meat 
proposed by Arezki and Bruckner (2010) as there is no specific argument to select them 
over other food items.
Data for monthly rice and wheat prices are taken from the UNCTAD Commodity 
Statistics between 1961 and 2009 (United Nations 2011b), whereas monthly maize 
prices are from the webpage of CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement
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Centre (CIMMYT 2011). In order to retain observations, six missing values in the case 
of rice prices are filled using linear interpolation. Data for domestic consumption of 
rice, wheat and maize are from the FAOSTAT’s commodity balances (FAO 2011), 
while for nominal GDP are from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2011) .
The control variables consist of a dummy for whether a country is classed as a transition 
economy during 1989-1992, a dummy for whether a country is judged as democratic in 
the previous year, a dummy for whether a leader exit occurs within six months after an 
election,15 a dummy for whether a leader exit is attributable to a constitutional term 
limit, the tenure of the leader at the start of a calendar month and the age of the leader at 
the start of a calendar year. Besides, the control variables also comprise the log of real 
GDP per capita and the growth rate of real GDP per capita (both are annual data and 
lagged by one year). Data for the transition economy dummy are from the Development 
Research Institute (2009) and for the democracy dummy are from the Polity IV dataset 
(Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2010). To be considered democratic, a country must have a 
polity2 score greater than zero. A country whose polity2 score is zero or negative is 
judged to be non-democratic. Data for the term limit dummy are mainly from Burke 
(2012), for leaders’ tenure and age are mainly from Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 
(2009) and for real GDP per capita and its annual growth rate are from the Penn World 
Table (PWT) (see, Heston, Summers & Aten 2011). Details on the above variables and 
their sources are provided in the Appendix 4.1.
The regression parameters are estimated using a linear probability model, a conditional 
logit model and a Cox proportional hazard model. Each of these models allows a fixed 
effects treatment, making it possible to control for unobservable country characteristics 
and heterogeneity across years. To account for heteroscedasticity and possible serial 
correlation, robust standard errors clustered at country level are used.
15 This is to capture the idea that a swearing ceremony and inauguration of a newly elected leader usually 
takes place within a few months after the day on which an election was held.
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Observations range from January 1961 to December 2009. Leaders that remain in power 
at the end of 2009 are considered to be right censored. Together with those who died in 
office of natural causes or those who ceased power due to deposition by another state, 
these leaders remaining in power at the end of 2009 are given the value 0 instead of 1 
for the leader exit dummy.16
Sample selection is initially based on the availability of data. Information from the 
FAOSTAT’s commodity balances are then used to calculate each country’s average net- 
export of rice, wheat and maize over 1961-2009 (or over the period where appropriate 
data are available). By design, only countries whose average net-export is negative for 
the three selected food items (i.e. only importing countries) are covered in the sample.
4.4 Results
The descriptive statistics provided in Table 4.1 give insights about the characteristics of 
the data. The total number of observations is 34,976, which consists of 591 leaders from 
77 countries.
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
N obs. Mean Std dev.
Food price index 34,976 59.280 24.098
Log of food price index 34,976 4.004 0.399
A Food price index 34,976 0.127 3.537
Log of RGDP per capita 34,495 8.043 1.207
RGDP per capita growth rate (rescaled into 1/100 percent) 34,495 0.022 0.068
Transition dummy 34,495 0.002 0.045
Democracy dummy 34,495 0.522 0.500
Post-election dummy 34,495 0.086 0.280
Term limit dummy 34,495 0.004 0.065
Tenure of leader at start of a calendar month (months) 34,495 0.821 0.908
Age of leader at start of a year (rescaled into 1/100 years) 34,495 0.563 0.110
16 See Bueno de Mesqueta et al. (2003) for the issue of leaders who died of natural cause while in power.
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4.4.1 The Basic Results
Table 4.2 columns 1-2 report the results from the linear probability model. In column 1, 
only the log of food price index is included in the regression along with country 
dummies and year dummies. In column 2, the regression also includes the log of real 
GDP per capita, real GDP per capita growth rate, a dummy for transition economy, 
democracy dummy, post-election dummy, constitutional term limit dummy, tenure of 
leader and age of leader. The effect that food prices have on political survival is positive 
and significant, particularly in column 2 where the effects of potential confounding 
factors are controlled. The estimates for the log of food price index indicate that, 
holding other things constant, a 1 percentage point increase in the food price index leads 
to an approximately 0.70 percent increase in the likelihood of a leader exit.
Columns 3^1 present the results from logit model as odds ratios. By definition, only 
countries with a within-sample variation in the dependent variable are covered in the 
sample. The effect of food prices on political survival is again significant especially 
when the regressions include control variables. The odds ratios corresponding to the log 
of food price index in column 4 indicate that, all else equal, a 1 percent increase in the 
food price index is associated with an increase in the odds ratios by 2.17 times.
Columns 5-6 report the results from the Cox proportional hazard model. The hazard 
ratios corresponding to the log of food price index are greater than 1 and statistically 
significant regardless of whether the regressions include control variables or not. 
Leaders who experience higher food prices during their time in power are shown to 
have a worse chance of survival than those experiencing lower food prices. The 
estimated values in column 6 indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the food 
price index, on average, increases the hazard of exit by 1.96 times.
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Table 4.2 The Effects of Food Prices on Political Survival
Period: Jan 1961-Dec 2009
Linear Linear Logit Logit Cox prop. Cox prop.
prob. prob. hazard hazard
IH 121 [31 [41 [51 [61
Log of food price index 0.008 0.007* 1.846* 2.171* 1.957** 1.957**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.672) (0.015) (0.618) (0.618)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.001 1.341 1.281
(0.003) (0.459) (0.383)
RGDP per capita growth -0.025*** 0.043*** 0.086***
(0.009) (0.050) (0.080)
Transition dummy 0.003 0.582 0.789
(0.016) (0.528) (0.664)
Democracy dummy -0.004* 0.688* 0.721*
(0.002) (0.146) (0.142)
Post-election dummy 0.034*** 6.243*** 5.100***
(0.004) (0.935) (1.211)
Term limit dummy 0.974*** - I - * * * 33.370***
(0.006) (+) (9.602)
Tenure of leader - 0.000 1.136
(0.001) (0.186)
Age of leader 0.016 5.111 4.754**
(0.012) (5.990) (3.765)
N observations 34,495 34,495 31,514 31,514 33,992 33,992
N countries 77 77 67 67 77 77
Nleaders 582 582 567 567 571 571
N exits 466 466 466 466 457 457
R2 0.002 0.314 0.014 0.336
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 5-6 is the 
duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year dummies. By 
definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample variation in the 
dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an individual subject 
and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for linear probability 
model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional hazard model are 
hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The /?2in columns 1-2 
refers to the within-./?2, whereas in columns 3-4 refers to the pseudo-R2. *, **, *** denotes significance 
at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the leader term limit dummy 
in columns 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
The results on control variables indicate that variation in the real GDP per capita growth 
rate is strongly associated with the occurrence of national leader exits. This confirms 
earlier findings reported in Burke (2012) that economic growth rate has a significant 
effect on the likelihood of leader exits. By contrast, the log of real GDP per capita does 
not seem to have any significant relationship with political survival. Irrespective of the 
estimation model used, the estimates for this variable are not statistically significant. 
Democracy in general reduces the likelihood of leader exits, but democratic institutions 
in the forms of elections and term-limit increase the likelihood of leader changes.
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4.4.2 Results with the Data Limited to 1961-2004
Regressions in Table 4.2 cover the period January 1961 to December 2009. Different 
from the years between 1961 and 2004 for which national leader data from Goemans, 
Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009) are used, later years rely on an own data update based on 
various sources. To ensure that the conclusions drawn in this chapter are not simply 
driven by the appended data, regressions in Table 4.3 restrict the analysis to January 
1961-December 2004.
Table 4.3 The Effects of Food Prices on Political Survival; 
Results with the Data Limited to 1961-2004
Period: Jan 1961-Dec 2004
Linear Linear Logit Logit Cox prop. Cox prop.
prob. prob. hazard hazard
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Log of food price index 0.009* 0.008* 2.063* 2.551* 2.069* 1.996**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.781) (1.231) (0.797) (0.701)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.002 1.436 1.290
(0.003) (0.587) (0.443)
RGDP per capita growth -0.027*** 0.042*** 0.087**
(0.010) (0.050) (0.085)
Transition dummy 0.001 0.523 0.676
(0.158) (0.506) (0.614)
Democracy dummy -0.003 0.747 0.751
(0.002) (0.175) (0.156)
Post-election dummy 0.034*** 6.347*** 5.253***
(0.004) (0.889) (1.316)
Term limit dummy 0.973*** 33.253***
(0.007) (+) (10.290)
Tenure of leader 0.000 1.173
(0.001) (0.191)
Age of leader 0.015 4.957* 5.025**
(0.013) (6.227) (4.100)
N observations 30,125 30,125 26,813 26,813 29,686 29,686
N countries 77 77 62 62 77 77
N leaders 518 518 497 497 508 508
N exits 406 406 406 406 398 398
R2 0.002 0.303 0.017 0.330
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 5-6 is the 
duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year dummies. By 
definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample variation in the 
dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an individual subject 
and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for linear probability 
model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional hazard model are 
hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The R2 in columns 1-2 
refers to the within-R2, whereas in columns 3-4 refers to the pseudo-R2. *, **, *** denotes significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the leader term limit dummy 
in columns 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
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The results suggest that the relationship between food prices and the occurrence of 
national leader exits is persistent. In columns 1-2, the coefficients of the log of food 
price index are positive and statistically significant even when no control variables are 
included in the regression. In columns 3-6, the odds ratios and the hazard ratios 
corresponding to the log of food price index are greater than 1 and significant regardless 
of whether the regressions control for the effects of potential confounding factors or not.
4.4.3 Results with Further Lagged Food Price Index
Intuitively, it is natural to expect that the effect of food prices on political survival takes 
place with some delays. While a priori there is no clear justification for how long the 
food price index should be lagged to best capture the delayed effect, regressions in 
previous tables employ a t— 1 log of food price index. To test whether finding in Tables 
4.2 would differ with different delayed effects, regressions in Table 4.4 include either a 
t-2 or a t- 3 log of food price index as a regressor.
The results from regressions involving a t-2 log of food price index indicate a stronger 
relationship between food prices and political survival. Compared to the results reported 
in Table 4.2 columns 2, 4 and 6, the estimates for the log of food price index in Table 
4.4 columns 1-3 are not only greater in magnitude, but also in statistical significance. In 
columns 4-6, the results from regressions involving a t- 3 log of food price index 
indicate the persistence of the association between food prices and the occurrence of 
national leader exits, with a magnitude in-between those reported in Table 4.2 and in 
columns 1-3 of Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4 The Effects of Food Prices on Political Survival; 
Results with Further Lagged Food Price Index
Food price index: t-2 Food price index: t-3
Linear
prob.
Logit Cox prop, 
hazard
Linear
prob.
Logit Cox prop, 
hazard
m 121 E l 141 151 161
Log of food price index 0.011** 3.201** 2.493** 0.009** 2.637** 2.263**
(0.005) (1.785) (0.908) (0.005) (1.380) (0.821)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.001 1.310 1.252 0.001 1.310 1.255
(0.003) (0.445) (0.372) (0.003) (0.445) (0.372)
RGDP per capita growth -0.025*** 0.041*** 0.085*** -0.025*** 0.041*** 0.083***
(0.009) (0.047) (0.078) (0.009) (0.046) (0.076)
Transition dummy 0.004 0.627 0.847 0.004 0.621 0.837
(0.017) (0.576) (0.755) (0.018) (0.582) (0.743)
Democracy dummy -0.004** 0.663** 0.694** -0.004** 0.657** 0.692**
(0.002) (0.136) (0.126) (0.002) (0.134) (0.125)
Post-election dummy 0.034*** 6.198*** 5.083*** 0.034*** 6.200*** 5.032***
(0.004) (0.920) (1.173) (0.004) (0.921) (1.175)
Term limit dummy 0.975*** 34.135*** 0.975*** 34.048***
Tenure of leader
(0.006)
- 0.000
(0.001)
(+)
1.138
(0.187)
(9.680) (0.006)
- 0.000
(0.001)
(+)
1.139
(0.189)
(9.669)
Age of leader 0.017 5.770 5.221** 0.017 5.750 5.165**
(0.012) (6.720) (4.032) (0.012) (6.696) (1.175)
N observations 34,440 31,024 33,877 34,375 30,974 33,884
N countries 77 66 77 77 66 77
N leaders 578 561 568 578 561 568
N exits 463 463 454 463 463 454
R2 0.316 0.340 0.316 0.339
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 
6 is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year 
dummies. By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample 
variation in the dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an 
individual subject and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for 
linear probability model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional 
hazard model are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The R2 
in columns 1 and 4 refers to the within-/?2, whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-/?2. *, **, 
*** denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the 
leader term limit dummy in columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
4.4.4 The Roles of the State of Democracy
It has been argued that leaders in democratic countries are more susceptible to economic 
slowdowns than their counterparts in non-democratic countries (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003). Democratic leaders need not only to maintain the support of their inner 
circles, but also larger constituents in the society. This is harder to do under weak 
economic conditions.
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Table 4.5 The Effects of Food Prices on Political Survival; 
Results with an Interaction Term between the Food Price Index 
and the Dummy for Democracy
Interaction: Democracy dummy Interaction: Non-democracy dummy
Linear Logit Cox prop. Linear Logit Cox prop.
prob. hazard prob. hazard
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Log of food price index 0.006 1.923 1.537 0.008 2.245* 2.034**
(0.004) (1.083) (0.599) (0.005) (1.062) (0.650)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.001 1.305 1.234 0.001 1.305 1.234
(0.003) (0.426) (0.360) (0.003) (0.426) (0.360)
RGDP per capita growth -0.025*** 0.045*** 0.091** -0.025*** 0.045*** 0.091**
(0.009) (0.052) (0.085) (0.009) (0.052) (0.085)
Transition dummy 0.003 0.581 0.792 0.003 0.581 0.792
(0.016) (0.528) (0.669) (0.016) (0.528) (0.669)
Democracy dummy -0.011 0.374 0.240
(0.015) (0.589) (0.293)
Non-democracy dummy 0.011 2.672 4.170
(0.015) (4.208) (5.089)
Lfpindex*democracy 0.002 1.167 1.324
(0.004) (0.454) (0.395)
Lfpindex*non-democracy -0.002 0.857 0.756
(0.004) (0.333) (0.226)
Post-election dummy 0.034*** 6.242*** 5.113*** 0.034*** 6.242*** 5.113***
(0.004) (0.935) (1.202) (0.004) (0.935) (1.202)
Term limit dummy 0.974*** _ ! _ * * * 33.481*** 0.974*** 33.481***
(0.006) (+) (9.620) (0.006) (+) (9.620)
Tenure of leader - 0.000 1.139 - 0.000 1.139
(0.001) (0.187) (0.001) (0.187)
Age of leader 0. 016 5.153 4.784** 0.016 5.153 4.784**
(0.012) (6.024) (3.795) (0.012) (6.024) (3.795)
N observations 34,495 31,514 33,992 34,495 31,514 33,992
N countries 77 67 77 77 67 77
N leaders 582 567 571 582 567 571
N exits 466 466 457 466 466 457
R2 0.314 0.336 0.314 0.336
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 
6 is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year 
dummies. By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample 
variation in the dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an 
individual subject and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for 
linear probability model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional 
hazard model are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The /?’ 
in columns 1 and 4 refers to the within-/?’, whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-/?’. *, **, 
*** denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the 
leader term limit dummy in columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
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To test whether the state of democracy moderates the effect that food prices have on 
political survival, regressions in Table 4.5 include an interaction term between the log 
of food price index and the dummy for democracy or non-democracy. The non­
democracy dummy is similar to democracy dummy, but reversely coded (it takes the 
value 1 if the democracy dummy is equal to 0, and takes the value 0 otherwise) for the 
sake of convenience in reporting the regression results. With the presence of the 
interaction term, the estimates for the log of food price index in columns 1-3 reflect the 
effect of food prices on political survival under non-democracy, while in columns 4-6 
reflect the effect under democracy.17
The results reported in columns 1 and 4 indicate that the coefficients of the interaction 
term between the log of food price index and the dummy for democracy or non­
democracy are not statistically significant. In columns 2-3 and 4-6, the ratios of odds 
and the ratios of hazard that correspond to the interaction term are also not statistically 
significant, asserting that the effect of food prices on political survival does not change 
with a change in the state of democracy.
However, the overall results in Table 4.5 indicate that the effect of food prices on 
political survival is likely only significant in democracies and not in non-democratic 
countries. The estimates for the log of food price index are significant in columns 5 and 
6 where they reflect the effect of food prices on political survival under democracy, but 
not significant in columns 1-3 where they reflect the effect under non-democracy.
Thus, even though the marginal effect that food prices have on political survival is not 
significantly different in democratic and non-democratic countries, but at a given food 
prices, the likelihood of the occurrence of national leader exits is higher under 
democracy than under non-democracy. This is in line with the idea that leaders in 
democratic countries are more susceptible to economic slowdowns than their 
counterparts in non-democratic countries (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
17 Further results from regressions covering an interaction term between the log of food price index and 
the dummies for democratic or non-democratic government systems are provided in the appendix
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4.4.5 The Roles of Per Capita Income Level
Variation in food prices may affect people in low-income, middle-income and high- 
income countries differently. For example, higher staple prices may severely hamper the 
ability of people in low-income countries to meet their basic needs, but cause no serious 
problem for people in high-income countries. Thus, even though the relationship 
between real GDP per capita and the occurrence of national leader exits has been shown 
to be insignificant, it is likely that per capita income level plays a role in moderating the 
effect of food prices on political survival.
To test whether the proposition is true, regressions in Table 4.6 columns 1-3 include an 
interaction term between the log of food price index and the log of real GDP per capita. 
The results provide only a weak support for the importance of real GDP per capita in 
affecting the relationship between food prices and political survival. The estimates for 
the interaction term are significant only in column 3 where the regression parameters 
are estimated using the Cox proportional hazard model, and not significant in columns 
1-2 where the parameters are estimated using the linear probability model or the logit 
model.
4.4.6 The Roles of Economic Growth Rate
Thus far, real GDP per capita growth rate has been shown to be an important variable 
whose effect on political survival is continuously significant. To test whether the effect 
of real GDP per capita growth rate affects the relationship between food prices and 
political survival, regressions in Table 4.6 columns 4-6 include an interaction term 
between the log of food price index and the growth rate of real GDP per capita.
The results give no evidence that the effect of food prices on political survival changes 
with a change in real GDP per capita growth rate. In column 4, the coefficient of the 
interaction term between the log of food price index and the annual growth rate of real 
GDP per capita are not statistically significant. In columns 5-6, the ratios of odds and 
the ratios of hazard that correspond to the interaction term are also not significant.
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Table 4.6 The Effects of Food Prices on Political Survival; 
Results with an Interaction Term between the Food 
Price Index and Economic Control Variables
Interaction: Log of RGDP per capita Interaction: RGDP per capita growth
Linear
prob.
Logit Cox prop, 
hazard
Linear
prob.
Logit Cox prop, 
hazard
m [2] f31 [41 [51 [61
Log of food price index -0.015 0.297 0.200 0.007* 2.341** 2.035**
(0.017) (0.412) (0.215) (0.004) (1.055) (0.646)
Log of RGDP per capita -0.010 0.486 0.438 0.001 1.409 1.304
Lfpindex*Log RGDP pc
(0.008)
0.003
(0.002)
(0.312)
1.250
(0.177)
(0.224)
1.279*
(0.138)
(0.003) (0.486) (0.393)
RGDP per capita growth -0.025*** 0.048*** 0.093*** 0.013 + 58.885
Lfpindex*RGDP pc grow
(0.009) (0.055) (0.087) (0.106)
-0.009
(0.026)
(+)
0.041
(0.103)
(535.9)
0.188
(0.432)
Transition dummy 0.003 0.565 0.755 0.003 0.498 0.734
(0.016) (0.521) (0.649) (0.016) (0.460) (0.635)
Democracy dummy -0.004* 0.701* 0.749 -0.004** 0.682* 0.719*
(0.002) (0.150) (0.148) (0.002) (0.144) (0.141)
Post-election dummy 0.034*** 6.259*** 5.160*** 0.034*** 6.304*** 5.120***
(0.004) (0.935) (1.196) (0.004) (0.941) (1.220)
Term limit dummy 0.974*** - ) _ * * * 33.756*** 0.974*** -(.*** 33.107***
Tenure of leader
(0.006)
0.000
(0.001)
(+)
1.152
(0.188)
(9.734) (0.006)
- 0.000
(0.001)
(+)
1.132
(0.184)
(9.611)
Age of leader 0.017 5.684 5.419** 0.016 5.043 4.739**
(0.012) (6.747) (4.319) (0.012) (5.889) (3.745)
N observations 34,495 31,514 33,992 34,495 31,514 33,992
N countries 77 67 77 77 67 77
N leaders 582 567 571 582 567 571
N exits 466 466 457 466 466 457
R2 0.314 0.337 0.314 0.336
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 
6 is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year 
dummies. By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample 
variation in the dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an 
individual subject and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for 
linear probability model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional 
hazard model are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The R2 
in columns 1 and 4 refers to the within-/?-, whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-R2. *, **, 
*** denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the 
leader term limit dummy in columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant. The 
estimated odds ratio for the real GDP per capita growth rate in column 4 is large and positive, but not 
statistically significant.
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4.4.7 The Effects of Changes in Food Prices
In all regressions above, the effect that food prices have on political survival is 
estimated using the price level. While it has been shown that the effect of the food price 
level is significant, one might be curious about the relationship between food price 
changes and the occurrence of national leader exits.
Table 4.7 The Effects of Changes in Food Prices on Political Survival
Period: Jan 1961-Dec 2009 Period: Jan 1961-Dec 2004
Linear Logit Cox prop. Linear Logit Cox prop.
prob. hazard prob. hazard
HI 121 111 [41 [51 [61
A Food price index - 0.000 0.999 1.004 - 0.000 0.985 0.989
(0.000) (0.016) (0.013) (0.000) (0.026) (0.021)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.001 1.357 1.283 0.002 1.447 1.283
(0.003) (0.463) (0.386) (0.003) (0.588) (0.444)
RGDP per capita growth -0.025*** 0.043*** 0.083*** -0.027*** 0.041*** 0.082**
(0.009) (0.050) (0.077) (0.010) (0.049) (0.080)
Transition dummy 0.003 0.548 0.752 0.001 0.485 0.647
(0.016) (0.497) (0.632) (0.016) (0.468) (0.585)
Democracy dummy -0.004** 0.668* 0.701* -0.003 0.726 0.736
(0.002) (0.141) (0.138) (0.002) (0.170) (0.153)
Post-election dummy 0.034*** 6.243*** 5.125*** 0.034*** 6.319*** 5.274***
(0.004) (0.936) (1.214) (0.005) (0.885) (1.313)
Term limit dummy 0.974*** .(_*** 33.106*** 0.973*** 33.316***
(0.006) (+) (9.643) (0.007) (+) (10.51)
Tenure of leader - 0.000 1.132 0.000 1.167
(0.001) (0.186) (0.001) (0.190)
Age of leader 0.016 5.031 4.697* 0.015 4.876 4.986**
(0.012) (5.900) (3.739) (0.013) (6.111) (4.064)
N observations 34,495 31,514 33,992 30,125 26,813 29,686
N countries 77 67 77 77 62 77
N leaders 582 567 571 518 497 508
N exits 466 466 457 406 406 398
R2 0.314 0.335 0.303 0.329
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 
6 is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year 
dummies. By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing with in-sample 
variation in the dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an 
individual subject and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for 
linear probability model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional 
hazard model are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The R2 
in columns 1 and 4 refers to the within-/?’, whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-/?’. *, **, 
*** denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the 
leader term limit dummy in columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
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To test whether changes in food prices have a systematic effect on political survival, 
regressions in Table 4.7 include 1-month lag of changes in food price index instead of 
the M log of food price index as a regressor. The results indicate that the effect of 
changes in food prices is not significant. Irrespective of the estimation model used and 
the period of analysis covered (January 1961-December 2009 or January 1961— 
December 2004), the estimates for changes in food price index are never statistically 
significant at conventional levels.
This finding is remarkable as recently Arezki and Bruckner (2011) report that changes 
in food prices significantly deteriorate political institutions and increase the likelihood 
of civil conflicts, including anti-government demonstrations and riots. One possible 
explanation for these seemingly conflicting findings is that differences in the empirical 
design, sample and control variables have driven the results. The other possible 
explanation is that political survival differs from civil conflicts. On the one hand, the 
occurrence of civil conflicts does not necessarily lead to a national leader exit. On the 
other hand, the occurrence of civil conflict is not required for the occurrence of a 
national leader exit.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines the relationship between food prices and political survival in 
food net-importing countries. It uses international food price and domestic consumption 
data to compose a monthly country-specific food price index that is independent of 
domestic political dynamics and estimates how such an index affects the occurrence of 
leader exits.
The results provide evidence that variation in food prices are systematically related to 
the occurrence of national leader exits. The effect of food prices on political survival 
does not change with changes in the log of real GDP per capita, real GDP per capita 
growth rate and the state of democracy. However, once the joint-effect between food 
prices and the state of democracy is controlled, the effect of food prices on political 
survival is significant only in democracies and not in non-democratic countries. Thus,
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while the marginal effect that food prices have on political survival in democratic and 
non-democratic countries is not significantly different, at a given food prices, the 
likelihood of the occurrence of national leader exits is higher under democracy than 
under non-democracy.
Further research is needed to examine the effect of food prices on political survival in 
net-exporting countries. While intuitively the effect for these countries would be 
different from the one found in this chapter, another challenge is to estimate the 
relationship between food prices and political survival in countries that were net- 
exporting for one commodity and, at the same time, net-importing for other food items.
These findings accentuate the importance of taking food prices into account in public 
policy making. Leaders in both developed and developing economies are cautioned that 
increases in international food prices do threaten their survival. It is, thus, in their 
interest to cooperate and promote global food security and to prevent international food 
price hikes. What kind of actions that should be taken and who should be involved are 
nevertheless beyond this paper.
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Appendix 4.1
Table A4.1 Variable Definitions and Sources
Dummy for leader exits
Log of food price index
Log of real GDP per capita
Real GDP per capita growth
Transition dummy
Democracy dummy
- Binary variable: coded 1 if there is a national leader exit in a country 
during the reference month; 0 otherwise.
- Covers exits caused by sickness, resignation, the loss of legislature 
support, election loss and various incidents that contravene the 
constitution, conventions or norms in a country, such as a popular 
revolt, domestic rebellion, military coup d'etat, and assassination.
- Excludes leader changes that are caused by natural death or 
deposition by another state.
- Constructed using data from Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009) 
with minor revisions and own update for the period 2005-2009.
- The log-transformed food price index. The food price index is an 
arithmetic mean of rice price index, wheat price index and maize 
price index (January 2010 is the base month). The weights of rice, 
wheat and maize in each country are based on the average ratios of 
their internationally valued domestic consumption to nominal GDP.
- Rice price: Monthly average of nominal price quotes (US$/metric 
ton) for Thai rice, white milled, 5% broken, FOB Bangkok 
1961-2009 (United Nations 201 lb).
Six missing values are filled using linear interpolation.
- Wheat price: Monthly average of nominal price quotes (US$/metric 
ton) for US wheat, n° 2 hard red winter (ordinary), FOB Gulf 
1961-2009 (United Nations 2011b).
- Monthly average farm price (US$/metric ton) for maize 1961-2009 
(Cimmyt 2011).
- Rice domestic consumption: the total amount of rice (metric tons) 
available as human food including any commodity derived during the 
reference year, 1961-2009 (FAO 2011).
- Wheat domestic consumption: the total amount of wheat (metric tons) 
available as human food including any commodity derived during the 
reference year, 1961-2009 (FAO 2011).
- Maize domestic consumption: the total amount of maize (metric tons) 
available as human food including any commodity derived during the 
reference year, 1961-2009 (FAO 2011).
- GDP at current prices (World Bank 2011)
- The log of purchasing power parity (PPP) converted GDP per capita 
at 2005 constant prices.
- Calculated using data from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011)
- The annual growth rate of purchasing power parity (PPP) converted 
GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices.
- Rescaled into 1/100 percent.
- Calculated using data from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011)
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is classed as a transition 
economy during 1989-1992; 0 otherwise.
- Taken from Development Research Institute (2009).
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic;
0 otherwise.
- To be considered democratic, a country must have a polity2 score 
greater than zero in the Polity IV dataset. A country whose polity2 
score is zero or negative is judged to be non-democratic.
- Constructed using data from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2010),
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Table A4.1 Variable definitions and sources_______________________ {continued from previous page)
Dummy for an absolute 
monarchy
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is judged to be non-democratic 
and its effective leader is titled a king, a queen or their equivalents;
0 otherwise.
Dummy for a military 
dictatorship
- Own coding based on information from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), taking into 
account discrepancies in the state of democracy.
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be non- 
democratic and its effective leader is a military member by 
profession; 0 otherwise.
- A retired member of the army, navy of the air-force remains treated 
as a military personal.
- Own coding based on information from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), taking into 
account discrepancies in the state of democracy.
Dummy for a civil autocracy - Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be non- 
democratic and its effective leader is a military member by 
profession; 0 otherwise.
- Own coding based on information from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), taking into 
account discrepancies in the state of democracy.
Dummy for a parliamentary 
democracy
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years and has a parliamentary government that can be 
removed by the legislative; 0 otherwise.
- Own coding based on information from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), taking into 
account discrepancies in the state of democracy.
Dummy for a presidential 
democracy
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years and has a non-parliamentary government that 
cannot be removed by the legislative; 0 otherwise.
- Own coding based on information from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), taking into 
account discrepancies in the state of democracy.
Dummy for a mixed 
democracy
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a country is considered to be democratic 
for at least two years and has a parliamentary government with a head 
of state that is elected directly by the people; 0 otherwise.
- Own coding based on information from Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
(2010) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), taking into 
account discrepancies in the state of democracy.
Post-election dummy - Binary variable: coded 1 if a leader exit occurs within six months 
after an election; 0 otherwise.
Term limit dummy
- Constructed using election data from Hyde and Marinov (2012) and 
systems of government data from Burke (2012).
- Binary variable: coded 1 if a leader exit is attributable to a 
constitutional term limit; 0 otherwise.
- Primarily based on Burke (2012), with own update for the period 
2007-2009.
Tenure of leader - The number of month-ends that a leader has passed while in power.
- Constructed using data from Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009) 
with minor revisions and own update for the period 2005-2009.
Age of leader - The number of 31 December that a leader has passed from the 
birthday. Rescaled into 1/100 year.
- Constructed using data from Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009) 
with minor revisions and own update for the period 2005-2009.
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Appendix 4.2
Table A4.2.1 Results with an Interaction Term between the Food 
Price Index and the Dummy for Monarchy
Interaction: Democracy dummy Interaction: Non-democracy dummy
Linear Logit Cox prop. Linear Logit Cox prop.
prob. hazard prob. hazard
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Log of food price index 0.007* 2.377* 2.098** 0.009** 22.206*** 8.576**
(0.004) (1.062) (0.648) (0.005) (1.062) (7.218)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.001 1.319 1.280 0.001 1.319 1.280
(0.003) (0.458) (0.393) (0.003) (0.426) (0.393)
RGDP per capita growth -0.026*** 0.038*** 0.077*** -0.026*** 0.037*** 0.077***
(0.009) (0.044) (0.072) (0.009) (0.052) (0.072)
Transition dummy 0.003 0.539 0.764 0.003 0.539 0.764
(0.015) (0.486) (0.641) (0.016) (0.528) (0.641)
Monarchy dummy 0.001 0.001*** 0.011
(0.014) (0.001) (0.026)
Non-monarchy dummy -0.001
1511.171***
87.303
(0.015) (4.208) (203.895)
Lfpindex*monarchy 0.002 9.339*** 4.086
(0.003) (5.248) (2.561)
Lfpindex*non-monarchy -0.002 0.107*** 0.244
(0.004) (0.333) (0.171)
Post-election dummy 0.338*** 6.267*** 5.136*** 0.034*** 6.266*** 5.136***
(0.004) (0.941) (1.235) (0.004) (0.935) (1.235)
Term limit dummy 0.974*** +*** 31.708*** 0.974*** _(_*** 31.708***
(0.006) (+) (9.147) (0.006) (+) (9.417)
Tenure of leader 0.001 1.187 0.000 1.186
(0.001) (0.191) (0.001) (0.187)
Age of leader 0.010 3.326 3.474 0.014 3.326 3.474
(0.012) (4.011) (2.747) (0.012) (6.024) (2.747)
N observations 34,495 31,514 33,992 34,495 31,514 33,992
N countries 77 67 77 77 67 77
Nleaders 582 567 571 582 567 571
N exits 466 466 457 466 466 457
R2 0.314 0.336 0.314 0.336
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 6 
is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year dummies. 
By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample variation in the 
dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an individual subject 
and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for linear probability 
model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional hazard model are 
hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The R2 in columns 1 and 4 
refers to the within-/?-', whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-/?2. *, **, *** denotes significance 
at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the leader term limit dummy in 
columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
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Table A4.2.2 Results with an Interaction Term between the Food 
Price Index and the Dummy for Civil Autocracy
Interaction: Democracy dummy Interaction: Non-democracy dummy
Linear Logit Cox prop. Linear Logit Cox prop.
prob. hazard prob. hazard
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Log of food price index 0.006 2.034 1.946** 0.009** 2.714 1.923
(0.004) (0.936) (0.619) (0.005) (1.704) (0.938)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.001 1.279 1.191 0.001 1.279 1.191
(0.003) (0.421) (0.358) (0.002) (0.421) (0.358)
RGDP per capita growth -0.025*** 0.044*** 0.090*** -0.024*** 0.044*** 0.090***
(0.008) (0.048) (0.083) (0.008) (0.048) (0.082)
Transition dummy 0.004 0.543 0.739 0.004 0.543 0.739
(0.015) (0.490) (0.617) (0.015) (0.490) (0.617)
Civil autocracy dummy -0.007 0.596 1.900
(0.016) (0.938) (2.628)
Non-civil aut. dummy 0.007 1.676 0.526
(0.016) (2.636) (0.727)
Lfpindex*civil autocracy 0.003 1.334 0.987
(0.004) (0.523) (0.332)
Lfpindex*non-civil aut. -0.003 0.749 1.012
(0.004) (0.294) (0.340)
Post-election dummy 0.034*** 6.135*** 4 999*** 0.033*** 6.135*** 4 999***
(0.004) (0.921) (1.203) (0.004) (0.921) (1.203)
Term limit dummy 0.974*** - } . * * * 33.223*** 0.974*** -(_*** 33.223***
(0.006) (+) (9.644) (0.006) (+) (9.644)
Tenure of leader 0.000 1.162 0.000 1.162
(0.001) (0.182) (0.001) (0.182)
Age of leader 0. 013 3.994 3.938** 0.013 3.994 3.938*
(0.011) (4.524) (2.945) (0.011) (4.524) (2.94)
N observations 34,495 31,514 33,992 34,495 31,514 33,992
N countries 77 67 77 77 67 77
N leaders 582 567 571 582 567 571
N exits 466 466 457 466 466 457
R2 0.314 0.337 0.314 0.337
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 
6 is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year 
dummies. By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample 
variation in the dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an 
individual subject and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for 
linear probability model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional 
hazard model are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The R2 
in columns 1 and 4 refers to the within-/?’, whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-/?’. *, **, 
*** denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the 
leader term limit dummy in columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
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Table A4.2.3 Results with an Interaction Term between the Food 
Price Index and the Dummy for Military Dictatorship
Interaction: Democracy dummy Interaction: Non-democracy dummy
Linear Logit Cox prop. Linear Logit Cox prop.
prob. hazard prob. hazard
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Log of food price index 0.007* 2.441** 2.150** 0.005 1.864 1.696
(0.004) (1.083) (0.686) (0.005) (1.241) (0.811)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.001 1.361 1.311 0.001 1.361 1.311
(0.003) (0.426) (0.401) (0.003) (0.468) (0.401)
RGDP per capita growth -0.025*** 0.040*** 0.081*** -0.025*** 0.040*** 0.081***
(0.008) (0.052) (0.076) (0.008) (0.047) (0.076)
Transition dummy 0.003 0.534 0.761 0.003 0.534 0.761
(0.015) (0.528) (0.640) (0.015) (0.485) (0.640)
Military dictat. dummy 0.010 2.827 2.444
(0.016) (0.589) (4.020)
Non-military d. dummy -0.011 0.353 0.049
(0.016) (0.700) (0.672)
Lfpindex*military dictat. -0.002 0.763 0.788
(0.004) (0.454) (0.343)
Lfpindex*non-military d. 0.002 1.309 1.267
(0.004) (0.674) (0.552)
Post-election dummy 0.033*** 6.229*** 5.092*** 0.034*** 6.229*** 5.092***
(0.004) (0.935) (1.223) (0.004) (0.936) (1.223)
Term limit dummy 0.973*** 31.840*** 0.974*** 31.84***
(0.006) (+) (9.180) (0.006) (+) (9.180)
Tenure of leader 0.000 1.199 0.000 1.199
(0.001) (0.187) (0.001) (0.197)
Age of leader 0.012 3.940 3.827* 0.012 3.940 4.827*
(0.010) (6.024) (3.030) (0.010) (4.498) (3.030)
N observations 34,495 31,514 33,992 34,495 31,514 33,992
N countries 77 67 77 77 67 77
N leaders 582 567 571 582 567 571
N exits 466 466 457 466 466 457
R2 0.314 0.336 0.314 0.336
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 
6 is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year 
dummies. By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample 
variation in the dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an 
individual subject and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for 
linear probability model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional 
hazard model are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The /?-’ 
in columns 1 and 4 refers to the within-/?’, whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-/?-’. *, **, 
*** denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the 
leader term limit dummy in columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
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Table A4.2.4 Results with an Interaction Term between the Food 
Price Index and the Dummy for Parliamentary Democracy
Interaction: Democracy dummy Interaction: Non-democracy dummy
Linear Logit Cox prop. Linear Logit Cox prop.
prob. hazard prob. hazard
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Log of food price index 0.006* 2.253* 1.831* 0.038 1.189 1.832*
(0.004) (0.968) (0.565) (0.005) (0.911) (0.659)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.002 1.111 1.144 0.002 1.111 1.144
(0.002) (0.352) (0.303) (0.002) (0.352) (0.303)
RGDP per capita growth -0.024*** 0.048*** 0.090** -0.025*** 0.048*** 0.090**
(0.008) (0.055) (0.085) (0.008) (0.055) (0.085)
Transition dummy 0.004 0.566 0.777 0.004 0.566 0.777
(0.016) (0.554) (0.701) (0.016) (0.554) (0.701)
Parliamentary d. dummy 0.003 5.055 0.460
(0.015) (11.747) (0.535)
Non-parliam. d. dummy -0.003 0.197 2.169
(0.015) (0.549) (2.521)
Lfpindex*parliamentary -0.003 0.527 1.000
(0.003) (0.302) (0.289)
Lfpindex*non-parliam. d. 0.003 1.895 0.999
(0.004) (1.087) (0.288)
Post-election dummy 0.033*** 6.319*** 5.132*** 0.033*** 6.319*** 5 132***
(0.004) (0.941) (1.211) (0.004) (0941) (1.211)
Term limit dummy 0.974*** _!_*** 34.872*** 0.974*** 34.872***
(0.006) (+) (10.406) (0.006) (+) (10.406)
Tenure of leader - 0.000 1.023 - 0.000 1.023
(0.001) (0.185) (0.001) (0.185)
Age of leader 0. 021* 9.110* 6.857** 0.021* 9.110* 6.857**
(0.012) (11.538) (5.555) (0.012) (11.538) (5.555)
N observations 34,495 31,514 33,992 34,495 31,514 33,992
N countries 77 67 77 77 67 77
N leaders 582 567 571 582 567 571
N exits 466 466 457 466 466 457
R2 0.314 0.336 0.314 0.336
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 
6 is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year 
dummies. By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample 
variation in the dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an 
individual subject and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for 
linear probability model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional 
hazard model are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The R2 
in columns 1 and 4 refers to the within-,/?2, whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-./?2. *, **, 
*** denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the 
leader term limit dummy in columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
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Table A4.2.5 Results with an Interaction Term between the Food 
Price Index and the Dummy for Presidential Democracy
Interaction: Democracy dummy Interaction: Non-democracy dummy
Linear Logit Cox prop. Linear Logit Cox prop.
prob. hazard prob. hazard
[11 [21 [31 [41 [51 [61
Log of food price index 0.006 1.970 2.059** 0.009 2.275** 2.270**
(0.004) (1.126) (0.702) (0.006) (1.239) (0.796)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.001 1.240 1.254 0.001 1.240 1.254
(0.002) (0.416) (0.369) (0.002) (0.416) (0.369)
RGDP per capita growth -0.025*** 0.040*** 0.077*** -0.025*** 0.040*** 0.077***
(0.008) (0.047) (0.070) (0.008) (0.047) (0.070)
Transition dummy 0.003 0.535 0.769 0.003 0.535 0.769
(0.016) (0.502) (0.670) (0.015) (0.502) (0.670)
Presidential d. dummy -0.006 0.344 0.951
(0.026) (0.617) (1.260)
Non-presid. d. dummy 0.006 2.898 1.050
(0.026) (5.187) (1.392)
Lfpindex*presidential d. 0.002 1.397 1.102
(0.006) (0.589) (0.349)
Lfpindex*non-presid. d. -0.002 0.715 0.907
(0.006) (0.301) (0.287)
Post-election dummy 0.034*** 6.253*** 5.106*** 0.033*** 6.253*** 5.106***
(0.004) (0.934) (1.226) (0.004) (0.934) (1.226)
Term limit dummy 0.973*** +*** 31.810*** 0.974*** 31.810***
(0.006) (+) (9.135) (0.006) (+) (9.135)
Tenure of leader 0.000 1.1917 0.000 1.197
(0.001) (0.194) (0.001) (0.194)
Age of leader 0.012 4.210 3.901* 0.012 4.210 3.901*
(0.011) (4.842) (3.056) (0.011) (4.842) (3.056)
N observations 34,495 31,514 33,992 34,495 31,514 33,992
N countries 77 67 77 77 67 77
N leaders 582 567 571 582 567 571
N exits 466 466 457 466 466 457
R2 0.314 0.336 0.314 0.336
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 
6 is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year 
dummies. By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample 
variation in the dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an 
individual subject and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for 
linear probability model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional 
hazard model are hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The R: 
in columns 1 and 4 refers to the within-./?’, whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-./?-’. *, **, 
*** denotes significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the 
leader term limit dummy in columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
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Table A4.2.6 Results with an Interaction Term between the Food 
Price Index and the Dummy for Mixed Democracy
Interaction: Democracy dummy Interaction: Non-democracy dummy
Linear Logit Cox prop. Linear Logit Cox prop.
prob. hazard prob. hazard
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Log of food price index 0.006 2.240* 2.056** 0.038 26.510*** 16.928***
(0.004) (1.013) (0.645) (0.246) (14.824) (10.07)
Log of RGDP per capita 0.001 1.373 1.318 0.001 1.373 1.318
(0.002) (0.479) (0.409) (0.002) (0.479) (0.409)
RGDP per capita growth -0.026*** 0.035*** 0.074*** -0.026*** 0.035*** 0.074***
(0.008) (0.041) (0.068) (0.008) (0.041) (0.068)
Transition dummy 0.003 0.527 0.758 0.003 0.527 0.758
(0.015) (0.479) (0.640) (0.015) (0.479) (0.640)
Mixed democ. dummy -0.115 119.062 0.001***
(0.087) (281.057) (0.002)
Non-mixed d. dummy 0.015 0.008** 1123.334***
(0.087) (0.019) (2722.723)
Lfpindex*mixed democ. 0.031
11.830***
8.232***
(0.024) (4.553) (4.086)
Lfpindex*non-mixed d. -0.031 0.084*** 0.121***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.060)
Post-election dummy 0.033*** 6.271*** 5.131*** 0.034*** 6.271*** 5.131***
(0.043) (0.946) (1.240) (0.004) (0.946) (1.240)
Term limit dummy 0.974*** 32.104*** 0.974*** 32.104***
(0.006) (+) (9.359) (0.006) (+) (9.359)
Tenure of leader 0.000 1.196 0.000 1.196
(0.001) (0.191) (0.001) (0.191)
Age of leader 0. Oil 3.900 3.858* 0.011 3.900 3.858*
(0.011) (4.511) (2.990) (0.011) (4.511) (2.990)
N observations 34,495 31,514 33,992 34,495 31,514 33,992
N countries 77 67 77 77 67 77
N leaders 582 567 571 582 567 571
N exits 466 466 457 466 466 457
R2 0.314 0.336 0.314 0.336
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-2 and 4-5 is a dummy for leader exits and in columns 3 and 6 
is the duration to a leader exit. Each regression includes a constant, country dummies and year dummies. 
By definition, the logit model restricts the sample to countries experiencing within-sample variation in the 
dependent variable. The Cox proportional hazard model treats each leader-spell as an individual subject 
and only includes leaders in power at the start of the month. The reported values for linear probability 
model are coefficients, for logit model are odds ratios, and for the Cox proportional hazard model are 
hazard ratios. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. The R2 in columns 1 and 4 
refers to the within-/?-, whereas in columns 2 and 5 refers to the pseudo-/?2. *, **, *** denotes significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. +The estimated odds ratios for the leader term limit dummy in 
columns 2 and 4 are large, positive and statistically significant.
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks
This thesis has addressed three substantive issues with respect to the roles of democratic 
and non-democratic institutions in the economy. The first is the relationship between 
democratisation, systems of government and the size of public spending. The second is 
the existence of electoral budget cycles under non-democratic regimes. The third is the 
effect that food prices have on political survival and how the state of democracy 
influences such an effect.
From the results in Chapter 2, it can be concluded that the effect of democratisation on 
the size of general government consumption is not by itself robustly significant. The 
importance of the relationship between democratisation and general government 
consumption size is subject to the systems of government prevailing before and after a 
political reform, and only democratisation that originates from a military dictatorship 
and ends up with a parliamentary democracy has a robust significant relationship with 
the share of general government consumption in a country’s overall economy. With 
regard to gross public gross fixed capital formation, it can be concluded that the effects 
of democratisation and systems of government are weak and not statistically significant
Findings in Chapter 2 leave a natural direction for further research. That is, to determine 
whether systems of government affect how public spending is allocated. Governments 
led by a an absolute monarch, a military dictator or a civil autocrat may spend the same 
amount of consumption expenditure as those lead by a president or a prime minister, but 
be very different in the way they allocate it. The extent to which different types of 
governments are able to effectively use the spending is also worthy of future research.
From the results in Chapter 3, the conclusion is that electoral budget cycles do exist 
under non-democratic regimes. The effect of elections on the GDP share of the central 
government budget balance is significant and robust to a number of variations in control 
variables, estimation models, sample selection criteria and designations of the election- 
year dummy. The other conclusion is that the persistence of budget cycles under non-
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democratic regimes is driven by the subsample of countries with less distance from 
democracy (shallow autocracies). The effect of elections on the share of the central 
government budget balance in GDP is under no circumstances significant when the 
regression includes only the subsample of countries with greater distance from 
democracy (deep autocracies).
This finding underscores the importance of providing a more complete picture of the 
effect of elections on government budget balance. Rather than limiting themselves to 
the studies in democratic countries, economists need to pay more attention on the cases 
under non-democratic regimes and seriously examine the relationship between the level 
of democracy and politically driven budget cycles.
Finally, from Chapter 4 it can be concluded that the effect of food prices on political 
survival is significant and robust. The relationship between food prices and the 
occurrence of national leader exits does not change with changes in the log of real gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita or the real GDP per capita growth rate. The 
relationship also does not change with changes in the state of democracy. However, 
once the joint-effect between food prices and the state of democracy is controlled, the 
relationship between food prices and the occurrence of national leader exits is 
significant only in democracies and not in non-democratic countries.
Chapter 4 is an early study on the importance of food prices on political survival. Future 
research should investigate the effect of food prices on political survival in countries 
that are food net-exporting. While it is intuitive to expect that the effect for net- 
exporting countries would be different from the effect found in this chapter, another 
challenge is to estimate the relationship between food prices and political survival in 
countries that were net-exporting for one or two commodities and, at the same time, net- 
importing for other food items.
98
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D 2005, ‘Constitutions, politics and economics: A review essay on Persson 
and Tabellini’s the Economic Effects of Constitutions, Journal o f Economic 
Literature, vol. XLIII, pp. 1025-1048
Acemoglu, D, Johnson, S & Robinson, JA 2001, ‘The colonial origins of comparative 
development: An empirical investigation’, American Economic Review, vol. 91, 
no. 5, pp. 1369-1401
Afonso, A & Furceri, D 2010, ‘Government size, composition, volatility and economic 
growth’, European Journal o f Political Economy, vol. 26, no.4, pp. 517-532
Agell, J & Persson, M 2006, ‘Benevolent planners, malevolent dictators and democratic 
voters’, Stockholm University, Department o f Economics Research Papers 
2006/6
Akhmedov, A & Zhuravskaya, E 2004, ‘Opportunistic political cycles: Test in a young 
democracy setting’, The Quarterly Journal o f Economics, vol. 119, no.4, pp. 
1301-1338
Alesina, A & Dollar, D 2000, ‘Who gives aid to whom and why Journal o f Economic 
Growth, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 33-63
Alesina, A, Roubini, N & Cohen, GD 1997, Political cycles and the macroeconomy, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Alesina, A & Wacziarg, R 1998, ‘Openness, country size and government’, Journal o f 
Public Economics, vol. 69, pp. 305-321
Alt, JE & Crystal, A 1983, Political Economics, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, CA
Alt, JE & Lassen, DD 2006, ‘Transparency, political polarization and political budget 
cycles in OECD countries,’ American Journal o f Political Science, vol. 50, pp. 
530-550
Amara, T & Lowe, C 2011, ‘Veteran Tunisian leader quits after protests’, Reuters, 14 
January, viewed 15 December 2012, <http://www.reuters.com>
Andersen, JJ 2011, ‘The form of government and fiscal dynamics’, European Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 27, pp. 297-310
99
Arellano, M & Bond, S 1991, ‘Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations’, Review o f Economic 
Studies, vol. 58, pp. 277-297
Arezki, R & Bruckner, M 2011, ‘Food prices and political instability’, IMF Working 
Papers 11/62
Bartels, LM & Zaller, J 2001, ‘Presidential vote models: A recount’, Political Science & 
Politics, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 8-20
Bellemare, MF 2011, Rising Food Prices, Food Price Volatility and Political Unrest, 
Unpublished manuscript
Bertrand, M, Duflo, E, & Mullainathan, S 2004, ‘How much should we trust 
differences-in-differences estimates 2’ .Quarterly Journal o f Economics, vol. 119, 
no. l,pp. 249-275
Besley, TJ 2007, ‘The new political economy’, Economic Journal, vol. 117, no. 524, 
pp. F570-F587
Blaydes, L 2006, ‘Electoral budget cycles under authoritarianism: Economic 
opportunism in Mubarak’s Egypt’, Paper to be presented in the Midwest 
Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, IL
Block, S 2002, ‘Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the 
case of Africa’, Journal o f Development Economics, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 205-228
Blume, L, Müller, J, Voigt, S & Wolf, S 2009, ‘The economic effects of constitutions: 
replicating -and extending- Persson and Tabellini’, Public Choice, vol. 139, no. 
l,pp. 197-225
Brender, A & Drazen, A 2005, ‘Political budget cycles in new versus established 
democracies’, Jo urnal o f Monetary Economics, vol. 52, pp. 1271-1295
Bueno de Mesquita, B, Smith, A, Siverson, R & Morrow, J 2003, The Logic o f Political 
Survival, Boston, MIT Press
Burke, PJ 2011, ‘Economic growth and political survival’, B.E. Journal o f 
Macroeconomics, vol. 12, no. 1
Burke, PJ & Leigh, A 2010, ‘Do output contractions trigger democratic 
change?'American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 124— 
157
Carmignani, F 2002, ‘New evidence on the politics and economics of multiparty 
cabinets duration’, Scottish Journal o f Political Economy, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 
249-279
100
Cervellati, M, Fortunato, P & Sunde, U 2011, ‘Democratization and civil liberties: The 
role of violence during the transition’, CEPR Discussion Papers 8315
Cheibub, J, Gandhi, J & Vreeland, J 2010, ‘Democracy and dictatorship revisited’, 
Public Choice, vol. 143, no. 1, pp. 67-101
CIMMYT, Price Database,CIMMYT International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Centre, viewed 11 October 2011, <http://www.cimmyt.org>
Collier, D & Levitsky, S 1997, ‘Research note: Democracy with adjectives: conceptual 
innovation in comparative research’, World Politics, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 430^151
Cox, G 2010, Authoritarian elections and leadership succession 1975-2000, 
Unpublished manuscript
Cusack, TR 1997, ‘Partisan politics and public finance: Changes in public spending in 
the industrialized democracies 1955-1989’, Public Choice, vol. 91, no. 3-4, pp. 
375-395
Deacon, R 2009, ‘Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy’, Public 
Choice, vol. 139, no. 1-2, pp. 241-262
Dell, M, Jones, BF & Olken, BA 2012, ‘Temperature shocks and economic growth: 
Evidence from the last half century’, American Economic Journal: 
Macroeconomics, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 66-95
Delva, JG & Loney, J 2008, ‘Haiti’s government falls after food riots’, Reuters, 12 
April, viewed 15 December 2012, <http://www.reuters.com>
Diamond, L 2002, ‘Elections without democracy: Thinking about hybrid regimes’, 
Journal o f Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 21-35
Drazen, A & Eslava, M2010, ‘Electoral manipulation via expenditure composition: 
Theory and evidence’, Journal o f Development Economics, vol. 92, pp. 39-52
Duch, RM &Stevenson, R 2008, The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic 
Institutions Condition Election Results, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
Earth Policy Institute 2008, Food Price Unrest around the World, September 2007- 
April 2008, Earth Policy Institute, viewed 15 December 2012, 
<http ://www. earthpol icy. org>
Elgie, R 1998, ‘The classification of democratic regime types: Conceptual ambiguity 
and contestable assumptions’, European Journal o f Political Research, vol. 33, 
pp. 219-238
101
Evans-Pritchard, A 2011, ‘Egypt and Tunisia usher in the new era of global food 
revolutions’, The Telegraph, 30 January, viewed 15 December 2012, 
<http ://www. tel egraph. c o. uk>
Fair, RC 1978, ‘The effect of economic events on votes for president’, Review 
o f Economics and Statistics, vol. 60, pp. 159-173
Fearon, J2011, ‘Self-enforcing democracy’, Quarterly Journal o f Economics, vol. 126, 
no. 4, pp. 1661-1708
Ferreira, F & Gyourko, J 2009, ‘Do political parties matter? Evidence from U.S. cities- 
super’, Quarterly Journal o f Economics, vol. 124, no. 1, pp. 399—422
Fischer, S 2004, IMF Essays from a Time o f Crisis: The International Financial System, 
Stabilization, and Development, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 1995, Dimensions o f Need: An Atlas o f Food 
and Agriculture, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
Rome
Furet, F 1996, The French Revolution 1770-1814, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA
Gallego, M & Pitchik, C 2004, ‘An economic theory of leadership turnover’, Journal o f 
Public Economics, vol. 88, no. 12, pp. 2361-2382
Gandhi, J & Przeworski, A 2006, ‘Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under 
dictatorships’, Economics and Politics, vol. 18, pp. 1-26
Gandhi, J & Przeworski, A 2007, ‘Authoritarian institutions and the survival of 
autocrats’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 40, no. 11, pp. 1279-1301
Geddes, B 1999, ‘What do we know about democratization after twenty years?’, Annual 
Review o f Political Science, vol. 2, pp. 115-144
Geddes, B 2005, ‘Why parties and elections in authoritarian regimes?’, Paper to be 
presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association
Goemans, HE, Gleditsch, KS & Chiozza, G 2009, ‘Introducing Archigos: A data set of 
political leaders’, Journal o f Peace Research, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 269-283
Gonzalez, MA 2002a, ‘Do changes in democracy affect the political budget cycle: 
Evidence from Mexico’, Review of Development Economics, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 
204-224
Gonzalez, MA 2002b, On Democracy, Transparency and Economic Policy: Theory and 
Evidence, Unpublished dissertation, Princeton University
102
Grafstein, R 2009, ‘The puzzle of weak pocketbook voting’, Journal o f Theoretical 
Politics, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 451—482
Guiso, L, Sapienza, P& Zingales, L 2009, ‘Cultural biases in economic 
exchang e?’,Quarterly Journal o f Economics, vol. 124, no. 3, pp. 1095-1131
Hammond, AL, Kramer, WJ, Katz, RS, Tran, JT & Walker, C 2007, The Next 4 Billion, 
Washington, World Resources Institute
Hadenius, A & Teorell, J 2007, ‘Pathways from authoritarianism’, Journal o f 
Democracy, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 143-156
Hausken, K, Martin, CW & Plümper, T 2004, ‘Government spending and taxation in 
democracies and autocracies’, Constitutional Political Economy, vol. 15, no. 3, 
pp. 239-259
Hendrix, C, Haggart, S & Magaloni, B 2009, ‘Grievance and opportunity: Food prices, 
political regime, and protest’, Paper to be presented at the 2009 the 
International Studies Association Annual Meeting, The International Studies 
Association
Heston, A, Summers, R & Aten, B 2011, Penn World Table version 7.0, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
Hibbs, DA Jr 2000, ‘Bread and peace voting in U.S. presidential elections’, Public 
Choice, vol. 104, no. 1-2, pp. 149-80
Hibbs, DA Jr 2006, ‘Voting and the macroeconomy’, in Barry Weingast and Donald 
Wittman, (eds.) The Oxford Handbook o f Political Economy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, chapter 31, pp. 565-586
Hollyer, JR, Rosendorff, BP & Vreeland, JR 2011, ‘Democracy and transparency’, 
Journal o f Politics, vol. 73, pp 1191-1205
Hyde, SD 2006, Observing Norms: Explaining the Causes and Consequences o f 
Internationally Monitored Elections, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
California, San Diego, CA
Hyde, SD & Marinov, N 2012, ‘National elections across democracy and autocracy: 
Which elections can be lost?’, Political Analysis, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 191-210
Hyde, SD & 0’Mahony, A 2010, ‘International scrutiny and pre-electoral fiscal 
manipulation in developing countries 'Journal o f Politics, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 
690-704
103
IMF 2011, International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Funds, viewed 
11 October 2011, <http://www.imf.org>
Jensen, S & Jensen, L 1995, ‘Debt, deficits and transition to EMU: A small country 
analysis’, European Journal o f Political Economy, vol. 11, pp. 3-25
Katsimi, M & Sarantides, V 2012, ‘Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy 
in developed, established democracies?’, Public Choice, vol. 151, no. 1, pp 325— 
362
Kiewiet, DR 1984, Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects o f 
Economic Issues, Chicago, University of Chicago Press
Kiewiet, DR & Udell, M 1998, ‘Twenty-five years after Kramer: An assessment of 
economic retrospective voting based upon improved estimates of income and 
unemployment’, Economics in Politics,vol. 10, pp. 219^18
Kilby, C 2009, ‘The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of 
World Bank loan disbursements’, Journal o f Development Economics, vol.89, 
no. 1, pp. 51-61
Kinder, DR & Kiewiet, DR 1979, ‘Economic grievances and political behavior: The 
role of personal discontents and collective judgments in congressional voting’, 
American Journal o f Political Science, vol. 23, pp. 495-527
Kramer, GH 1971, ‘Short-term fluctuations in U.S. voting behavior, 1896-1964’, 
American Political Science Review, vol. 65, pp. 131-143
Kuntz, P& Thompson, MR 2009, ‘More than just the final straw: Stolen elections as 
revolutionary triggers’, Comparative Politics, vol. 41, pp. 253-272
Lewis-Beck, MS & Stegmaier, M 2007, ‘Economic models of voting’, in Russel Dalton 
& Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.) The Oxford Handbook o f Political Behavior, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 518-537
Levitsky, S&Way, LA 2002, ‘The rise of competitive authoritarianism’, Journal o f 
Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 51-66
Marshall, MG, Gurr, TR& Jaggers, K 2010, POLITY IV Project: Dataset Users’ 
Manual, Center for Systemic Peace, Vienna, VA
McGuire, MC & Olson, M 1996, ‘The economics of autocracy and majority rule: The 
invisible hand and the use of force’, Journal o f Economic Literature, vol. 34, no. 
1, pp. 72-96
Meitzer, AH & Richard, SF 1981, ‘A rational theory of the size of government’, 
Journal o f Political Economy, vol. 89, pp. 914-927
104
Milesi-Ferretti, GM, Perotti, R & Ristagno, M 2002, ‘Electoral systems and public 
spending’, Quarterly Journal o f Economics, vol. 117, no. 2, pp. 609-657
Mulligan, CB, Gil, R & Sala-i-Martin, X 2004, ‘Do democracies have different public 
policies than nondemocracies?’, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, vol. 18, no.
1, pp. 51-74
Munck, GL & Verkuilen, J 2002, ‘Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: 
evaluating alternative indices’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, no. 11, 
pp. 5-34
Neely, S 2008, A Concise History o f the French Revolution, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Lanham, MD
Niskanen, WA 1997, ‘Autocratic, democratic and optimal government’, Economic 
Inquiry, vol. 35, pp. 464-^179
Nordhaus, W 1975, ‘The political business cycle’, Review o f Economic Studies, vol. 42, 
pp. 169-190
Nunnenkamp, P, Weingarth,.! & Weisser, J 2009, ‘Is NGO aid not so different after all? 
Comparing the allocation of Swiss aid by private and official donors’, European 
Journal o f Political Economy, vol. 25, no.4, pp. 422-438
Palmer, HD & Whitten, GD 1999, ‘The electoral impacts of unexpected inflation and 
economic growth’, British Journal o f Political Science, vol. 29, pp. 623-639
Papaioannou, E & Siourounis, G 2008, ‘Democratisation and growth’, Economic 
Journal, vol. 118, no. 532, pp. 1520-1551
Paul, D 2011, ‘Food matters: Commodity prices and the Egyptian revolution’, 
Huffington Post, 9 February, viewed 15 December 2012, 
<http://www.huffmgtonpost.com>
Pepinksy, T 2007, ‘Autocracy, elections and fiscal policy: Evidence from Malaysia’, 
Studiesin Comparative International Development, vol. 42, no. 1-2, pp. 136-163
Persson, T, Roland, G & Tabellini, G 2000, ‘Comparative politics and public finance’, 
Journal o f Political Economy, vol. 108, pp. 1121-1161
Persson, T, Roland, G & Tabellini, G 2007, ‘Electoral rules and government spending 
in parliamentary democracy’, Quarterly Journal o f Political Science, vol. 2, no.
2, pp. 155-188
Persson, T &Tabellini, G 2000, Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, 
Cambridge, MIT Press
105
Persson, T & Tabellini, G 2003, The Economic Effect o f Constitutions: What do the 
Data Say?, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Persson, T & Tabellini, G 2004, ‘Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes’, 
American Economic Review, vol. 94, no. 1, pp. 25-45
Persson, T & Tabellini, G 2006, ‘Democracy and development: The devil in the details’, 
American Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 2, pp. 319-324
Przeworski, A & Limongi, F 1993, ‘Political regimes and economic growth’, Journal o f 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 51-69
Rajan, R & Subramanian, A 2011, ‘Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth’, 
Journal o f Development Economics, vol. 94, no.l, pp. 106-118
Ram, R 2009, ‘Openness, country size and government size: Additional evidence from a 
large cross-country panel’, Journal o f Public Economics, vol. 93, pp. 213-218
Rodrik, D 1998, ‘Why do more open economies have bigger governments?’, Journal o f 
Political Economy, vol. 106, pp. 997-1032
Rodrik, D & Wacziarg, R 2005, ‘Do democratic transitions produce bad economic 
outcomes?’, American Economic Review, vol. 95, no. 2, pp. 50-55
Rogoff, K 1990, ‘Equilibrium political budget cycles’, American Economic Review, vol. 
80, pp. 21-36
Rogoff, K & Sibert, A 1988, ‘Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles’, Review of 
Economic Studies, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 1-16
Romero-Avila, D & Strauch, R 2008, ‘Public finance and long-term growth in Europe: 
Evidence from a panel data analysis’, European Journal o f Political Economy, 
vol. 24, pp. 172-191
Rude, G 1964, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and 
England 1730-1848, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Rude, GF & Kaye, HJ 2000, Revolutionary Europe 1783-1815, Blackwell Publishers, 
Malden, MA
Samuelson, P 1954, ‘The pure theory of public expenditure’, Review o f Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 36, pp. 387-389
Schedler, A 2002, ‘Elections without democracy: The menu of manipulation’, Journal 
o f Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2
Schuknecht, L 1996, ‘Political business cycles and fiscal policies in developing 
countries’, Kyklos, vol. 49, pp. 155-170
106
Schuknecht, L 2000, ‘Fiscal policy cycles and public expenditure in developing 
countries’, Public Choice, vol. 102, pp. 115-130
Shi, M & Svensson, J 2006, ‘Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and 
why?’, Journal o f Public Economics, vol. 90, pp. 1367-1389
Strom, K 2000, ‘Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies’, 
European Journal o f Political Research, vol. 37, pp. 261-289
Svolik, M 2009, ‘Power-sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes’, 
American Journal o f Political Science, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 477^494
Tabellini, G 2010, ‘Culture and institutions: Economic development in the regions of 
Europe’, Journal o f the European Economic Association, vol. 8, pp. 677-716
Thompson, MR & Kuntz, P 2006, ‘After defeat: When do rulers steal elections?’ in 
Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics o f Unfree
Competition, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, pp. 113-128
Tucker, J 2007, ‘Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post­
communist colored revolutions’, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 5, pp. 535-551
Tufite, E 1978, Political Control o f the Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
NJ
United Nations 2011, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, CD-ROM 
Edition, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, New York, NY
Vergne, C 2009, ‘Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in 
developing countries’, European Journal o f Political Economy, vol. 25, no. 1, 
pp. 63-77
Voigt, S 1997, ‘Positive constitutional economics: A survey’, Public Choice, vol. 90, 
no. \-A, pp. 11-53
Voigt, S 2011, ‘Positive constitutional economics II: A survey of recent developments’, 
Public Choice, vol. 146, no. 1, pp. 205-256
Von Braun, J, Byerlee, D, Chartres, C, Lumpkin, T, Olembo, N & Waage, J 2010, A 
Draft Strategy and Results Framework for the CG1AR, the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), Washington, DC
Warwick, PV 1992, ‘Economic trends and government survival in West European 
parliamentary democracies’, American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 4, 
pp. 875-887
107
Washington, EL 2008, ‘Female socialization: How daughters affect their legislator 
fathers' voting on women's issues’, The American Economic Review , vol. 98, 
no. 1, pp. 311-332
World Bank 2011, World Development Indicators, The World Bank, viewed 11 October 
2011, <http://www.worldbank.org>
Wright, J 2011, Electoral Spending Cycles in Dictatorships, Unpublished manuscript
108
Supplementary Tables
109
Table S.l List of Countries, States of Democracy and Systems of 
Government as Estimated in Table 2.2
S ta te s  o f  d e m o c ra c y S y s te m s  o f  g o v e rn m e n t
A fg h a n is ta n 1 9 7 2 -2 0 0 8  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 7 2 -1 9 7 3  M o n a rc h y  
1 9 7 4 -2 0 0 8  C iv il a u to c ra c y
A lb a n ia 1 9 7 2 -1 9 9 1  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 7 2 -1 9 8 5  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  
1 9 8 6 -1 9 9 1  C iv il a u to c ra c y
1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 8  P a rlia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y
A lg e ria 1 9 6 3 -2 0 0 8  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 3 -1 9 6 5  C iv il a u to c ra c y  
1 9 6 6 -1 9 9 9  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  
2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 8  C iv il a u to c ra c y
A n g o la 1 9 7 6 -2 0 0 8  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 7 6 -2 0 0 8  C iv il a u to c ra c y
A rg e n tin a 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 2  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 2  P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y
1 9 6 3 -1 9 6 3  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 3 -1 9 6 3  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
1 9 6 4 -1 9 6 6  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 4 -1 9 6 6  P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y
1 9 6 7 -1 9 7 3  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 7 -1 9 7 3  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
1 9 7 4 -1 9 7 6  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 7 4 -1 9 7 6  P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y
1 9 7 7 -1 9 8 3  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 7 7 -1 9 8 3  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
1 9 8 4 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 8 4 -2 0 0 8  P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y
A rm e n ia 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 8  M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y
A u s tra lia 1 9 6 0 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 0 -2 0 0 8  P a rlia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y
A u s tr ia 1 9 6 0 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 0 -2 0 0 8  M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y
A z e rb a ija n 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 8  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 8  C iv il a u to c ra c y
B a h a m a s 1 9 7 4 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 7 4 -2 0 0 8  P a rlia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y
B ah ra in 1 9 7 2 -2 0 0 8  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 7 2 -2 0 0 8  M o n a rc h y
B a n g la d e sh 1 9 7 2 -1 9 8 6  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 7 2 -1 9 7 7  C iv il a u to c ra c y  
1 9 7 8 -1 9 8 1  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
1 9 8 2 -  1982 C iv il a u to c ra c y
1 9 8 3 -  1986 M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
1 9 8 7 -2 0 0 7  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 8 7 -1 9 9 1  M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y  
1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 7  P a rlia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y
2 0 0 8 -2 0 0 8  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 2 0 0 8 -2 0 0 8  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
B a rb a d o s 1 9 6 7 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 7 -2 0 0 8  P a rlia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y
B e la ru s 1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 8  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 9 6 -2 0 0 8  C iv il a u to c ra c y
B e lg iu m 1 9 6 0 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 0 -2 0 0 8  P a rlia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y
B e liz e 1 9 8 2 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 8 2 -2 0 0 8  P a rlia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y
B e n in 1 9 6 1 -1 9 9 1  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 1 -1 9 6 3  C iv il a u to c ra c y  
1 9 6 4 -1 9 7 0  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  
1 9 7 1 -1 9 7 2  C iv il a u to c ra c y  
1 9 7 3 -1 9 9 1  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 8  P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y
B h u ta n 1 9 7 2 -2 0 0 7  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 7 2 -2 0 0 7  M o n a rc h y
2 0 0 8 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 2 0 0 8 -2 0 0 8  P a rlia m e n ta ry  d e m o c ra c y
B o liv ia 1 9 6 0 -1 9 8 2  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4  C iv il au to c ra c y  
1 9 6 5 -1 9 7 9  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
1 9 8 0 -  1980 C iv il a u to c ra c y
1 9 8 1 -  1982 M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
1 9 8 3 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 8 3 -2 0 0 8  P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y
B o sn ia -H e rz e g o v in a 1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 8  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 8  C iv il a u to c ra c y
B o tsw a n a 1 9 6 7 -2 0 0 8  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 7 -2 0 0 8  C iv il a u to c ra c y
B raz il 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 4  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 1  P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y  
1 9 6 2 -1 9 6 3  M ix e d  d e m o c ra c y  
1 9 6 4 -1 9 6 4  P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y
1 9 6 5 -1 9 8 5  N o n -d e m o c ra c y 1 9 6 5 -1 9 8 5  M ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip
1 9 8 6 -2 0 0 8  D e m o c ra c y 1 9 8 6 -2 0 0 8  P re s id e n tia l d e m o c ra c y
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Brunei Darussalam 
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
1985-2008 Non-democracy 
1972-1990 Non-democracy 
1991-2008 Democracy 
1961-2008 Non-democracy
Burundi 1963-1993 Non-democracy
1994-1996 Democracy 
1997-2005 Non-democracy
Cambodia
2006-2008 Democracy 
1972-2008 Non-democracy
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
1962-2008 Non-democracy 
1960-2008 Democracy 
1976-1990 Non-democracy 
1991-2008 Democracy 
1962-1993 Non-democracy
Chad
1994-2003 Democracy 
2004-2008 Non-democracy 
1962-2008 Non-democracy
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
1960-1973 Democracy 
1974-1990 Non-democracy 
1991-2008 Democracy 
1960-2008 Non-democracy 
1960-2008 Democracy 
1976-1990 Non-democracy 
1991-1995 Democracy 
1996-2004 Non-democracy
Congo, Republic of
2005-2008 Democracy 
1962-1963 Democracy 
1964-1992 Non-democracy
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire
1993-1997 Democracy 
1998-2008 Non-democracy 
1960-2008 Democracy 
1962-2008 Non-democracy
Croatia
Cuba
1992-2008 Democracy 
1972-2008 Non-democracy
Cyprus
Czech Republic 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
1961-1983 Non-democracy 
1984-2008 Democracy 
1994-2008 Democracy 
1961-2008 Non-democracy
_________(continued from previous page)
1985-2008 Monarchy 
1972-1990 Civil autocracy
1991- 2008 Mixed democracy
1961- 1966 Civil autocracy 
1967-2008 Military dictatorship
1963- 1966 Monarchy 
1967-1993 Military dictatorship 
1994-1996 Presidential democracy
1997- 2003 Military dictatorship 
2004-2005 Civil autocracy 
2006-2008 Presidential democracy 
1972-1975 Military dictatorship 
1976-1979 Civil autocracy 
1980-1991 Military dictatorship
1992- 2008 Civil autocracy
1962- 2008 Civil autocracy 
1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1976-1990 Civil autocracy 
1991-2008 Mixed democracy 
1962-1966 Civil autocracy 
1967-1979 Military dictatorship 
1980-1981 Civil autocracy 
1982-1993 Military dictatorship 
1994-2003 Mixed democracy
2004- 2008 Military dictatorship 
1962-1975 Civil autocracy 
1976-1979 Military dictatorship 
1980-1990 Civil autocracy 
1991-2008 Military dictatorship 
1960-1973 Presidential democracy 
1974-1990 Military dictatorship 
1991-2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-2008 Civil autocracy 
1960-2008 Presidential democracy 
1976-1990 Civil autocracy
1991- 1995 Mixed democracy 
1996-1999 Civil autocracy 
2000-2004 Military dictatorship
2005- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1962-1963 Presidential democracy
1964- 1968 Civil autocracy 
1969-1992 Military dictatorship
1993- 1997 Mixed democracy
1998- 2008 Military dictatorship
1960- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1962-1999 Civil autocracy
2000- 2000 Military dictatorship
2001- 2008 Civil autocracy
1992- 2008 Mixed democracy 
1972-2006 Civil autocracy 
2007-2008 Military dictatorship
1961- 1983 Civil autocracy 
1984-2008 Presidential democracy
1994- 2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1961-1965 Civil autocracy 
1966-1997 Military dictatorship 
1998-2008 Civil autocracy
1 1 1
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Denmark 1960-2008 Democracy
Djibouti 1978-2008 Non-democracy
Dominican Republic 1960-1966 Non-democracy
1967-2008 Democracy 
Ecuador 1960-1963 Democracy
1964-1979 Non-democracy
1980-2000 Democracy 
2001-2002 Non-democracy 
2003-2008 Democracy
Egypt 1960-2008 Non-democracy
El Salvador 1960-1984 Non-democracy
Equatorial Guinea
1985-2008 Democracy 
1969-2008 Non-democracy
Eritrea 1994-2008 Non-democracy
Estonia 1992-2008 Democracy
Ethiopia 1995-2008 Non-democracy
Ethiopia 1960-1992 Non-democracy
Fiji 1971-1992 Non-democracy
Finland
1993-2000 Democracy 
2001-2008 Non-democracy
1960-2008 Democracy
France 1960-2008 Democracy
Gabon 1962-2008 Non-democracy
Gambia 1966-2008 Non-democracy
Georgia 1995-2004 Non-democracy
Germany
2005-2008 Democracy 
1992-2008 Democracy
Germany, West 1972-1989 Democracy
Ghana 1960-1969 Non-democracy
Greece
1970-1972 Democracy 
1973-1979 Non-democracy 
1980-1981 Democracy 
1982-1993 Non-democracy 
1994-2008 Democracy 
1960-1967 Democracy
Grenada
1968-1974 Non-democracy 
1975-2008 Democracy 
1975-1979 Democracy
1980-1984 Non-democracy 
1985-2008 Democracy
___________ (icontinued from previous page )
1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1978-2008 Civil autocracy 
1960-1961 Military dictatorship 
1962-1963 Civil autocracy 
1964-1965 Military dictatorship
1966- 1966 Civil autocracy
1967- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-1963 Presidential democracy 
1964-1966 Military dictatorship 
1967-1972 Civil autocracy 
1973-1979 Military dictatorship
1980- 2000 Presidential democracy 
2001-2002 Civil autocracy 
2003-2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-2008 Military dictatorship 
1960-1980 Military dictatorship
1981- 1982 Civil autocracy 
1983-1984 Military dictatorship 
1985-2008 Presidential democracy
1969- 1979 Civil autocracy 
1980-2008 Military dictatorship
1994- 2008 Civil autocracy
1992-2008 Parliamentary democracy
1995- 2008 Civil autocracy 
1960-1974 Monarchy 
1975-1991 Military dictatorship
1992- 1992 Civil autocracy
1971- 1987 Civil autocracy 
1988-1992 Military dictatorship
1993- 2000 Parliamentary democracy
2001- 2001 Military dictatorship
2002- 2006 Civil autocracy 
2007-2008 Military dictatorship 
1960-2008 Mixed democracy 
1960-1965 Parliamentary democracy 
1966-2008 Mixed democracy 
1962-2008 Civil autocracy
1966- 1994 Civil autocracy 
1995-2008 Military dictatorship 
1995-2004 Civil autocracy 
2005-2008 Mixed democracy 
1992-2008 Parliamentary democracy
1972- 1989 Parliamentary democracy 
1960-1966 Civil autocracy
1967- 1969 Military dictatorship
1970- 1972 Parliamentary democracy
1973- 1979 Military dictatorship 
1980-1981 Presidential democracy
1982- 1993 Military dictatorship
1994- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-1967 Parliamentary democracy
1968- 1974 Military dictatorship 
1975-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1975-1979 Parliamentary democracy 
1980-1984 Civil autocracy 
1985-2008 Parliamentary democracy
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Guatemala 1960-1963 Democracy 1960-1963 Presidential democracy
1964-1966 Non-democracy 1964-1966 Military dictatorship
1967-1982 Democracy 1967-1982 Presidential democracy
1983-1986 Non-democracy 1983-1986 Military dictatorship
1987-2008 Democracy 1987-2008 Presidential democracy
Guinea 1961-2008 Non-democracy 1961-1984 Civil autocracy 
1985-2008 Military dictatorship
Guinea-Bissau 1975-2000 Non-democracy 1975-1980 Civil autocracy 
1981-2000 Military dictatorship
2001-2003 Democracy 2001-2003 Mixed democracy
2004-2004 Non-democracy 2004-2004 Civil autocracy
2005-2008 Democracy 2005-2008 Mixed democracy
Guyana 1972-2008 Non-democracy 1972-2008 Civil autocracy
Haiti 1962-2008 Non-democracy 1962-1986 Civil autocracy 
1987-1990 Military dictatorship 
1991-2008 Civil autocracy
Honduras 1960-1963 Democracy 1960-1963 Presidential democracy
1964-1982 Non-democracy 1964-1971 Military dictatorship
1972- 1972 Civil autocracy
1973- 1982 Military dictatorship
1983-2008 Democracy 1983-2008 Presidential democracy
Hungary 1972-1990 Non-democracy 1972-1990 Civil autocracy
1991-2008 Democracy 1991-2008 Parliamentary democracy
Iceland 1960-2008 Democracy 1960-2008 Mixed democracy
India 1960-2008 Democracy 1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy
Indonesia 1962-1999 Non-democracy 1962-1966 Civil autocracy 
1967-1999 Military dictatorship
2000-2008 Democracy 2000-2008 Presidential democracy
Iran 1960-2008 Non-democracy 1960-1979 Monarchy 
1980-2008 Civil autocracy
Iraq 1972-2008 Non-democracy 1972-1979 Military dictatorship 
1980-2003 Civil autocracy 
2004-2008 Military dictatorship
Ireland 1960-2008 Democracy 1960-2008 Mixed democracy
Israel 1960-2008 Democracy 1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy
Italy 1960-2008 Democracy 1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy
Jamaica 1963-2008 Democracy 1963-2008 Parliamentary democracy
Japan 1960-2008 Democracy 1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy
Jordan 1960-2008 Non-democracy 1960-2008 Monarchy
Kazakhstan 1995-2008 Non-democracy 1995-2008 Civil autocracy
Kenya 1964-1998 Non-democracy 1964-1998 Civil autocracy
1999-2008 Democracy 1999-2008 Presidential democracy
Kuwait 1988-2008 Non-democracy 1988-2008 Monarchy
Kyrgyzstan 1995-2005 Non-democracy 1995-2005 Civil autocracy
2006-2008 Democracy 2006-2008 Mixed democracy
Laos 1972-2008 Non-democracy 1972-1992 Civil autocracy 
1993-2008 Military dictatorship
Latvia 1995-2008 Democracy 1995-2008 Parliamentary democracy
Lebanon 1972-1975 Democracy 1972-1975 Parliamentary democracy
1976-2008 Non-democracy 1976-1988 Civil autocracy
1989- 1989 Military dictatorship
1990- 1998 Civil autocracy 
1999-2007 Military dictatorship 
2008-2008 Civil autocracy
Lesotho 1967-2008 Non-democracy 1967-1986 Civil autocracy 
1987-1993 Military dictatorship 
1994-2008 Civil autocracy
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Liberia
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia, Fed. States 
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
states of democracy and ... 
1972-2006 Non-democracy
2007-2008 Democracy 
1988-2008 Non-democracy 
1995-2008 Democracy 
1960-2008 Democracy
1992- 2008 Democracy 
1962-1993 Non-democracy
1994- 2008 Democracy 
1965-1994 Non-democracy
1995- 2008 Democracy 
1960-2008 Non-democracy 
1972-2008 Non-democracy 
1962-1992 Non-democracy
1993- 2008 Democracy 
1972-2008 Democracy 
1962-2008 Non-democracy
1969-2008 Democracy 
1960-2000 Non-democracy 
2001-2008 Democracy 
1992-2008 Democracy 
1994-2008 Democracy
1972-1990 Non-democracy 
1991-2008 Democracy
1960-2008 Non-democracy 
1976-2008 Non-democracy 
1991-2008 Non-democracy 
1962-1990 Non-democracy 
1991-2002 Democracy 
2003-2008 Non-democracy 
1960-2008 Democracy 
1960-2008 Democracy 
1960-1984 Non-democracy
1985-2008 Democracy 
1962-1993 Non-democracy
1994-1996 Democracy 
1997-2000 Non-democracy 
2001-2008 Democracy 
1961-1966 Democracy 
1967-1979 Non-democracy 
1980-1983 Democracy 
1984-1999 Non-democracy 
2000-2008 Democracy 
1960-2008 Democracy 
1972-2008 Non-democracy
___________ (continued from previous page)
1972- 1980 Civil autocracy 
1981-1990 Military dictatorship
1991- 2006 Civil autocracy
2007- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1988-2008 Military dictatorship 
1995-2008 Mixed democracy 
1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy
1992- 2008 Mixed democracy 
1962-1972 Civil autocracy
1973- 1993 Military dictatorship
1994- 2008 Mixed democracy 
1965-1994 Civil autocracy
1995- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-2008 Civil autocracy 
1972-2008 Civil autocracy 
1962-1968 Civil autocracy 
1969-1992 Military dictatorship
1993- 2008 Mixed democracy 
1972-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1962-1978 Civil autocracy
1979- 2007 Military dictatorship
2008- 2008 Civil autocracy 
1969-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1960-2000 Civil autocracy 
2001-2008 Presidential democracy
1992- 2008 Presidential democracy
1994- 1997 Parliamentary democracy 
1998-2000 Mixed democracy 
2001-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1972-1990 Civil autocracy 
1991-1992 Parliamentary democracy
1993- 2008 Mixed democracy 
1960-2008 Monarchy 
1976-2008 Civil autocracy 
1991-2008 Civil autocracy 
1962-1990 Monarchy 
1991-2002 Parliamentary democracy 
2003-2008 Monarchy 
1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy
1960- 1967 Civil autocracy 
1968-1979 Military dictatorship
1980- 1984 Civil autocracy 
1985-2008 Presidential democracy 
1962-1974 Civil autocracy 
1975-1993 Military dictatorship
1994- 1996 Mixed democracy 
1997-2000 Military dictatorship 
2001-2008 Mixed democracy
1961- 1966 Parliamentary democracy
1967-1979 Military dictatorship 
1980-1983 Presidential democracy 
1984-1999 Military dictatorship 
2000-2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1972-2008 Monarchy _____
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Pakistan 1974-1977 Democracy 
1978-1988 Non-democracy 
1989-1999 Democracy 
2000-2008 Non-democracy
Pakistan 1960-1971 Non-democracy
Panama 1960-1968 Democracy 
1969-1989 Non-democracy 
1990-2008 Democracy
Papua New Guinea 1976-2008 Democracy
Paraguay 1960-1989 Non-democracy 
1990-2008 Democracy
Peru 1960-1962 Democracy
1963- 1963 Non-democracy
1964- 1968 Democracy 
1969-1980 Non-democracy 
1981-1990 Democracy 
1991-2001 Non-democracy 
2002-2008 Democracy
Philippines 1960-1965 Democracy 
1966-1986 Non-democracy 
1987-2008 Democracy
Poland 1972-1989 Non-democracy 
1990-2008 Democracy
Portugal 1960-1976 Non-democracy 
1977-2008 Democracy
Qatar 1988-2008 Non-democracy
Romania 1962-1990 Non-democracy 
1991-2008 Democracy
Russian Federation 1992-2008 Non-democracy
Rwanda 1963-2008 Non-democracy
Samoa 1972-2008 Non-democracy
Sao Tome-Principe 1976-1991 Non-democracy 
1992-2008 Democracy
Saudi Arabia 1988-2008 Non-democracy
Senegal 1962-2000 Non-democracy 
2001-2008 Democracy
Sierra Leone 1963-1967 Democracy 
1968-1998 Non-democracy
Singapore
1999-2008 Democracy 
1966-2008 Non-democracy
Slovakia 1994-2008 Democracy
Slovenia 1992-2008 Democracy
Solomon Islands 1979-2008 Democracy
Somalia 1972-2008 Non-democracy
South Africa 1960-2008 Non-democracy
1974- 1977 Mixed democracy 
1978-1988 Military dictatorship
1989- 1999 Parliamentary democracy 
2000-2008 Military dictatorship 
1960-1971 Military dictatorship 
1960-1968 Presidential democracy 
1969-1989 Military dictatorship
1990- 2008 Presidential democracy
1976- 2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1960-1989 Military dictatorship
1990- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-1962 Presidential democracy
1963- 1963 Military dictatorship
1964- 1968 Presidential democracy 
1969-1980 Military dictatorship
1981- 1990 Presidential democracy
1991- 2001 Civil autocracy 
2002-2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-1965 Presidential democracy 
1966-1986 Civil autocracy
1987- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1972-1981 Civil autocracy
1982- 1989 Military dictatorship
1990- 2008 Mixed democracy 
1960-1974 Civil autocracy
1975- 1976 Military dictatorship
1977- 2008 Mixed democracy
1988- 2008 Monarchy
1962- 1990 Civil autocracy
1991- 2008 Mixed democracy
1992- 2008 Civil autocracy
1963- 1973 Civil autocracy 
1974-2008 Military dictatorship 
1972-2008 Monarchy
1976- 1991 Civil autocracy
1992-2008 Mixed democracy 
198 8-2008 Monarchy
1962- 2000 Civil autocracy 
2001-2008 Mixed democracy
1963- 1967 Parliamentary democracy
1968- 1968 Military dictatorship
1969- 1985 Civil autocracy 
1986-1996 Military dictatorship
1997- 1997 Civil autocracy
1998- 1998 Military dictatorship
1999- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1966-2004 Civil autocracy 
2005-2008 Military dictatorship 
1994-1999 Parliamentary democracy
2000- 2008 Mixed democracy 
1992-2003 Mixed democracy 
2004-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1979-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1972-1991 Military dictatorship 
1992-2008 Civil autocracy 
1960-2008 Civil autocracy
________ (icontinued from previous page)
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South Korea 1960-1988 Non-democracy
Spain
1989-2008 Democracy 
1960-1977 Non-democracy
Sri Lanka
1978-2008 Democracy 
1960-1977 Democracy
St. Lucia
1978-1989 Non-democracy 
1990-2008 Democracy 
1980-2008 Democracy
St. Vincent- 
the Grenadines 1980-2008 Democracy
Sudan 1972-1986 Non-democracy
Suriname
1987-1989 Democracy 
1990-2008 Non-democracy 
1976-1980 Democracy
Swaziland
1981-1988 Non-democracy 
1989-1990 Democracy
1991- 1991 Non-democracy
1992- 2008 Democracy 
1972-2008 Non-democracy
Sweden 1960-2008 Democracy
Switzerland 1960-2008 Democracy
Syria 1962-2008 Non-democracy
Tajikistan 1995-2008 Non-democracy
Tanzania 1962-2008 Non-democracy
Thailand 1960-1979 Non-democracy
Togo
1980-1991 Democracy
1992- 1992 Non-democracy
1993- 2006 Democracy 
2007-2008 Non-democracy 
1962-2008 Non-democracy
Tonga 1972-2008 Non-democracy
Trinidad & Tobago 1963-2008 Democracy
Tunisia 1963-2008 Non-democracy
Turkey 1960-1961 Non-democracy
Turkmenistan
1962-1980 Democracy 
1981-1983 Non-democracy 
1984-2008 Democracy 
1995-2008 Non-democracy
Uganda 1963-1980 Non-democracy
Ukraine
1981-1985 Democracy 
1986-2008 Non-democracy
1995-2008 Democracy
United Arab Emirates 1988-2008 Non-democracy
United Kingdom 1960-2008 Democracy
1960-1961 Civil autocracy 
1962-1988 Military dictatorship
1989- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-1975 Military dictatorship 
1976-1977 Civil autocracy 
1978-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1960-1977 Parliamentary democracy 
1978-1989 Civil autocracy
1990- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1980-2008 Parliamentary democracy
1980- 2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1972-1986 Military dictatorship
1987- 1989 Parliamentary democracy
1990- 2008 Military dictatorship
1976- 1980 Parliamentary democracy
1981- 1988 Military dictatorship 
1989-1990 Presidential democracy
1991- 1991 Military dictatorship
1992- 2008 Presidential democracy 
1972-2008 Monarchy 
1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1960-2008 Presidential democracy 
1962-1963 Civil autocracy 
1964-2008 Military dictatorship 
1995-2008 Civil autocracy 
1962-2005 Civil autocracy
2006- 2008 Military dictatorship 
1960-1973 Military dictatorship 
1974-1976 Civil autocracy
1977- 1979 Military dictatorship
1980- 1991 Parliamentary democracy
1992- 1992 Military dictatorship
1993- 2006 Parliamentary democracy
2007- 2008 Military dictatorship
1962- 1967 Civil autocracy 
1968-2005 Military dictatorship 
2006-2008 Civil autocracy 
1972-2008 Monarchy
1963- 2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1963-1987 Civil autocracy
1988- 2008 Military dictatorship
1960- 1960 Civil autocracy
1961- 1961 Military dictatorship
1962- 1980 Parliamentary democracy
1981- 1983 Military dictatorship 
1984-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1995-2008 Civil autocracy
1963- 1971 Civil autocracy 
1972-1979 Military dictatorship
1980- 1980 Civil autocracy
1981- 1985 Presidential democracy
1986- 1986 Military dictatorship
1987- 2008 Civil autocracy 
1995-2008 Mixed democracy
1988- 2008 Monarchy 
1960-2008 Parliamentary democracy
_________(<continued from previous page)
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United States of America 
Uruguay
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Viet Nam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
1960-2008 Democracy 
1960-1973 Democracy 
1974-1985 Non-democracy 
1986-2008 Democracy 
1992-2008 Non-democracy 
1981-2008 Democracy 
1960-2008 Democracy 
1977-2008 Non-democracy
1991-2008 Non-democracy
1965- 2008 Non-democracy
1966- 2008 Non-democracy
1960-2008 Presidential democracy 
1960-1973 Presidential democracy 
1974-1985 Military dictatorship 
1986-2008 Presidential democracy 
1992-2008 Civil autocracy 
1981-2008 Parliamentary democracy 
1960-2008 Presidential democracy 
1977-1997 Civil autocracy 
1998-2001 Military dictatorship 
2002-2008 Civil autocracy 
1991-2008 Military dictatorship
1965- 2008 Civil autocracy
1966- 2008 Civil autocracy_________
__________ (icontinued from previous page)
Note: Ethiopia for the period 1960-1992 includes Eritrea, which gained its independence in 1993. 
Pakistan for the period 1960-1971 includes Bangladesh, which gained its independence in 1972.
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Table S.2 List of Countries and Election-years as Estimated in Table
2.1
Years covered Election-year dummy = 1
Algeria! 1995-2003 1995;1999
Belarus 1999-2006 2001;2006
Burkina Fasot 1974-1976; 1980-2005 1998;2005
Burundi 1968-2001 1993
Congo, Republic of 1997-2005 2002
Croatia! 1992-1998 1992;1993; 1995; 1997
Dominican Republic! 1963-1977 1966;1970; 1974
Ecuador! 1961-1967; 1970-1978 1978
Egypt 1991-1997; 2003-2006 2005
Guatemala! 1960-1965; 1974-1983 1974;1978;1982
Haiti 1968-1987; 2000-2004 1987;2000
Honduras! 1966-1979 1971
Indonesia 1992-1998 1992;1997
Iran 1979-1996; 2004-2006 2005
Kazakhstan 1998-2006 1999;2005
Kenya 1971-2001 1992; 1997
Kyrgyzstan! 1994-2004 1995;2000
Mexico! 1981-1993 1982;1988
Pakistan 1999-2006 2002
Panama 1968-1981; 1984-1985 1968;1984
Paraguay 1978-1988 1978;1983; 1988
Rwanda 1969-2004 2003
Singapore! 1965-1967; 1970-2006 1972;1976;1980;1984;1988; 
1991;1997;2001; 2006
South Korea 1961-1962; 1972-1986 1981
Tanzania! 1969-2005 1995;2000; 2005
Tunisia! 1991-2006 1999;2004
Uganda! 2000-2006 2006
Yemen! 1991-1999 1999
Zimbabwe 1991-1997 1996
Note: This list will slightly change once more stringent criteria for sample selection are imposed (as in 
Table 3.1) or an alternative designation of election-year dummy is used (as in Table 4.1). tdenotes 
countries that belong to shallow autocracies.
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Table S.3 List of Countries and Leaders as Estimated in Table 4.2
Periods N am e o f  the leader
A lban ia Jan 1 9 8 4 -A pr 1985 H oxha
M ay 1 9 8 5 -A p r 1992 A lia
M ay 1 9 92 -Ju l 1997 B erisha
A ug 1 9 9 7 -O c t 1998 F atos N ano
N ov 1 9 9 8 -O c t 1999 M ajko
N ov 1 9 9 9 -F eb  2002 M eta
M ar 2 0 0 2 -Ju l 2002 M ajko
A ug 2 0 0 2 -S e p  2005 F atos N ano
O ct 2 0 0 5 -D e c  2009 Sali B erisha
A lgeria A ug 1 9 6 2 -S ep  1962 B en K hedda
O ct 196 2 -Ju n  1965 B ella
Jul 1 965 -D ec 1978 B oum edienne
Jan 19 7 9 -F eb  1979 B itat
M ar 197 9 -Jan  1992 B en jed id
Feb 1 9 92 -Ju l 1992 B o u d ia f
A ug 1 9 9 2 -Jan  1994 K afi
Feb 19 9 4 -A p r  1999 Z eroual
M ay 19 9 9 -D ec  2009 B outeflika
A ngo la Jan 1 9 85 -D ec  2009 D os Santos
B angladesh M ay 1 9 7 1 -Jan  1972 Syed N azru l Islam
Feb 1 9 7 2 -A ug 1975 S heikh  M ujib  R ahm an
Sep 1 9 7 5 -N o v  1975 M osh taque A hm ed
D ec 197 5 -M ay  1981 Z iau r R ahm an
Jun 1981-M a r  1982 Sattar
A pr 19 8 2 -D ec  1990 E rshad
Jan 1991-M a r  1991 A hm ed
A pr 1991-M a r  1996 K haleda  Z ia
A p r1 9 9 6 -J u n  1996 M oham m ad  H ab ibur R ahm an
Jul 1 9 9 6 -Ju l 2001 H asina  W azed
A ug 2001 -O c t  2001 L atifu r R ahm an
N ov 2 0 0 1 -O c t 2006 K haleda  Z ia
N ov  2 0 0 6 -Jan  2007 Iajudd in  A hm ed
Feb 2 0 0 7 -Jan  2009 F akhrudd in  A hm ed
Feb 2 0 0 9 -D e c  2009 S heikh  H asina W ajed
B elarus Jan 1 9 98 -D ec  2009 L ukashenko
B elgium Jan 2 0 0 0 -M a r  2008 V erhofstad t
A pr 2 0 0 8 -D e c  2008 Y ves L eterm e
Jan 2 0 0 9 -N o v  2009 H erm an  V an R om puy
D ec 2 0 0 9 -D e c  2009 Y ves L eterm e
B enin Jan 19 6 1 -O c t 1963 M aga
N ov  1 9 6 3 -Jan  1964 Soglo
Feb 19 6 4 -N o v  1965 A pithy
D ec 1 9 65 -D ec  1965 C ongacou
Jan  1 966 -D ec 1967 Soglo
Jan 196 8 -A u g  1968 A lley
Sep 1 9 68 -D ec  1969 Z insou
Jan 197 0 -M ay  1970 Pau l-E m ile  de Souza
Jun 1 9 7 0 -A p r 1972 M aga
M ay 1 9 7 2 -O c t 1972 A hom adegbe
N ov  1 9 7 2 -A p r 1991 K erekou
M ay 1991-A p r  1996 Soglo , C
M ay 1 9 9 6 -A p r 2006 K erekou
M ay 2 0 0 6 -D e c  2009 Y ayi Boni
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Bosnia and Herzegovina Jan 1994-Oct 1998
Nov 1998-Jun 1999 
Jul 1999-Feb 2000 
Mar 2000-Oct 2000 
Nov 2000-Jun 2001 
Jul 2001-Feb 2002 
Mar 2002-Oct 2002 
Nov 2002-Apr 2003 
May 2003-Jun 2003 
Jul 2003-Feb 2004 
Mar 2004-Oct 2004 
Nov 2004-Dec 2009 
Oct 1966—Jul 1980 
Aug 1980-Mar 1998 
Apr 1998-Apr 2008 
May 2008-Dec 2009 
Jan 1961-Jan 1966 
Feb 1966-Jan 1971 
Feb 1971-Feb 1974 
Mar 1974-Nov 1980 
Dec 1980-Nov 1982 
Dec 1982-Aug 1983 
Sep 1983-Oct 1987 
Nov 1987-Dec 2009 
Aug 1962—Jul 1966 
Aug 1966-Nov 1966 
Dec 1966-Nov 1976 
Dec 1976-Sep 1987 
Oct 1987—Jul 1993 
Aug 1993-Oct 1993 
Nov 1993-Feb 1994 
Mar 1994-Apr 1994 
May 1994-Jul 1996 
Aug 1996-Apr 2003 
May 2003-Aug 2005 
Sep 2005-Dec 2009 
Jan 1961-Nov 1982 
Dec 1982-Dec 2009 
Jan 1980-Apr 1991 
May 1991-Jul 2000 
Aug 2000-Feb 2001 
Mar 2001-Dec 2009 
Central African Republic Jan 1961-Jan 1966
Feb 1966-Sep 1979 
Oct 1979-Sep 1981 
Oct 1981-Oct 1993 
Nov 1993-Mar 2003 
Apr 2003-Dec 2009 
Chile Jan 1961-Nov 1964
Dec 1964-No v 1970 
Dec 1970-Sep 1973 
Oct 1973-Mar 1990 
Apr 1990-Mar 1994 
Apr 1994-Mar 2000 
Apr 2000-Mar 2006 
Apr 2006-Dec 2009
Table S.3 List of countries and leaders ...________
Izetbegovic
Radisic
Jelavic
Izetbegovic
Radisic
Krizanovic
Belkic
Sarovic
Borislav Paravac
Dragan Covic
Sulejman Tihic
Borislav Paravac
Khama
Masire
Mogae
Ian Khama
Yameogo
Lamizana
Gerard Kango Ouedraogo
Lamizana
Zerbo
J. P. Ouedraogo
Sankara
Campaore
Mwambutsa
Ntare
Micombero
Bagaza
Buyoya
Ndadaye
Kinigi
Ntarymira
Ntibantunganya
Buyoya
Ndayizeye
Pierre Nkurunziza
Ahidjo
Biya
Pires
Veiga
do Rosario
Neves
Dacko
Bokassa
Dacko
Kolingba
Patasse
Francois Bozize
Alessandri Rodriguez
Frei Montalva
Allende
Pinochet
Aylwin
Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
Ricardo Lagos Escobar 
Michelle Bachelet
___________ (continued from previous page)
Botswana 
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon 
Cape Verde
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Colombia
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Cyprus
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
(<continued from previous page)
Jan 1961-Aug 1962 Lleras Camargo
Sep 1962-Aug 1966 Guillermo-Leon
Sep 1966-Aug 1970 Lleras Restropo
Sep 1970-Aug 1974 Pastrana Borrero
Sep 1974-Aug 1978 Lopez Michelsen
Sep 1978-Aug 1982 Turbay
Sep 1982-Aug 1986 Betancur
Sep 1986-Aug 1990 Vargas
Sep 1990-Aug 1994 Trujillo
Sep 1994-Aug 1998 Pizano
Sep 1998-Aug 2002 Arango
Sep 2002-Dec 2009 Alvaro Uribe Velez
Jan 1961-May 1962 Echandi Jimenez
Jun 1962-May 1966 Orlich
Jun 1966-May 1970 Trejos
Jun 1970-May 1974 Figueres Ferrer
Jun 1974-May 1978 Quiros, Daniel
Jun 1978-May 1982 Carazo Odio
Jun 1982-May 1986 Monge Alverez
Jun 1986-May 1990 Arias
Jun 1990-May 1994 Calderon Fournier
Jun 1994-May 1998 Figueres Olsen
Jun 1998-May 2002 Rodriguez Echeverria
Jun 2002-May 2006 de la Espriella
Jun 2006-Dec 2009 Oscar Arias Sanchez
Jan 1961-Dec 1993 Houphouet-Boigny
Jan 1994-Dec 1999 Konan Bedie
Jan 2000-Oct 2000 Guei
Nov 2000-Dec 2009 Laurent Gbagbo
Jan 1988-Feb 1988 Kyprianou
Mar 1988-Feb 1993 Vassiliou
Mar 1993-Feb 2003 Clerides
Mar 2003-Feb 2008 Tassos Nikolaou Papadopoulos
Mar 2008-Dec 2009 Dimitris Christofias
Jan 1961-May 1961 Rafel Trujillo
Jun 1961-Jan 1962 Balaguer
Feb 1962-Feb 1963 Filiberto Bonnelly
Mar 1963-Sep 1963 Bosch
Oct 1963-Dec 1963 de los Santos
Jan 1964-Apr 1965 Cabral
May 1965-May 1965 Bartolome Benoit
Jun 1965-Sep 1965 Berreras
Oct 1965-Jul 1966 Godoy
Aug 1966-Jul 1978 Balaguer
Aug 1978-Jul 1982 Guzman Fernandez
Aug 1982-Aug 1982 Majluta Azar
Sep 1982-Aug 1986 Blanco
Sep 1986-Aug 1996 Balaguer
Sep 1996-Aug2000 Fernandez Reyna
Sep 2000-Aug 2004 Hipolito Mejia
Sep 2004-Dec 2009 Fernandez Reyna
Jan 1961-Jan 1961 Castillo
Feb 1961-Jan 1962 Portillo
Feb 1962-Jul 1962 Rodolfo Cordon
Aug 1962-Jul 1967 Rivera
Aug 1967-Jul 1972 Sanchez Hernandez
Aug 1972-Jul 1977 Molina
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El Salvador Aug 1977-Oct 1979 
Nov 1979-Dec 1980 
Jan 1981-May 1982 
Jun 1982-Jun 1984 
Jul 1984-Jun 1989 
Jul 1989-Jun 1994 
Jul 1994-Jun 1999 
Jul 1999-Jun 2004 
Jul 2004-Jun 2009 
Jul 2009-Dec 2009
Estonia Jan 1995-Apr 1995 
May 1995-Mar 1997 
Apr 1997-Mar 1999 
Apr 1999-Jan 2002 
Feb 2002-Apr 2003 
May 2003-Apr 2005 
May 2005-Dec 2009
Ethiopia Jan 1981-May 1991 
Jun 1991-Dec 2009
Fiji Nov 1970-Apr 1987 
May 1987-May 1987 
Jun 1987-Dec 1987 
Jan 1988-Jun 1992 
Jul 1992-May 1999 
Jun 1999-May 2000 
Jun 2000-Jul 2000 
Aug 2000-Dec 2006 
Jan 2007-Jan 2007 
Feb 2007-Dec 2009
Gambia, The Jan 1966-Jul 1994 
Aug 1994-Dec 2009
Georgia Jan 1992-Jan 1992 
Feb 1992-Mar 1992 
Apr 1992-Nov 2003 
Dec 2003-Jan 2004 
Feb 2004-Nov 2007 
Dec 2007-Jan 2008 
Feb 2008-Dec 2009
Ghana Jan 1961-Feb 1966 
Mar 1966-Apr 1969 
May 1969-Sep 1969 
Oct 1969-Jan 1972 
Feb 1972—Jul 1978 
Aug 1978-Jun 1979 
Jul 1979-Sep 1979 
Oct 1979-Dec 1981 
Jan 1982-Jan 2001 
Feb 2001-Jan 2009 
Feb 2009-Dec 2009
Guatemala Jan 1961-Mar 1963 
Apr 1963—Jul 1966 
Aug 1966—Jul 1970 
Aug 1970—Jul 1974 
Aug 1974—Jul 1978
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Romero Mena 
Majano Ramos 
Duarte
Magana Borjo 
Duarte 
Cristiani 
Calderon Sol 
Flores
Saca Gonzalez
Mauricio Funes
Tarand
Vahi
Siimann
Laar
Kallas
Parts
Andrus Ansip
Mengistu Marriam
Meles Zenawi
Mara
Bavadra
R.abuka
Mara
Rabuka
Chaudhry
Bainimarama
Laisenia Qarase
Jona Senilagakali
Voreqe Bainimarama
Jawara
Jammeh
Gamsakhurdia
Ioseliani
Shevardnadze
Burdjanadze
Saakashvili
Nino Burjanadze
Mikheil Saakashvili
Nkrumah
Ankrah
Afrifa
Busia
Acheampong
Akuffo
Rawlings
Limann
Rawlings
John Agyekum Kufuor 
John Atta Mills 
Ydigoras Fuente 
Peralta Azurdia 
Mendez Montenegro 
Arana Osorio
Laugerud Garcia___________________
________ (continued from previous page)
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Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Honduras
Indonesia
Iran
(continued from previous page)
Aug 1978-Mar 1982 Lucas Garcia
Apr 1982-Aug 1983 Rios Montt
Sep 1983-Jan 1986 Mejia Victores
Feb 1986-Jan 1991 Cerezo
Feb 1991-May 1993 Serrano Elias
Jun 1993-Jun 1993 Espina Salguero
Jul 1993-Jan 1996 Leon Carpio
Feb 1996-Jan 2000 Arzu Yrigoyen
Feb 2000-Jan 2004 Alfonso Portillo Cabrera
Feb 2004-Jan 2008 Berger Perdomo
Feb 2008-Dec 2009 Alvaro Colom Caballeros
Jan 1986-Dec 2008 Conte
Jan 2009-Dec 2009 Moussa Dadis Camara
Oct 1974-Nov 1980 Cabral
Dec 1980-May 1999 Vieira
Jun 1999-Feb 2000 Sanha
Mar 2000-Sep 2003 Kumba Iala
Oct 2003-Oct 2005 Henrique Pereira Rosa
Nov 2005-Mar 2009 Vieira
Apr 2009-Sep 2009 Raimundo Pereira
Oct 2009-Dec 2009 Sanha
Jan 1991-Feb 1991 Pascal-Troillet
Mar 1991-Sep 1991 Aristide
Oct 1991-Feb 1994 Cedras
Mar 1994-Feb 1996 Aristide
Mar 1996-Feb 2001 Preval
Mar 2001-Feb 2004 Aristide
Mar 2004-May 2006 Boniface Alexandre
Jun 2006-Dec 2009 Rene Preval
Jan 1961-Oct 1963 Villeda Morales
Nov 1963-Jun 1971 Lopez Arellano
Jul 1971-Dec 1972 Cruz
Jan 1973-Apr 1975 Lopez Arellano
May 1975-Aug 1978 Castro
Sep 1978-Jan 1982 Paz Garcia
Feb 1982-Jan 1986 Suazo Cordova
Feb 1986-Jan 1990 Azcona Hoyo
Feb 1990-Jan 1994 Callejas
Feb 1994-Jan 1998 Reina
Feb 1998-Jan 2002 Flores Facusse
Feb 2002-Jan 2006 Ricardo Maduro
Feb 2006-Jun 2009 Manuel Zelaya
Jul 2009-Dec 2009 Roberto Micheletti
Jan 1967-May 1998 Suharto
Jun 1998-Oct 1999 Habibie
Nov 1999-Jul 2001 Wahid
Aug 2001-Oct 2004 Megawati Sukarnoputri
Nov 2004-Dec 2009 Bambang Yudhoyono
Jan 1965-Feb 1979 Mohammad Reza
Mar 1979-Jun 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini
Jul 1989-Aug 1989 Khamenei
Sep 1989-Aug 1997 Rafsanjani
Sep 1997-Aug 2005 Khatami
Sep 2005-Dec 2009 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
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Ire land Jan 1961-N o v  1966 L eM ass
D ec 1 9 6 6 -M ar 1973 Lynch
A pr 1973 -Ju l 1977 C osgrave, L.
A ug  1 9 7 7 -D ec  1979 L ynch
Jan 1 9 8 0 -Jun  1981 H aughey
Jul 1 9 8 1 -M ar 1982 F itzgerald
A pr 1 9 8 2 -D ec  1982 H aughey
Jan 1 9 8 3 -M ar 1987 F itzgerald
A pr 19 8 7 -F eb  1992 H aughey
M ar 1 9 92 -D ec  1994 R eynolds
Jan 1 995 -Jun  1997 B ruton
Jul 199 7 -M ay  2008 A hern
Jun 2 0 0 8 -D e c  2009 C ow en
Israel Jan  196 1 -Ju n  1963 B en G urion
Jul 1 9 63 -F eb  1969 Eshkol
M ar 1 9 6 9 -M ar 1969 A llon
A p r1 9 6 9 -J u n  1974 M eir
Jul 1 9 7 4 -A pr 1977 R abin
M ay 1 9 7 7 -Ju n  1977 Peres
Jul 1 9 7 7 -O c t 1983 B egin
N ov  1 9 8 3 -S ep  1984 S ham ir
O ct 1 9 8 4 -O c t 1986 Peres
N ov  1986—Jul 1992 Sham ir
A ug 19 9 2 -N o v  1995 R abin
D ec 199 5 -Ju n  1996 Peres
Jul 1996—Jul 1999 N etanyahu
A ug 19 9 9 -M a r  2001 B arak
A pr 2001- J a n  2006 A riel Sharon
Feb 2 0 0 6 -M a r  2009 E hud O lm ert
A pr 2 0 0 9 -D e c  2009 N etanyahu
Jam aica Sep 19 6 2 -F eb  1967 B ustam ante
M ar 196 7 -A p r 1967 Sangster
M ay 1 9 6 7 -M ar 1972 Shearer
A pr 19 7 2 -N o v  1980 M anley
D ec 19 8 0 -F eb  1989 Seaga
M ar 1 9 8 9 -M ar 1992 M anley
A pr 1 9 9 2 -M ar 2006 P atterson
A pr 2 0 0 6 -S e p  2007 P ortia  S im pson  M iller
O ct 2 0 0 7 -D e c  2009 B ruce G old ing
Japan Jan 1961-N o v  1964 Ikeda
D ec 1 9 64 -Ju l 1972 Sato
A ug  19 7 2 -D ec  1974 T anaka
Jan  1 9 75 -D ec  1976 M iki
Jan 1 9 77 -D ec  1978 Fukuda
Jan  1 9 7 9 -Jun  1980 O hira
Jul 1980—Jul 1980 Ito
A ug  1 9 8 0 -N o v  1982 Suzuki
D ec 1 9 82 -N ov  1987 N akasone
D ec 198 7 -Ju n  1989 T akesh ita
Jul 19 8 9 -A u g  1989 U no
Sep 198 9 -N o v  1991 K aifu
D ec 1991-A u g  1993 M iyazaw a
Sep 19 9 3 -A p r 1994 H osokaw a
M ay 199 4 -Ju n  1994 H ata
Jul 199 4 -Jan  1996 M urayam a
Feb 1996 -Ju l 1998 H ashim oto
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Japan A ug 1 9 9 8 -A p r 2000 O buchi
M ay 2 0 0 0 -A p r  2001 Y oshiro  M ori
M ay 2001 -S e p  2006 Junich iro  K oizum i
O ct 2 0 0 6 -S e p  2007 Shinzo A be
O ct 2 0 0 7 -S e p  2008 Y asuo Fukuda
O ct 2 0 0 8 -S e p  2009 T aro A so
O ct 2 0 0 9 -D e c  2009 Y ukio  H atoyam a
Jordan Jan 198 3 -F eb  1999 H ussein  Ibn T alal E l-H ash im
M ar 1 9 99 -D ec  2009 A bdullah  Ibn H ussein  E l-H ashim i
K enya Jan  1 9 6 4 -A ug 1978 K enyatta
Sep 1 9 78 -D ec  2002 M oi
Jan 2 0 0 3 -D e c  2009 M w ai K ibaki
K orea, R epublic o f Jan  1961-M a y  1961 M yun C hang
Jun 1961 -Ju l 1961 C hang  D o Y ong
A ug 1961-O c t  1979 H ee Park
N ov 197 9 -A u g  1980 C hoi K uy H ay
Sep 19 8 0 -F eb  1988 C hun D oo H w an
M ar 19 8 8 -F eb  1993 R oh T ae W oo
M ar 19 9 3 -F eb  1998 K im  Y oung  Sam
M ar 1 9 98 -F eb  2003 K im  D ae Jung
M ar 2 0 0 3 -F e b  2008 R oh M oo H yun
M ar 2 0 0 8 -D e c  2009 Lee M yung  B ak
K uw ait Jan  1 988 -D ec 2009 Jab ir A s-Sabah
K yrgyzstan Jan 1 9 9 9 -M ar 2005 A kayev
A pr 2 0 0 5 -D e c  2009 K urm anbek  B akiyev
L ebanon Jan 1 9 9 7 -N o v  1998 E lias H raw i
D ec 199 8 -N o v  2007 E m ile L ahoud
D ec 2 0 0 7 -M ay  2008 Fouad S in iora
Jun 2 0 0 8 -D e c  2009 M ichel Su leim an
L ibya Jan 1 990 -D ec 2009 Q addafi
M alaysia Jan 1961-S e p  1970 R ahm an
O ct 197 0 -Jan  1976 R azak
Feb 1976-Ju l 1981 H ussein  B in O nn
A ug 1981- O c t  2003 M ahatir B in M oham m ad
N ov 2 0 0 3 -A p r  2009 A hm ad B adaw i
M ay 2 0 0 9 -D e c  2009 N ajib  T un R azak
M ali Jan  1967 -N o  v 1968 K eita
D ec 1 9 6 8 -M ar 1991 T raore
A pr 1991- J u n  1992 A m adou T oure
Jul 199 2 -Ju n  2002 K onare
Jul 2 0 0 2 -D e c  2009 A m adou T oure
M auritius Jan 1 976 -Jun  1982 R am goolam
Jul 1 9 82 -D ec  1995 A nerood  Jugnauth
Jan 19 9 6 -S ep  2000 R am goolam  N.
O ct 2 0 0 0 -S e p  2003 A nerood  Jugnauth
O ct 2 0 0 3 -Ju l 2005 Paul B erenger
A ug 2 0 0 5 -D e c  2009 N av in  R am goolam
M exico Jan 1 9 61 -D ec  1964 L opez M ateos
Jan 19 6 5 -D ec  1970 D iaz O rdaz
Jan 19 7 1 -D ec  1976 E cheverria  A lvarez
Jan  1 9 77 -D ec  1982 L opez P ortillo
Jan 1 9 8 3 -D ec  1988 de La M adrid
Jan  1 9 8 9 -D ec  1994 Salinas
Jan  1 9 95 -D ec  2000 Z edillo
Jan 2 0 0 1 -D e c  2006 V icente F ox  Q uesada
Jan  2 0 0 7 -D e c  2009 Felipe C alderon
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Morocco Jan 1961-Feb 1961 
Mar 1961-Jul 1999 
Aug 1999-Dec 2009
Mozambique Jan 1980-Nov 1986 
Dec 1986-Feb 2005 
Mar 2005-Dec 2009
Namibia Apr 1990-Mar 2005 
Apr 2005-Dec 2009
Netherlands Jan 1961-Jul 1963 
Aug 1963-Apr 1965 
May 1965-Nov 1966 
Dec 1966-Apr 1967 
May 1967-Jul 1971 
Aug 1971-May 1973 
Jun 1973-Dec 1977 
Jan 1978-Nov 1982 
Dec 1982-Aug 1994 
Sep 1994-Jul 2002 
Aug 2002-Dec 2009
Nicaragua Jan 1961-May 1963 
Jun 1963-Aug 1966 
Sep 1966-May 1967 
Jun 1967-Jul 1979 
Aug 1979-Apr 1990 
May 1990-Jan 1997 
Feb 1997-Jan 2002 
Feb 2002-Jan 2007 
Feb 2007-Dec 2009
Niger Jan 1961-Apr 1974 
May 1974-Nov 1987 
Dec 1987-Apr 1993 
May 1993-Jan 1996 
Feb 1996-Apr 1999 
May 1999-Dec 1999 
Jan 2000-Dec 2009
Nigeria Jan 1961-Jan 1966 
Feb 1966-Jul 1966 
Aug 1966-Jul 1975 
Aug 1975-Feb 1976 
Mar 1976-Oct 1979 
Nov 1979-Dec 1983 
Jan 1984-Aug 1985 
Sep 1985-Aug 1993 
Sep 1993-Nov 1993 
Dec 1993-Jun 1998 
Jul 1998-May 1999 
Jun 1999-May 2007 
Jun 2007-Dec 2009
Norway Jan 1961-Aug 1963 
Sep 1963-Sep 1963 
Oct 1963-Oct 1965 
Nov 1965-Mar 1971 
Apr 1971-Oct 1972 
Nov 1972-Oct 1973 
Nov 1973-Jan 1976 
Feb 1976-Feb 1981
Mohammed V
Hassan II
Muhammad VI
Machel
Chissano
Guebuza
Nujoma
Hifikepunye Pohamba
de Quay
Marijnen
Cals
Zijlstra
De Jong
Biesheuvel
den Uyl
van Agt
Lubbers
Kok
Jan Peter Balkenende 
Luis Somoza Debayle 
Shick Gutierrez 
Guerrero Gutierrez 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle 
Daniel Ortega 
Violeta Chamorro 
Aleman
Enrique Bolanos
Daniel Ortega
Diori
Kountche
Seibou
Ousmane
Mainassara
Wanke
Mamadou
Balewa
Ironsi
Gowon
Ramat Mohammed
Obasanjo
Shagari
Buhari
Babangida
Shonekan
Abacha
Abubakar
Obasanjo
Umaru Musa Yar'Adua
Gerhardsen
Lyng
Gerhardsen
Borten
Bratteli
Korvald
Bratteli
Nordli
________ {continued from previous page)
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Norway
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Rwanda
Senegal
Slovenia
Sri Lanka
(icontinued from previous page)
Mar 1981-Oct 1981 Brundtland
Nov 1981-May 1986 Willoch
Jun 1986-Oct 1989 Brundtland
Nov 1989-Nov 1990 Syse
Dec 1990-Dec 2009 Brundtland
Jan 1961-Oct 1964 Chiari, Roberto
Nov 1964-Oct 1968 Robles
Nov 1968-Jul 1981 Torrijos Herrera
Aug 1981-Mar 1982 Florez Aguilar
Apr 1982-Aug 1983 Dario Paredes
Sep 1983-Dec 1989 Noriega
Jan 1990-Sep 1994 Endara
Oct 1994-Sep 1999 Balladares
Oct 1999-Sep 2004 Mireya Moscoso
Oct 2004-Jul 2009 Martin Torrijos
Aug 2009-Dec 2009 Ricardo Martinelli
Jan 1980-Jul 1980 Morales Bermudez
Aug 1980-Jul 1985 Belaunde
Aug 1985-Jul 1990 Garcia Perez
Aug 1990-Nov 2000 Fujimori
Dec 2000-Jul 2001 Valentin Paniagua
Aug 2001-Jul 2006 Alejandro Toledo
Aug 2006-Dec 2009 Alan Garcia
Jan 1961-Nov 1961 Garcia
Dec 1961-Dec 1965 Macapagal
Jan 1966-Feb 1986 Marcos
Mar 1986-Jun 1992 Aquino
Jul 1992-Jun 1998 Ramos
Jul 1998-Jan 2001 Estrada
Feb 2001-Dec 2009 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Jan 1961-Sep 1968 Salazar
Oct 1968-Apr 1974 Caetano
May 1974-Sep 1974 Spinola
Oct 1974—Jul 1976 Costa Gomes
Aug 1976-Mar 1986 Eanes
Apr 1986-Mar 1996 Soares
Apr 1996-Mar 2006 Sampaio
Apr 2006-Dec 2009 Anibal Cavaco Silva
Nov 1961-Jul 1973 Kayibanda
Aug 1973-Apr 1994 Habyarimana
May 1994—Jul 1994 Sindikubwabo
Aug 1994-Dec 2009 Paul Kagame
Jan 1961-Jan 1981 Senghor
Feb 1981-Apr 2000 Diouf
May 2000-Dec 2009 Abdoulaye Wade
Jan 1992-May 1992 Peterle
Jun 1992-May 2000 Drnovsek
Jun 2000-Nov 2000 Bajuk
Dec 2000-Dec 2002 Drnovsek
Jan 2003-Nov 2004 Anton Rop
Dec 2004-Nov 2008 Janez Jansa
Dec 2008-Dec 2009 Borut Pahor
Jan 1961-Mar 1965 Bandaranaike, S
Apr 1965-May 1970 Senanayake, Dudley
Jun 1970-Jan 1977 Bandaranaike, S
Feb 1977-Jan 1989 Jayewardene
Feb 1989-May 1993 Premadasa
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Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Switzerland
Jun 1993-Nov 1994 Wijetunge
Dec 1994-Nov 2005 Kumaratunga
Dec 2005-Dec 2009 Mahinda Rajapakse
Jan 1961-Nov 1964 Abboud
Dec 1964-Jun 1965 al-Khalifa
Jul 1965-Jul 1966 Maghoub
Aug 1966-May 1967 Mahdi
Jun 1967-May 1969 Maghoub
Jun 1969-Jul 1971 Nimeiri
Aug 1971-Apr 1985 Nimeiri
May 1985-May 1986 Abdul Rahman Swaredahab
Jun 1986-Jun 1989 Al-Mirghani
Jul 1989-Dec 2009 Al-Bashir
Oct 1968-Aug 1982 Subhuza II
Sep 1982-Aug 1983 Dzeliwe Shongwe
Sep 1983-Apr 1986 Ntombe Thwala
May 1986-Dec 2009 Mswati
Jan 1961-Dec 1961 Friedrich
Jan 1962-Dec 1962 Chaudet
Jan 1963-Dec 1963 Spuhler
Jan 1964-Dec 1964 von Moos
Jan 1965-Dec 1965 Tschudi
Jan 1966-Dec 1966 Schaffner
Jan 1967-Dec 1967 Bonvin
Jan 1968-Dec 1968 Spuhler
Jan 1969-Dec 1979 von Moos
Jan 1980-Dec 1980 Chevallaz
Jan 1981-Dec 1981 Furgler
Jan 1982-Dec 1982 Honegger
Jan 1983-Dec 1983 Aubert
Jan 1984-Dec 1984 Schlumpf
Jan 1985-Dec 1985 Furgler
Jan 1986-Dec 1986 Egli
Jan 1987-Dec 1987 Aubert
Jan 1988-Dec 1988 Stich
Jan 1989-Dec 1989 Delamuraz
Jan 1990-Dec 1990 Koller
Jan 1991-Dec 1991 Cotti
Jan 1992-Dec 1992 Felber
Jan 1993-Dec 1993 Ogi
Jan 1994-Dec 1994 Stich
Jan 1995-Dec 1995 Villiger
Jan 1996-Dec 1996 Delamuraz
Jan 1997-Dec 1997 Koller
Jan 1998-Dec 1998 Cotti
Jan 1999-Dec 1999 Dreifuss
Jan 2000-Dec 2000 Ogi
Jan 2001-Dec 2001 Leuenberger
Jan 2002-Dec 2002 Villiger
Jan 2003-Dec 2003 Pascal Couchepin
Jan 2004-Dec 2004 Joseph Deiss
Jan 2005-Dec 2005 Samuel Schmid
Jan 2006-Dec 2006 Moritz Leuenberger
Jan 2007-Dec 2007 Micheline Calmy-Rey
Jan 2008-Dec 2008 Pascal Couchepin
Jan 2009-Dec 2009 Hans-Rudolf Merz
128
Table S.3 List of countries and leaders ..._________________________ (continued from previous page)
Syria Jan 1966-Feb 1966 Al-Hafiz
Mar 1966-Jun 2000 El-Atassi, N.
Jul 2000-Dec 2009 Bashar al-Assad
Tanzania Jan 1988-Nov 1995 Mwinyi
Dec 1995-Dec 2005 Mkapa
Jan 2006-Dec 2009 Kikwete
Togo Jan 1961-Jan 1963 Olympio
Feb 1963-Jan 1967 Grunitzky
Feb 1967-Apr 1967 Dadjo
May 1967-Feb 2005 Eyadema
Mar 2005-May 2005 Abass Bonfoh
Jun 2005-Dec 2009 Faure Gnassingbe
Trinidad &Tobago Sep 1962-Mar 1981 Williams
Apr 1981-Dec 1986 Chambers
Jan 1987-Dec 1991 Robinson
Jan 1992-Nov 1995 Manning
Dec 1995-Dec 2001 Panday
Jan 2002-Dec 2009 Manning
United Arab Emirates Jan 1975-Dec 2009 An-Nahayan
United Kingdom Jan 1961-Oct 1963 MacMillan
Nov 1963-Oct 1964 Douglas-Home
Nov 1964-Jun 1970 Wilson
Jul 1970-Mar 1974 Heath
Apr 1974-Apr 1976 Wilson
May 1976-May 1979 Callaghan
Jun 1979-Nov 1990 Thatcher
Dec 1990-May 1997 Major
Jun 1997-Jun 2007 Blair
Jul 2007-Dec 2009 Gordon Brown
Uzbekistan Jan 1992-Dec 2009 Karimov
Yemen Jan 1990-Dec 2009 Saleh al-Hashidi
Zambia Nov 1964-Nov 1991 Kaunda
Dec 1991-Jan 2002 Chiluba
Feb 2002-Jun 2008 Levy Mwanawasa
Jul 2008-Dec 2009 Rupiah Banda
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